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THE CAPITAL GAINS "SIEVE" AND THE
"FARCE" OF PROGRESSIVITY 1921-1986
John W Lee, Ill
I. INTRODUCTION

From the Revenue Act of 1921, which introduced an individual capital
gains preference, to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which repealed making
the maximum individual permanent ordinary income rate and capital gains
rate both 28 percent, the capital gains preference reduced, on average, the
effective income tax rate of high income individuals substantially below
the top nominal progressive income tax rates. This made progressivity "a
farce, ... grotesquely unfair, ... a wicked fraud upon the small income
taxpayer." 1 Economist Henry Simons described this combination of high

* John William Lee, III, Professor of Law, College of William & Mary. B.A. 1965,
University of North Carolina; LL.B. 1968, University of Virginia; LL.M. (Taxation) 1970,
Georgetown University. I am grateful for the generous financial support of the College of
William & Mary School of Law. I also wish to thank Ed Cohen, who taught me corporate
tax, and recounted to me over the past three decades after tax conferences at the University
of Virginia (often at his home) so much of the tax history which he experienced, and played
a role in over the past seven decades.
I. Cf 65 CONG. REC. H2085 (1924) (statement of Rep. Mills) ("[The progressive rate]
becomes a farce, it becomes grotesquely unfair, it becomes a wicked fraud upon the smallincome taxpayer if the law at the same time provides that the men with larger incomes may .
. . entirely avoid the taxes."). Mills was referring to tax exempt interest not the capital gains
preference, for which he was a leading proponent. !d. at 2848. "In Andrew Mellon's view
[which Mills shared], when faced with excessive taxation, investors will shift capital from
productive enterprises into tax-exempt securities or other alternatives that can avoid the
realization of taxable income." G. Marc Worthy, Book Note, An Examination of Tax Law
and Supply-side Economics: Creed of Greed or Opportunity for All?, 72 N. DAK. L. REV.
691, 699 (1996). Representative William A. Oldfield, D-Ark., proposing repeal of the
capital gains preference [defeated 137 to 58 by a half empty Chamber], identified
Representative Mills and Ways & Means Chair William R. Green, R-lowa, as his chief
opponents. 65 CONG. REC. H2846 (1924).
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nominal individual ordinary income tax rates with a substantial individual
capital gains preference as "a grand scheme of deception, whereby
enormous surtaxes are voted in exchange for promises that they will not be
made effective. . . . Politicians may point with pride to the rates, while
quietly reminding their wealthy constituents of the loopholes .... Congress
... [should] quit this ludicrous business of dipping deeply in large incomes
with a sieve."2 Based on the legislative history of capital gains for the next
80 years, maintenance of high ordinary income rates while granting
preferential capital gains rates appears less duplicitous except, perhaps, in
the case of Secretary of Treasury Andrew Mellon3 and between opposing

2. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 68 (1938). See also Marc Lindner, Eisenhower-Era MarxistConfiscatory Taxation: Requiem for the Rhetoric of Rate Reduction for the Rich, 70 TuL. L.
REV. 905,925-26 (1976); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don't Need Another
Hero, 60 So. CAL. L. REV. 397, 418 (1987) ("While rhetoric and attention focused on
nominal tax rates, real or effective rates could be lowered more quietly by creating
preferential capital gains rates .... "). In closed hearings, a letter was read pointing out the
broad language of the predecessor to Section I 031, like-kind exchange, "would seem to
make possible the exchange of any security held for investment for any other security ....
We would seem to be approaching what may be desirable- a practical elimination of any
graduated tax." Confidential Hearings on H.R. 8245 before the Senate Finance Committee,
67th Cong. 41 (1921) [hereinafter 1921 Confidential Senate Hearings] (letter to Sen. Reed
Smoot, R-Utah, from Robert R. Reed, Esq.). See Greene v. Comm'r, 15 B.T.A. 401 (1929),
aff'd, 42 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1930) (finding that stocks of all classes are of like-kind, such as
common and preferred).
3. H.R. Rep. No. 68-179, at 77-82 (1924) (presenting the minority views of II
Democratic House Ways and Means Committee members asserting that "the proposed
Mellon bill is drawn for the purpose of giving principle [sic] relief to the large taxpayer and
our plan is based upon giving relief to all income taxpayers, but the larger percentage of
relief to the small taxpayer"); GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY
I 075 (1988) ("Mellon insisted that [tax reductions] should go mainly to the rich."). But see
Worthy, supra note I, at 695-713 (defends Sec'y Mellon's tax philosophy as not shifting the
tax burden from the wealthy to the poor). For a more thorough analysis, see Marc Linder,
Eisenhower-era Marxist-confiscatory Taxation: Requiem for the Rhetoric of Rate Reduction
for the Rich, 70 TuL. L. REV. 905, 987-95 (1996). Secretary of the Treasury Andrew
Mellon's actions in providing preferences for capital gains and like-kind exchanges in 1921
and 1923 as well as lowering the top ordinary rates, see infra note 37, suggest that he
actually did not favor progressivity. Indeed, Secretary Mellon stated that capital gains
should not be subject to income taxation. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money:
American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 151 (1994).
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Treasury Dr. T.S. Adams said that the previous
Secretary of the Treasury favored progressivity albeit at a lower level. Hearings on
Revenue Revision before the House Ways and Means Committee, 66th Cong. 10-11 (1920)
[hereinafter 1920 House Hearings] (Sec'y Huston under President Woodrow Wilson "said
[what] he would prefer is a simple reduction of the surtax rates to the point which would not
force investments in tax-exempt securities .... As you know, our surtaxes go to 65 per cent.
There is in addition 8 per cent normal tax, making a total maximum of 73 per cent. It is an
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factions in Congress: one favoring progressivity, the other favoring lighter
burdens on capital. This schism between an income tax and a consumption
tax has existed for over 100 years. 4
Any substantial individual capital gains preference substantially lowers
the effective rate only at the highest income levels. This is because 80
percent of those who enjoy such preference earn the top 2 to 3 percent of
income anually. Year-after-year those same individuals enjoy between 60
and 70 percent of the tax benefits of any substantial individual capital gains
preference on economic income. 5 They thereby achieved effective income
tax rates substantially below the top individual income tax brackets. 6 This
distributive effect results from the concentration of capital wealth among
three quarters of high-income taxpayers/ as well as the higher ordinary
income tax rates otherwise applicable there. In short, an individual capital
gains preference produces vertical inequities for lower income taxpayers
and horizontal inequities for high-income taxpayers not realizing capital
gains. 8
extreme rate which I think may be fairly be said to be impossible, impracticable in times of
peace.").
4. Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power. the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of
"Incomes," 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1062, 1100-04, 1123-28, 1130-33, 1153-54 (2001); see
also John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax
Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 2095 (2000); SUSAN B. HANSEN, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION 72 (1983)
(Democrats historically favor more progressive forms of taxation; Republicans have
historically opted for lower taxes on business and flat rate or regressive taxes.). But see
Steven A. Bank, Origins of a Flat Tax, 73 DENY. U.L. REV. 329, 333 (1996) ("[A] struggle
of more than fifty years to replace a regressive tax system with a proportional, not
progressive, one ... to balance out the regressive effects of other aspects of the federal
revenue system and to require the wealthy to contribute their proportionate share."). In a
cash flow consumption tax, all cash flows are included in the tax base, and any amount not
spent on consumption is deductible; thus the cost of investments would be deductible. J.M.
DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE & POLICY 70 (2004).
5. See infra notes 86, 112, 137 and 228, and accompanying text.
6. Deborah A. Geier, Incremental Versus Fundamental Tax Reform and the Top One
Percent, 56 SMU L. REV. 99, 117 (2003).
7. See infra notes 142 and 203-06 and accompanying text.
8. See Tax Reform, 1969: Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform Before the House
Ways & Means Comm., pt. 4, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1592 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 House
Hearings] (Statement of Assistant Sec'y of the Treasury for Tax Policy Stanley Surrey)
("Fairness it seems to me comes down to two things- one, that as between people who have
different levels of income, one higher and one lower, the person with higher income should
pay a progressively greater tax [i.e., 'vertical equity']; and second, as between people who
are at the same level of income and who are similarly situated, they should pay the same tax
[i.e., 'horizontal equity'].").

4

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:1

"For the past one hundred years, the income tax laws and the
surrounding debates have been incredibly repetitive in broad themes and in
specific metaphors and references." 9 This is particularly the case with
individual capital gains preference debates that occurred between 1921 and
1986. Constant themes or arguments in support of a capital gains
preference include:
(1) ameliorating the bunching of realized gams which blocked
realizations, and thus increased revenues, 10
(2) after 1930, encouraging investments, II
(3) serving as a rough offset for inflation, I2 and
(4) benefitting the economy as a whole and allowing the benefits to
trickle down to workers.I 3
In addition to disproving these contentions (other than the preference
contributing to a rise in the stock market for a time and temporarily
increasing revenues); the principal argument against a capital gains
preference since the 1930's has been that its distributive effect undercuts
the fundamental tax policy of ability to pay since higher income individuals
gamer 70 to 80 percent (over ninety percent in the beginning) of the tax
benefits of any substantial capital gains preference. I4 This concentration of
benefits at the top occurs because stock constitutes as much as 85 percent
of realizations in boom market years, and 50 percent in other years. Is
Further, the top 1 percent hold such a large majority of individually owned
stock that they report at least one-half of realized individual stock gains
year after year.I 6 The increasing concentration of capital gains income
results in a substantial capital gains preference lowering the effective
individual income tax rates at the very top below the effective rates of the
taxpayers directly below them, making it appear that some of the top

9. Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 122.
I 0. See infra notes 48-60, 84 (temporarily increase but at the cost of decreasing future
revenues), 97, and 146 and accompanying text.
II. See infra notes 64 and 261 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 57, 82, 98, and 245 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. For refutations of the contentions of
capital gains proponents listed in the preceding text, see John W. Lee, Critique of Current
Congressional Capital Gains Contentions, 15 VA. TAX REV. I (1995).
14. See infra notes 43-4, 50, 86, and 136, 228, 267 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 57, 89, 91, and 134 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 112-13, 134-37, and 163 and accompanying text.
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income taxpayers have effective income tax rates equal to the average
taxpayer with modest income. 17
There has been a pattern of cloaking public stock- often, proponents'
real target for the capital gains preference - with more popular symbols,
such as breaking up small farms in the beginning and more recently small
investors or small business. 18 Furthermore, from the 1940's through 1986,
supporters of a capital gains preference generally ignored more universal
interests and larger annual realizations, and instead championed the tax
preference for particular local constituent special interests accounting for
minuscule percentages of annual realizations of capital assets, such as
timber, farm livestock, land, 19 and more recently, start up ventures. 20
Not surprisingly, taxation of capital gains has been intensely political.
A Republican Congress and Administration (President Warren G. Harding)
fashioned the first individual capital gains preference in the 1920's; 21 then a
Democratic Congress and Administration (President Franklin D.
Roosevelt) cut back on such preference in the early 1930's. 22 Next, a
Conservative Coalition of predominantly Southern conservative Democrats
and Republicans under both Democratic and Republican Administrations
increased it several times from the late 1930's through the early 1980's. 23
Then, a bi-partisan coalition of Conservatives and Liberals together with
the Republican Administration of President Reagan ended the capital gains
preference in 1986 in exchange for much lower ordinary rates. 24
The combination of the aforementioned political partisanship and the
power of the capital gains special interests, especially in the eyes of the
Conservative Coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats, made
reform of individual capital gains taxation exceedingly difficult. Ideal
solutions such as (a) raising the capital gains rate and lowering the top
ordinary rate to narrow the gap between them, thereby limiting capital

17. See infra notes 140, 204-06 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 51-3, 221-23, 270 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 133-34 (data for 1959) and 329 (data for 1985).
20. See infra notes 171, 226, 356, and 367-60 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 65, 72-4, 106 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 352 and 377 and accompanying text. I appreciate Professor Jim
Bryce's focusing my attention on this feature of capital gains legislation with his questions
and the patience of many of my colleagues at the University of Alabama Law School during
my fruitful visit last school year as I kept them posted on my progress in this area.
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gains preference to the traditional targets of stock and real estate, and
taxing unrealized capital appreciation at death; 25 or (b) even better,
universal indexing of capital and depreciable assets with no special rate
treatment, 26 proved politically impossible prior to 1986.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 produced only symbolic reform.
Surrogate limitation on the individual capital gains preference of high
income taxpayers, the minimum tax on tax preferences (80 percent of
which was the initial capital gains preference27 ), was gutted in enactment
by the same political process that made direct reform impossible. 28
Further, the ultimate impact of this minimum tax on the individual capital
gains preference was greatly reduced. 29 Today, the successor Alternative
Minimum Tax threatens to burden only middle income taxpayers, not the
rich for whom the minimum tax was first intended. 30
The Second Best solution taken by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was to
make the top individual capital gains rate the same as the top permanent
individual ordinary income rate of 28 percent. 31 In substance, the capital
gains preference had been eliminated by taxing ordinary income like
capital gains. 32 Even this solution was made politically possible only by
the notion of distributional equity - that a tax cut must be equivalent as a
percentage decrease in effective rates across income classes. 33 For the
reduction of the top individual income tax rate from 50 percent to 28
percent in the 1986 Act not to violate distributional equity, preferences
concentrated at top income levels had to be eliminated, especially the
individual capital gains preference. 34

25. See infra notes 117-20, 131 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 337-40 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 196-97 and 199 and accompanying text.
29. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
30. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 352 and accompanying text.
32. A 28% maximum capital gains rate had been sandwiched between 1978 and 1980,
see infra notes 248 and 290 and accompanying text; a 25% rate from 1942 to 1977, see infra
notes I 02-03 and accompanying text; and a 20% rate between 1981 and 1985, see infra
notes 290, 348, 377 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 353 and accompanying text.
34. !d.
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II. THE EARLY YEARS: 1920'S TO 1950'S
A. 1920'S TO 1940'S SETTING THE STAGE: THE PREFERENCE FOR BIG
INCOMES AND PUBLIC STOCK
Enactment of an individual capital gains preference in 1921 - a flat
12\12 percent for capital assets held two or more years at disposition "to
distinguish between ordinary daily transactions of the speculator on one
side, and the more deliberate and long transactions which characterize the
35
investor on the other side" - coupled with a step up (or down) in basis of
36
assets held at death to fair market value at that time,
rendered the
7
38
progressive individual ordinary income rates ofthe dai a "farce."

35. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 206(b), 42 Stat. 227,233 (1921); 1920
House Hearings, supra note 3, at 128-32, 134-35 (statement of Frederick Kellogg, Esq.)
(originator of separate capital gains rate and holding period concepts). There was no need
for a corporate capital gains preference at this time, since the individual flat rate capital
gains preference deliberately paralleled the corporate flat rate income tax.
1921
Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 37 (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, Special
Tax Advisor).
36. Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 202(a), 42 Stat. 227, 229; 1921 Confidential Senate Hearings,
supra note 2, at 307 (statement of Sen. Reed) (Anecdote of publisher with multimillion
dollar building, who would rather give it to posterity than sell with 80% of profits going to
the Government); see also 1920 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 14-15 (Statement of Ways
and Means Chair Fordney) (Example of retained earnings apparently by a closely-held
corporation probably in the automotive business, such as Ford Motor Co.). Professor Bank
shows, however, that corporations began to accumulate more earnings not in response to
double taxation of distributed earnings. Steven A. Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat
for Declining Dividends? Evidence From History, 56 TAX L. REV. 463, 466 (2003)
("[D]ouble taxation of corporate income first emerged between World War I and II in
response to a shift in corporate attitudes toward retained earnings, and not vice versa.").
37. The Revenue Act of 1921 reduced the maximum rate from 73% to 58%. § 210,42
Stat. 227, 233, 237. Secretary of Treasury Andrew Mellon directed further reductions in the
Revenue Act of 1924, and the Revenue Act of 1926 reduced the top rate to 25%. Pub. L.
No. 69-20, § 210 (maximum normal rate of 5%) and § 211 (maximum surtax of 20% of net
income in excess of $1 00,000), 44 Stat. 9, 21-23 (1926). Interestingly, the House bill
picked a top surtax rate of 33% because 32% was the spread in interest rates between tax
exempt and taxable bonds. 1921 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 39-40
(colloquy between Sen. Smoot and Dr. Adams.)
38. See supra note I and accompanying text; see generally the seminal Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What's Law Got to Do with It?, 39 Sw.
L.J. 869, 873 n.IS (1985).
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During the Roaring Twenties' boom stock market years, capital gains
amounted to almost 50 percent of individual sector taxable income. 39 In
the 1925 boom stock market year, the 12 Yz percent flat rate capital gains
preference benefitted only individuals with more than $30,000 of taxable
income ($313,910 in 2004 dollars40 ) where an ordinary income rate greater
than the flat capital gains rate first applied. 41 That year only 68,317
taxpayers reported over $30,000 a year; 42 and among this small group, the
9,560 taxpayers reporting more than $100,000 ($1,070,286 in 2004 dollars)
received $91 million in tax relief from the flat 12Yz percent capital gains
rate while the remaining 62,757 taxpayers received only $13Yz million. 43
Thus, fewer than 10,000 individual taxpayers with $100,000 or more in
annual income paid about 50 percent of the individual income taxes44 and
received almost 90 percent of the benefits of the flat capital gains rate.
Accordingly, the effective income rate of the rich of the day was far below
the nominal top income tax rates.

39. Proposed Revision of the Revenue Laws of 1938: Report of a Subcomm. on Internal
Revenue Taxation of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 90
(1938) [hereinafter Vinson Report]. Since only 15% of personal income was then taxed, see
infra note 45, capital gains constituted only 7.5% of personal income albeit 50% of taxed
income. In the recent stock market boom years of 1998-2000, capital gains taxes constituted
10%, II%, and 12% of income taxes respectively. CBO, CAPITAL GAINS TAXES AND
FEDERAL REVENUES 3 (Oct. 2, 2002) [hereinafter CBO, CAPITAL GAINS TAXES]. Since the
maximum capital gains rate during this period was 20% and the maximum ordinary rate was
39.6% (before phase outs), capital gains income possibly made up as much as 20% of
individual income during this period.
40.
All calculations in this Article of changes in purchasing power over the referenced
years were made with the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis "calculator" at
http://woodrow. mp Is. frb. fed. us/research/data/us/calc/.
41. Revenue Act of 1921 § 211, 42 Stat. at 236. Dr. Adams disingenuously answered
the query of Senator David Walsh, D-Mass., as to whether "you discriminate in favor of
those who have an income of over $29,000" with "[ w ]e simply say that their tax on capital
gain shall not be over 12.5 percent." 1921 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at
39.
42. I STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT
ON CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES, pt. 7, at 4-5 (1929) [hereinafter 1929 JOINT COMM.
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT].
43. !d.; see also Hearings on H.R. 7385 before the Senate Finance Committee, 73rd
Cong. 180 (1934) (statement of Herbert Wood, Esq.) ("Out of seven billion and one hundred
and some million of capital gains realized in the taxable years 1925 to 1929, over six
billions occurred in incomes of $100,000 or more.").
44. See Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1938 Before the House Committee on Ways &
Means, 75th Con g. II 0 (1938).
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Most workers were exempted from the income tax due to generous
personal exemptions,45 but were heavily burdened by regressive excise
taxes, prompting the "Mellon Ditty."46 Undersecretary ofTreasury Ogden
Mills, who had been a Wall Street tax lawyer and member of the House
Ways and Means Committee in the early 1920's, pointed out in the 1932
Senate Finance Committee Hearings that the real tax burden were state and
local taxes borne by small and moderate income taxpayers. 47
Congress' articulated rationale for the initial capital gains preference
was that "bunching" of gain accrued over many years into a single year
subject to progressive rates "blocked" voluntary transactions such as sales
of capital assets. 48 On the eve of the Revenue Act of 1921, sales of public
stock by the highest income individuals were indeed blocked. 49 However,
45. Only 2.5 million individuals paid Federal income taxes in 1925 out of perhaps 30
million workers. See Kornhauser, supra note 38, at 873 n.l8. From 1918 to 1920 only
9.5% of the U.S. population was subject to the Federal income tax; from 1921 through 1929,
only 13% to 14% of personal income was taxed. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX
ANALYSIS, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE CAPITAL GAINS TAX REDUCTIONS OF 1978, at 49
n.l4 (Sept. 1985) [hereinafter 1978 CAPITAL GAINS REPORT]. The $4,000 personal
exemption for a married taxpayer was worth $41 ,855 in 2004 dollars. See generally Geier,
supra note 6, at 103.
46. 65 CONG. REC. H3031-32 (statements of Rep. Lankford) (populist doggerel about
the Mellon Plan's taxing farmers, laborers, and small businesses through excise taxes, while
"urging less taxes for the millionaire profiteer and more for the common folks." The
following lines from two verses give the flavor: "Tax the people, tax with care; Tax to help
the millionaire; Tax the farmer; Tax his fowl; Tax the dog and tax his howl; ... Tax his
"Henry," tax the gas; Tax the road that he must pass; And make him travel o'er the grass;
Tax him just all you can; This is, friends, the Mellon plan."). See generally John W. Lee,
"Death and Taxes'" and Hypocrisy, 60 TAX NOTES 1393 (1993).
47. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1932 Before the Senate Finance Committee, 72nd
Con g. 3 (1932) (testimony of Undersecretary Ogden Mills).
48. Thus, the capital gains preference was enacted "to permit such transactions to go
forward without fear of a prohibitive tax .... " H.R. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921 ). See
also id. at 128-32, 134-35 (Frederick Kellogg, Esq.) (proposing separate schedule for capital
assets because of blockage of transactions with high individual surtax rates); 61 CONG. REC
H5201 (1921) (statement of Rep. Hawley) (noting that the blocking surely was influenced
by the prospect that with the end of WWI the high income rates would be slashed).
TINDALL, supra note 3, at 1020-22 (discussing transition from wartime to peacetime). Cf
61 CONG. REC. H5178 (Aug 18, 1921) (statement Rep. Oldfield) (Rich taxpayers knew "that
the Republican party was liable to come into power, and they knew you [Republicans]
would ... reduce the taxes on the rich .... ").
49. "For the year 1916, when the tax rate was low, there was reported by taxpayers
having a net income of $300,000 over $992,000,000 in net income .... By 1918 -that is to
say, in two years, and good years - the amount of net income reported by taxpayers having
incomes of $300,000 or over had fallen to $392,000,000. It seems to me the common sense
of the situation indicates that we can not successfully enforce tax rates running to 73 per
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such blocking arose from the high rates alone, not bunching, since the bulk
of capital gains then, as now, are realized year-after-year by individual
taxpayers with income otherwise taxable at the top nominal brackets. 50
The legislative history reveals that from the beginning, capital gains
proponents cloaked the true object of their bounty (public stock
concentrated in high income taxpayers) with more popular symbols. For
instance, the House floor debate on the Revenue Act of 1921 generally
spoke first of high rates blocking sales of farm land before discussing their
blocking sales ofsecurities. 51 A decade later the Chair ofthe House Ways
and Means Committee, recalling that the 1921 introduction of a capital
gains rate had been presented as having a tendency to permit the break up
of large farms, asked what percentage of capital gains sales was attributable
to such real estate. 52 Undersecretary Ogden Mills (who had been a Ways &

cent." 1920 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 10-11 (Statement of Dr. T.S. Adams); 61
CONG. REC. H5201 (August 18, 1921) (statement of Rep. Hawley); 1921 Confidential
Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 36-37; accord, id. at 306-07 (Sen. Smoot). Some
proponents based their support on the increased revenues from unblocking. 65 CONG. REC.
H2847 (Feb. 20, 1924) (statements of Rep. Green). Populist Rep. William A. Oldfield, DArk., argued that if the taxpayer did not sell an appreciated capital asset, he wouldn't have
the gain. 65 CONG. REC. H2846 (Feb. 20, 1924). This is a very valid point in boom-bust
cycles. In fact, Representative Oldfield would have preferred that they not sell real estate at
the higher prices generated by inflation, "because these immense profits . . . have been
capitalized, and the people of America, in every city in this country, are paying rent on that
high capitalization due to inflation and due to this [capital gains preference] provision." 1d.
at 2848. Interestingly the Nation was in a major recession in 1921. 1921 Confidential
Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 199-202 (statement of Dr. Adams for Treasury); see also,
Greene v. Comm'r, 15 B.T.A. 401,407 (1929) (board reviewed), aff'd, 42 F.2d 852 (2d Cir.
1930).
50. Hearings on H.R. 7385 Before the Senate Finance Committee, 73rd Cong. 176-79
(1934) (statement of Herbert Wood, Esq.); see also 1929 JOlNT COMM. SUPPLEMENTAL
REPORT, supra note 42.
51. See, e.g., 61 CONG. REC., pt. 5, at H520 I (Aug. 18, 1921) (statement of Rep. Willis
C. Hawley). Rep. William A. Oldfield, D-Ark., seeking repeal of the capital gains
preference in 1924, recounted that the Ways and Means Committee had provided the
preference, because "there were a great many people in America in 1921 ... who had
timberlands and coal lands and other lands which they had owned for some years, and they
did not want to sell them at inflated prices which we had in 1920 and 1921 and pay the high
surtax rate." 65 CONG. REC., pt. 3, at H2846 (Feb. 20, 1924) (statement of Rep. Oldfield).
This story is suspiciously similar to the better-documented special interest origins in 1923 of
the "stock or securities" exception to tax-free like-kind exchanges under the predecessor to
Section I 031, which had been a companion provision to capital gains in 1921. See 64
CONG. REC., pt. 3, at H2852-53 (Feb. I, 1923) (statement of Rep. Gamer).
52. Hearings on Revenue Revision 1932 Before the House Committee on Ways &
Means, 72nd Cong. 42 (1932) (statement of Chair Collier) [hereinafter 1932 House
Hearings].
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Means Member in the early 1920's) replied that he did not know the
percentage, but acknowledged that a substantial part was from public
stock. 53 Actually, it was about 85 percent. 54
By the beginning of the New Deal, the Joint Committee on Taxation
had reported the distributive effects of Mellon's flat 12\12 percent capital
gains rate for the 10,000 Oligarches to the tax writing committees. 55 In
1934 Congress tried to solve some of the distributive defects of a flat
capital gains rate by employing a deduction instead, while concurrently
attmepting to preserve the "unblocking" benefits of a low rate. 56 As a
partial offset for inflation, 57 the drafters of the Revenue Act of 1934
fashioned that deduction as a 4-step sliding scale58 with a maximum

53. !d. (statement of Undersecretary Mills).
54. 1929 JOINT COMM. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 14, 16 (85% of gain
realized from public stock).
55. !d.
56. Treasury Undersecretary Dr. Magill doubted that the 1921 Act's 12.5% capital
gains rate had been the factor unlocking transactions. Revenue Act of 1934: Confidential
Hearings on H.R. 7385 Before the Senate Finance Committee, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at
107, 110 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 Confidential Senate Hearings].
57. !d. at 54-55 (colloquy between Sen. McAdoo and Magill).
58. The schedule had three 20% steps, or incremental deductions, over years two
through five, plus a final fourth I 0% step after a ten-year holding period. Revenue Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, § 117,48 Stat. 680,714. The origins of the House bill's sliding
scale was the Joint Committee's 1929 proposal of a two to fifteen year sliding scale capital
gains deduction with a I 00% deduction after fiften years based on (a) the policy of
approximating the tax that would have been paid had the capital gain been realized in equal
annual payments over the holding period, and (b) the premise that a large part of capital
gains "is derived from the taxation of appreciation in money value as distinct from actual
value." 1929 JOINT COMM. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, pt. 7, supra note 42, at 2. The House
Ways and Means Committee bill dropped the later years' deductions of the Joint
Committee's 1929 proposal, and particularly the I 00% exclusion after fifteen years, due to
revenue needs in 1933 and 1934. Revenue Act of 1938: Confidential Hearings on H.R. 9682
Before the Senate Finance Committee, 75th Con g., 3rd Sess., pt. I, at I 02-03 (1938)
[hereinafter 1938 Confidential Senate Hearings] (Chief of Joint Comm. Staff Lovell
Parker). The House bill provided just three 20% deductions at years one, two, and five for a
maximum deduction of 60% (with the maximum capital gains rate at the last step of 26.8%
[40% inclusion x 67% maximum ordinary rate = 26.8%]). H.R. Res. 704, 73rd Cong.
(1934) ("The theory is that the gain or loss should be somewhat reduced in proportion to the
time for which the capital asset has been held.") (emphasis added). The Senate bill
(followed by the Conference bill) added a fourth I 0% step at year ten, resulting in a
maximum deduction of 70%, and hence a maximum capital gains rate of 18.9%, which is
closer to the 1921 Act's flat 12.5% rate. 1934 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 56,
at 107-09; S. REP. No. 558, at 12 (1934) (additional bracket in order not to prevent normal
business transactions). In fact, the ten-year, 70% sliding scale deduction ultimately enacted
in 1934 taxed capital gains considerably less than they would have been taxed each year as
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deduction of 70 percent, and thus, a maximum effective rate of 18.9
percent59 after a ten year or longer holding period.
Just as the Treasury had wamed, 60 top upper income individuals
disproportionally sold their public stock at the last step, and obtained the
greatest capital gains deductions while the moderate income taxpayers
disproportionally sold at the shortest steps. Statistics from 1934 "indicate
that of taxpayers with incomes of over $100,000 [$1,398,000 in 2004
dollars], 70 percent of their net capital gains was derived from transactions
involving assets held over 10 years, whereas in the case of taxpayers with
incomes not exceeding $25,000 [$349,430 in 2004 dollars], only 25 percent
of their capital gains came from transactions in assets held over 10 years." 61
Thus, the sliding scale increased rather than lessened blocking. At the
same time, disproportional benefit between income classes rose in
substance, albeit not in form.
After quadrupling from its depression lows, the Stock Market suffered
a more than 50 percent decline in 1937, and plunged the Nation into a
recession. 62 Business witnesses in the 1938 House and Senate tax writing
Committee Hearings blamed a host of hated "soak-the-rich" tax provisions,
accrued. 1938 Confidential Senate Hearings, pt. I, at II (statement of Dr. Roswell Magill,
Undersecretary of the Treasury).
59. Maximum individual rate was 63% (normal tax of 4% plus surtax of 59%) on
income above one million dollars. Revenue Act of 1934 §§ II and 12(b), 48 Stat. at 68485.
60. Statement of the Acting Secretary of the Treasury Regarding the Preliminary Report
of a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Ways and Means Relative to Methods of Preventing the
Avoidance and Evasion of the Internal Revenue Laws Together with Suggestions for the
Simplification and Improvement Thereof, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (Comm. Print 1933) (1933
House Ways & Means Subcommittee bill's 60% step-down after a five-year or longer
holding period "would in fact operate to encourage taxpayers to hold appreciated assets for
[five] years, instead of for [two], as at present, which would be an undesirable result."); see
also 1934 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 56, at I 09 (statement of Sen. Gore).
61. H.R. REP. No. 2333, at 30 (1942). Due to continuation of the broad personal
exemptions, the Federal income tax remained a tax only on higher income taxpayers who
maintained low effective rates (in the 20% range) through the capital gains preference while
the masses remained subject to regressive excise taxes. In short, only "symbolic reform"
was affected as to capital gains in the Revenue Act of 1934, as with other FDR income tax
changes. MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM 2-3, 288-93 (1984) (use of
"political enemies" in political discourse which deflects and reassures reformists or at least
the people undermines reform efforts; thus Roosevelt espoused soak-the-rich income tax
policies, but regressive excise taxes raised even more revenues compared to income tax
revenues during the New Deal Era than before (in 1920's) or after (late 1940's) the FDR
years.
62. Mitch Zacks, Market Rally Signaling Recovery in Economy, CHICAGO SuN-TIMES,
June 15, 2003, at 36 (54.3% decline during the bear market of 1937-1938).
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63

such as freezing capital, for causing a resurgence of the Great Depression.
Congress accepted this conventional wisdom that the 1934 sliding scale
capital gains deduction contributed to the 193 7 stock market break, because
it encouraged longer holding periods at the higher income levels where
64
capital assets continued to be concentrated.
Accordingly, in 1938
Congress collapsed the sliding scale into only two vestigial steps - a 33
percent deduction with a maximum effective rate of 20 percent at eighteen
months, and a 50 percent deduction with a maximum effective rate of 15
65
percent at twenty-four months.
Congress intended the 33 to 50 percent
deductions to benefit taxpayers with small capital gains and net income,
and the maximum rate ceilings of 20 to 15 percent to benefit the upper
66
income individual taxpayers, who controlled the bulk of the public stock.
Thus, Congress structurally brought back the disproportional benefit
feature of the 1921 Act's flat rate, but did not shut the "little fellow" - the
moderate income taxpayer - out entirely this time due to the deduction
alternative.

B. THE 1940'S: SPECIAL INTERESTS' FOUNDATION FOR A CONSERVATIVE
COALITION ON CAPITAL GAINS EMERGES, ALONG WITH THE FIRST
APPEARANCE OF THE 25 PERCENT MAXIMUM CAPITAL GAINS RATE

63. 1938 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at 387 (statement of Rep.
Keller); id. at 154 (statement of M.L. Seidman, N.Y. Board of Trade) (businessmen believe
this to be case). Cf Revenue Act of 1942: Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before the Senate
Finance Comm., 77th Cong. 1217 (1942) [hereinafter 1942 Senate Finance Comm.
Hearings] (statement of Elisha Friedman, New York City attorney and self-styled
economist) ("lockout capital"). In fact frozen credit from lenders not making loans was a
feature of the Great Depression. Federal Reserve's Second Monetary Report for 1992:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing, and Urban Affairs, I 02nd Cong. 70
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 Senate Hearing] (In bust phases, "sharp declines in output and
income were associated with a freezing up of credit availability, widespread bankruptcies by
borrowers, and closings of newly insolvent financial institutions.").
64. S. REP. No. 75-1567, at 6 (1938) ("[T]he committee believes that the plan proposed
in the House bill is excessively complicated and will not permit a free flow of capital into
productive enterprises. The committee is convinced that at the present time transactions are
prevented by the capital-gains tax and that the result has been a material hindrance to
business and a considerable loss of revenue."); accord, Harrison Demands End of Profits
Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1938, at A-1 (quoting Senate Finance Chair Pat Harrison, DMiss., that "a sit-down strike upon the part of capital ... should [be broken] ... and ...
effective work should be done toward removing some of the barriers that are checking the
flow of capital and credit into new investment and new industries.").
65. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 117(b), 52 Stat. 447, 501 (1939).
66. 1938 Confidential Senate Hearings, supra note 58, at II, 15-16 (statement of Dr.
Roswell Magill, Undersecretary of the Treasury).
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With the expansion of the individual Federal income tax base in the
early 1940's, the modern federal income tax first became a mass tax
(through lowering personal exemptions)67 with high rates (ultimately up to
88 percent). 68 This transformation was also reflected in the expansion ofthe
individual capital gains preference. In developing the Revenue Act of
1942, the House and Senate tax-writing committees reconsidered the
treatment of capital gains for the third time in a decade. Citing declining
capital gains revenue, 69 they strengthened the capital gains preference by
shortening the holding period to six months, and provided a single 50
percent deduction for the small taxpayer while increasing the alternative 15

67. Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the
Expansion of the Income Tax During World War If, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 686, 694-95
( 1989) (By lowering personal exemptions, 1940 and 1941 Revenue Acts increased the
number of taxpayers from 7,000,000 to 17,000,000 and then to 27,000,000; and then a 45%
increase to around 40,000,000 taxpayers.). Randolph Paul regretted the further lowering of
exemptions, but considerations of equity were trumped by the goal of avoiding inflationary
price increases. TREASURY DEP'T AND HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, DATA ON
PROPOSED REVENUE BILL OF 1942 170 (Confidential Comm. Print 1942) [hereinafter DATA
ON PROPOSED 1942 BILL] Exhibit 64 at 169 (statement ofSec'y of the Treasury Morgenthau)
(lowering the personal exemptions under the individual income tax from $1,500 for a
married person plus $400 for each dependent to $1,200 and $300, respectively, would
produce additional revenue of $1, I 00,000,000 of which about I 0 percent would come from
6,900,000 new taxpayers). Professor Carolyn Jones, supra, pointed out that the total
reductions in the personal exemptions greatly increased the number of covered taxpayers:
from 7 million to 40 million income taxpayers in the early 1940's (possibly including both
civilian and military populations).
In DATA ON PROPOSED 1942 BILL, supra at p. 170 Exhibit 65, Assistant Secretary
Randolph E. Paul regretted the necessity of lowering exemptions because they were at the
right level based on equity; but they had to be lowered in order to withdraw excess
consumer purchasing power, which otherwise would create inflationary pressure.
Historically, family exemptions offset any income otherwise reportable by the working
masses during the Great Depression. Jones, supra.
Excess turns on the experience of the viewer. My maternal grandfather first paid
income taxes in the early 1940's when he worked as a carpenter at construction sites for
munitions making plants or "powder plants" across the deep South and then the old Midwest
in the early 1940's. (Then he moved to Vallejo, California in late 1944 to work at the Naval
munitions factory at Mare Island. My earliest memories commence then.) He would
proudly show us the Powder Plants he had "built" in Southwest Ohio on some Sunday
drives, when we lived in trailer camps in and around Dayton, Ohio in the early 1950's. (All
of those camps are still there, but stuffed with much larger trailers, not like the ones my
grandfather used to pull with a car or a truck whenever we moved.)
68. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L 77-753, § 102 (normal tax of 6%) and § 103
(maximum surtax of 82% on net income over $200,000), 56 Stat. 798, 802-03.
69. H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 29 (1942) ("It has been shown that too high a capital
gains tax will result in a loss of revenue to the Government.").
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percent flat rate from the Revenue Act of 1938 to a single 25 percent
maximum rate for the high income taxpayer. 70
More significantly, in 1942 and 1943 Congress extended the preference
beyond the public stock and real estate investments of high income
individuals to benefit a wide range of middle class taxpayers who were
often the Democrats' constituent groups/ 1 such as taxpayers with timber
royalties, 72 revenue from the sales of used equipment and livestoce3 and
lump-sum distributions from qualified retirement plans. 74 This laid the
initial political foundation for a capital gains coalition of Republicans and
conservative, predominantly Southern, Democrats - the Conservative
Coalition. 75 Incidentally, when President Roosevelt, vetoed the 1943 Act,

70. Revenue Act of 1942, § 150, 56 Stat. at 843-44; see supra note 65 and
accompanying text.
71. Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1942 Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, vol. I, 77th Cong. 196-99 (1942) [hereinafter 1942 House Hearings] (statement of
Merle Miller, Esq.).
72. Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-235, § 127, 58 Stat. 21, 46; S. REP. No. 78627, at 25-26 (1943); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 78-1079, at 52-53 (1944); see JOHN F. WITTE,
THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 121 (1985). Timber
witnesses, who argued that current rules discriminated against a taxpayer cutting her own
timber or selling under a timber cutting contract, asked for up front deductions for
cultivation expenses. Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1943 Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 78th Cong. 795-97 (1943) (statement of Lovell Parker, former Chief of
Staff of Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation, representing the forest industries).
Members of the Committee appeared impressed with Parker's presentation. !d. at 824-29.
73. Revenue Act of 1942 § 151, 56 Stat. at 846. The House Committee on Ways and
Means Bill added buildings and similar real estate improvements back to capital assets to
eliminate unfairness and considerable administrative difficulty in allocation of gain between
land and improvements. H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 52 (1942). The earlier deletion of
depreciable property had been "a relief provision to enable corporations to have the full
benefit of a loss from the sale of machinery, instead of being limited by the capital loss
provisions, which [then] would permit it only a certain percentage of the loss. It was felt at
the time that the taxpayer should not be denied the full loss because it sold the property at a
loss instead of abandoning the property." !d. at 54. The war economy sales were now at a
gain, and so the House Committee on Ways and Means provided capital gains for net gains
and an ordinary loss for net losses in the case of sales or exchanges of depreciable personal
property, and involuntary conversions of all depreciable property including real estate
improvements. !d. at 54, 96-97.
74. Revenue Act of 1942 § 165(b), 56 Stat. at 863. The Senate Finance Committee bill
afforded capital gains treatment to lump-sum distributions from qualified retirement plans
on account of separation from service with neither a rationale, S. REP. No. 77-1631, at 138
(1942), nor prior discussion in the Senate hearings or on the House side, evidencing special
interest influence, i.e., a "backroom deal."
75. Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1957-1994 surveyed roll call votes in both
Houses in which a "Conservative Coalition" arose. A majority (usually almost all) of the
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while specifically citing timber royalties, because it was "not a tax bill but
a tax relief bill, providing relief not for the needy, but for the greedy." 76 In
response, a Conservative Coalition overrode this first tax bill veto. 77 The
innovation in the plea hearings for special capital gains relief78 that would
have resulted in narrow provisions is a hall-mark of special interest
provisions. 79
The Treasury's Special Tax Advisor, Randolph Paul, was ineffective in
combating these special interest add-ons in 1942. He was too busy fending
of~ 0 the brush fire from the publicly supported Bland Amendment, which
called for a flat rate of 10 percent with no holding period. 81
Republican members and a majority of the "Southern" Democrats voted one way and a
majority of the "Northern" Democrats voted the other way. The Conservative Coalition first
began to appear as a reaction to FDR's attempt to "pack" the Supreme Court in 1937. See
JAMES T. PATTERSON, CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATISM AND THE NEW DEAL 87-127 (1967).
It appeared twice as often during Truman's Administration. JOEL P. MARGOLIS, THE
CONSERVATIVE COALITION IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 1933-1968 81 (1973)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin- Madison) (on file with the University
of Wisconsin Library) (most likely to appear on issues of taxes, economic policy, health,
education, welfare, and labor); see LEONARD BAKER, BACK TO BACK: THE DUEL BETWEEN
FDR AND THE SUPREME COURT I 09-36 (1967) (apparent electoral triumph of 1936 would be
dissipated in 1937 because of the failure of the "court-packing" plan). It essentially
disappeared after the 1994 elections as the newly empowered GOP did not need the votes of
Southern Democrats (a dwindling breed) to advance its agenda. 51 CONG. Q. ALMANAC C10 (1995).
The Conservative Coalition appeared stronger on capital gains than on other issues.
45 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 40-B (1989). This may well have been due more to a congruence of
interest groups benefited, some favored by Republicans and others favored by Southern
Democrats, than to any shared ideology as to capital gains taxation.
76. H.R. Doc. No. 78-443, at I (1943). President Franklin Roosevelt specifically
criticized the treating of income from the cutting of timber as capital gain. !d. at 2.
77. WITTE, supra note 72, at 121.
78. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at !51 (statement of M.L. Seidman,
N.Y. Board of Trade) (criticism of non-business bad debt rule); accord id., vol. I, at 962-63
(statement of Frank I. McNeny) (origin of family guarantee rule once contained in Section
166); id. vol. I, at 962 (statement of McNeny) (criticism of capital loss rule); id., vol. 2, at
1734 (statement of Paul E. Shorb, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (criticism of worthless
securities rule); id., vol. 2, at 1745 (statement of Shorb) (need specific rule for mortgage
foreclosures); id., vol. 2, at 1784 (statement of Ellsworth Alvord, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce) (criticism of involuntary conversion rule as not going far enough); id., vol. I, at
4 70 (statement of Joseph Bright, estate analyst) (requesting approval of overlapping pension
and profit-sharing plans).
79. Frank Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 16 (1984).
80. Largely in response to Representative Bland's proposed bill, Randolph Paul (Paul),
the preeminent tax expert of the day, refuted the myths that the Government would be ahead
if capital gains and losses were excluded from income and that the British tax system did so.
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In the 1942 Hearings, Randolph Paul provided the most thoughtful
analysis of the capital gains policy to date backed by extensive historical
data. He debunked a long-time favorite rationalization for the preference,
that the treatment of capital gains and losses had a major impact on the
stock market, and addressed the inflation rationale. 82 He presented data,
including charts, showing the historical fluctuations in revenues from
capital transactions reflected market conditions rather than capital gains tax
Nevertheless, conservative Republican capital gams cuts
rates. 83

1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at 251-65; id., vol. 2, at 1628-58, (statement of
Paul); 1942 Senate Finance Comm. Hearings, supra note 63, at 87 (statement of Paul). Paul
sought to reduce the disparity between capital gains and ordinary income rates and to
minimize the revenue losses from deducting a portion of net long-term capital losses against
ordinary income. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at 85 (statement of Paul)
(noting that capital gains rates were left at 1938 rates while ordinary income rates have been
substantially increased; and with the rate increases, the privilege of deducting capital losses
from ordinary income has encouraged an unusually large amount of capital loss realization
at the end of 1941 after Pearl Harbor). Treasury also recommended that the step-up (or
more rarely step-down) in basis at death be replaced by carryover basis to avoid this
"special privilege" whereby a "large part of the capital gains inherent in the increased value
of property thus escapes income tax, as the assets are handed down from one generation to
another." See 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at 89-90 (statement of Paul).
While few witnesses in the House Hearings addressed this issue, the bankers and the trust
officers who did were vehement in their opposition, claiming that the proposal "would affect
a fundamental change in our entire economy and eliminate most, if not all, of the incentive
for private enterprise which has been peculiar to the American way of life." See, e.g., 1942
House Hearings, vol. 3, supra note 71, at 2878 (statement of Charles My lander,
representing the American Bankers Association).
81. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at 122 (statement of Rep. Carlson).
82. Special Tax Advisor Paul, addressing the more serious allegation that the capital
gains tax and limitation on deductibility of capital losses against ordinary income had a
negative effect on the stock market in the 1930s, admitted the capital gains tax had some
effect on the stock market, but in his opinion "market conditions are determined by the more
broad economic conditions rather than by the tax rate." 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra
note 71, at 257; see also id. at 262-63 (statement of Paul indicating that Treasury's proposed
30% maximum alternative rate took account of inflation). See also 88 CONG. REC., pt. 8, at
Hl34 (Jan. 15, 1942) (extension of statements of Rep. Keller). Paul also correctly argued
before the House Ways and Means Committee that inflation increased other kinds of income
as well as capital gains, including business profits and wages, so that adjustment of the tax
laws for general price changes, i.e., inflation, as to capital assets would in justice require
similar adjustment as to the other forms of income and loss also. 1942 House Hearings, vol.
2, supra note 71, at 1636. For example, debt carrying capital assets (including mortgage
interest) should be indexed as well to prevent distortion. 134 CONG. REC. S3954, 3957 (Apr.
14, 1988) (statements of Sen. Bradley and Rep. Bensten ).
83. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71 at 256-7; id. at 1628-30, 1642-43, 1647
(charts). For example, during the period 1925-1931 when the flat rate of 12.5% prevailed,
net capital gains fluctuated from $4.5 billion in 1928 to $500 million in 1931. !d. at 256.
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proponents continued to assert that decreases in the capital gains rate were
necessary to increase revenues by unblocking transactions. 84
Paul's most significant innovation in the 1942 Hearings was to proffer
an "equity argument" against a rich capital gains preference supported by
distribution statistics showing disproportional benefits received by the most
wealthy taxpayers. He asserted that the Bland bill would reduce the taxes
of not more than one-tenth of the taxpayers with the probable result that the
other nine-tenths of taxpayers would be called upon to pay what the onetenth saved. 85
The capital transactions are largely concentrated in the higher income
groups. In 1937 more than 60 percent of the returns with income above
$25,000 [$325,174 in 2004 dollars] reported capital transactions. In 1938
statutory net capital gains constituted 64.7 percent of the net income of
individuals with net incomes of$1,000,000 [$13,280,000 in 2004 dollars]
and over, but less than 1 percent of the net incomes of individuals with net
income under $5,000 [$64,200 in 2004 dollars]. 86

From these facts, it is inescapable that the highest income individuals
had effective rates far below the top ordinary income rates.
In 1938, net capital gains income was concentrated among taxpayers
with net incomes of $100,000 ($1,328,000 in 2004 dollars) to under
$1,000,000 who reported 27.3 percent of net long term capital gains, and
taxpayers with $1,000,000 and more than 21.9 percent net long term capital
gains. 87 In the House Ways and Means Hearings on the Revenue Revision
of 1942 Act, Randolph Paul was asked what percentage of capital gains and

Similarly, notwithstanding the "increase" in rates under the 1934 Act, net capital gains
almost doubled from 1935 to 1936 reflecting the economic recovery (i.e., $762 million to
$1.456 billion). !d. at 256-57.
84. Paul argued that a capital gains rate reduction (if it were not expected to be
permanent) would increase revenues temporarily but at the cost of future revenue yield
resulting in net revenue loss, as had happened in 1938. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra
note 71, at 1628-29. Compare id. at 262-3 and id., vol. 2, at 1652-25 (colloquy between
Paul and Rep. Knudson) with id., vol. I, supra note 83, at 265 and id., vol. 2, at 163-64
(colloquy between Paul and Rep. Reed) for Congressional disagreement. Paul also was the
first to point out the conversion of ordinary income into capital gains problem (i.e., retention
of corporate earnings example; discount bonds; Iiquidation-reincorporation). !d., vol. I, at
1630-31.
85. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at 253 (statement of Paul). In 1937
less than one in ten taxpayers reported a capital gain. !d.
86. !d. (statement of Paul). For 1959 distribution of individual ownership of stock, see
infra note 136 and accompanying text.
87. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at 261.
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losses arose from stock market transactions. Paul replied that it depended
on the taxpayer's income bracket: 88 "Under the $5,000 brackets it is shown
that 74 percent of the gains come from profits on stocks and bonds ....
These figures show that in incomes between $100,000 and $1,000,000, 81
percent of these gains were from profits on stocks and bonds, and when
you get over $1,000,000, 99 percent were from that source."89 Third
Ranking Representative Jere Cooper, D-Tenn., observed that every ten
years or so the Committee was told that 85 percent of capital gains and
losses consisted of stocks and bonds by income group, but the above data
showed a 90 percent average. 90 Paul replied that the average was 80
percent of capital gains and 70 percent of the losses. 91
The unconvincing response of proponents of the Bland amendment was
that these statistics reflected the desirable effects of closely-held businesses
going public. 92 Similarly, the response of a pro-Bland capital gains cut
witness, when questioned about the alleged 85 percent of capital gains
realizations coming from public securities transactions, was the "cloaking"
argument: the remaining 15 percent covered many hardships such as gains
from residential sales. 93 Nevertheless, Paul failed to carry the day for the
Treasury counter-proposal of a 50 percent deduction and an alternative 30
percent flat rate with an eighteen-month holding period. 94 However, he may
have prevented adoption of the Bland 10 percent flat rate without any
holding period.
Apparently detecting a cool breeze from Ways and Means, Paul revised
theTreasury's proposals between the time of the Ways & Means Hearings
(and after consultation with the Joint Committee Staff) and the release of
the House report. The new Treasury proposal called for a (reduced)
holding period of fifteen months, a 50 percent deduction and a (reduced)
alternative maximum capital gains effective rate of 25 percent. 95 While ten
percentage points higher than the maximum individual capital gains rate

88. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at 260 (statement of Rep. Broehne,
Member, House Comm. on Ways and Means).
89. !d. (statement of Paul).
90. !d. at 261 (statement of Rep. Cooper).
91. !d. (statement of Paul).
92. !d. at 924 (statement of Emil Schram, President of the New York Stock Exchange).
93. 1942 Senate Finance Comm. Hearings, supra note 63, at 1225 (statement of
Friedman).
94. 1942 House Hearings, vol. I, supra note 71, at 89-90 (statement of Paul).
95. DATA ON PROPOSED 1942 BILL, supra note 63, at 352-53.
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under the Revenue Act of 1938, this maximum rate was roughly
comparable to the 25.2 percent maximum effective rate after five years
under the House Revenue Bill of 1934's year one to five, 3-step sliding
scale. 96
The 1942 House Ways and Means Committee Report, as the public
witnesses appearing before the Committee, did not acknowledge Paul's
arguments except to implicitly deny them. 97 Notwithstanding the Ways
and Means Committee Report's implicit rejection of Treasury's arguments,
the final House bill abandoned the sliding scale approach due to its
"tendency to delay the taking of gains [while] stimulat[ing] the realization
of losses," and instead adopted Treasury's modified proposal: a fifteen
month holding period, a 25 percent maximum rate, and an alternative 50
percent deduction. 98
The 1942 Senate bill, following the pattern for the past decade, was
more favorable to holders of capital assets than the House bill, which
shortened the holding period to six months and expanded the definition of
capital assets while generally following the House's 25 percent maximum
capital gains rate and alternative 50 percent capital gains deduction. 99
96. H.R. 7835, 73d Cong. § II (2d Sess. 1934) (4% normal tax). !d. at§ 12(b) (59%
surtax at $1 million). !d. at§ 117(a) (40% inclusion after five years). 40% x 63% = 25.2%.
97. "It has been shown that too high a capital gains tax will result in a loss of revenue to
the Government." H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Con g., I st Sess., at 29 (1942); accordS. REP.
No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., at 49-50 (1942). The House Report, ignoring the
implications of Treasury's testimony as to the concentration of public stock at the upper
income levels, asserted also that too high a capital gains tax would "have the effect of
discouraging taxpayers from investing in new or productive enterprises," reasoning that too
high capital gains rates would discourage sales and hence reinvestment [in new and hence
non-public stock]. H.R. REP. No. 2333, at 29. And rather than speaking of bringing the top
capital gains rate into line with the increases in ordinary rates as Paul had, the Report noted
that with a top ordinary rate of 88%, "it is not believed that a moderate increase in the
capital-gain rate will retard capital transactions." !d. at 30. (The "moderate increase" was
from a maximum individual capital gains rate of 15 percent to 25 percent. This 25%
maximum rate lasted until 1978 when the capital gains deduction was increased to 60%
resulting then in a maximum individual rate of 28%--70% maximum rate on investment
income 40% of gains remaining after the capital gains deduction. When President Ronald
Reagan cut the top rate on unearned income in 1981 to the same as the top 50% rate on
earned income, the capital gains rate ceiling fell to 20% (50% x 40% remaining after the
capital gains deduction). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 raised the maximum individual
capital rate back to 28%. President Bill Clinton in 1997 signed the first of a series of
income tax cuts "for the greedy not for the needy." If anything, the needy got spending cuts
as to social services. It is worth noting the FOR so described the Revenue Act of 1944,
which he vetoed, but the Conservative Coalition overrode.
98. !d. at 30, 31.
99. H.R. 7378, 77thCong. §§ 152(b)-(c)(2dSess. 1942).
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Citing the declining capital gains revenue data, the 1942 Finance
100
Committee Report concluded that too high a rate reduced revenues.
This
ignores the adverse effect of WWII on the stock market (and hence,
101
declining revenues).
102

The Conference followed the Senate bill
fixing the 50 percent capital
gains deduction for the next 36 years, with the long-term capital gain
holding period remaining six months, except for 1978-1982 when a 1-year
holding period applied. The 25 percent alternative maximum rate was,
103
104
however, limited in 1969
and eliminated in 1978
at the same time that
the individual capital gains deduction was increased to 60 percent.
C. THE 1950'S: BUSINESS AS USUAL (BUT ON A CLEAR DAY, YOU CAN
SEE FOREVER)

1.

Revenue Act of 1951: "A Veritable Landslide of Special Provisions"

105

The Revenue Act of 1951 extended capital gains coverage, through
numerous exceptions, to the sale or exchange requirement and to resolution
in favor of taxpayers in conflicts between the Internal Revenue Service and
106
the courts over capital transaction treatment.
This pattern extended

100. S. REP. No. 1631, at 49-50.
101. David James, The Main Campaign, Bus. REVIEW WEEKLY, Mar. 27, 2003, at 14
(charting initial decline in Dow Industrial average after Pearl Harbor, some rebound in
month after, and decline again after three months and substantial decline after six months);
Jason Kirby, Time Is On Your Side, CANADIAN Bus., Oct. 15, 2001, at 17 (touching on
Americans' fears about the outcome of the Second World War, noting that at the time of the
attack on Pearl Harbor, Dec. 7, 1941, the Dow was at 110, and five months after the Pearl
Harbor attack the Dow had fallen 16%; when America's strength in WW II began to be felt,
Dow began its rise).
102. H.R. REP. No. 2586, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1942).
103. The House bill eliminated the alternative maximum 25% rate. H.R. 13270, 91 st
Cong. §§ 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516(c) (1st Sess. 1969). The Senate bill capped capital
gains subject to 25% maximum rate to $140,000. !d. The Conference bill and hence final
legislation lowered the cap to $50,000. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); Tax
Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 301, 511, 83 Stat. 487, 580-85, 636-37.
104. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 402, 92 Stat. 2763, 2867.
105. WITTE, supra note 72, at 142.
106. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 31-37,41-43,47-48 (1951) (tax-free
rollover on sale of residence, capital gains for coal royalties under predecessor to Section
631 (c), and for sale of livestock and unharvested crops in the context of predecessor to
Section 1231 ); WITTE, supra note 72, at 143. Sales of livestock also constituted a far
greater percentage of capital gains realizations by lower income taxpayers than in any other
income class, see infra note 134, reflecting the lower income of smaller farmers.
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capital gains treatment (1) as a relief for certain types of income, (2) in lieu
of an explicit averaging device, or (3) as an incentive.I 07
2.

1954 Code Continuation ofPatterns of Late 1939 Code

The 1954 Code Hearings rehashed the previous two decades by either
echoing the folklore of 1930's and 1940's Hearings as to rates, holding
period and capital losses, or, as in the 1940's, entertaining special interests
pleas for aid.Ios The original 1954 Code continued the late 1939 Code
107. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 84TH CONG., THE FEDERAL
REVENUE SYSTEM: FACTS AND PROBLEMS 16 (Comm. Print 1956). The Staff study lists
timber, livestock, unharvested crops, coal royalties, lump-sum distributions from retirement
plans, lump-sum employment payments, and employee stock options. !d. at 16-21. The
Staff Report was heavily influenced here by Professor Surrey's paper submitted for the
accompanying Hearing. See infra notes 116 and II 7.
108. Some witnesses at the 1953 House General Revenue Revision Hearings raised the
threadbare arguments that capital gains should be taxed at 10% or 12.5% at the most, or not
at all. Further, they argued that capital losses should be deductible against ordinary income
in order to (a) unblock transactions, (b) increase the revenue yield, and (c) reduce boom and
bust distortions in the stock market. Hearings on Forty Topics Pertaining to the General
Revision of the Internal Revenue Code Before the House Ways and Means Committee, pt. 2,
83d Cong. 1184, 1196, 1202, 1206 (1953) [hereinafter 1954 House Hearings] (statement of
Ellsworth Alvord; National Association of Manufacturers; American Taxpayers
Association; Council of State Chambers of Commerce; respectively); see also The Internal
Revenue Code of 1954: Hearings on H.R. 8300 Before the Senate Finance Committee, pt. 2,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 711, 741, 742, 997 (1954) [hereinafter 1954 Senate Hearings]
(statements of Edward McCormick, American Stock Exchange [holding period]; G. Keith
Funston, New York Stock Exchange [holding period, rate, and capital losses]; Walter
Maynard, Association of Stock Exchanges [rate and holding period]; Arthur Jenkins [capital
losses]; respectively); 1953 House Hearings, supra at 1185-91, 1198-1200, 1203-05, 1207
(statements of John W. Anderson, National Patent Council ["encourage inventors by
increasing their rewards"]; Stuart McCarthy [termination of personal service agencies];
American Institute of Accountants [worthless stock in wholly owned subsidiary and bidding
in at foreclosure sale]; Council of State Chambers of Commerce [bidding in at foreclosure
sale and loss on abandonment of option]; respectively); 1954 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, supra
at passim (statements of Fortescue Hopkins, Esq. [business bad debt treatment for
shareholder loans]; Charles Briggs [seeking to reverse House capitalization of
administrative timber cutting expenses]; Merril Bradford [same]; Harold Kuhn [elective
non-recognition of sale of residence and limitation of capital losses]; R.J. Dearborn
[patents]; respectively); id., pt. 3, at passim (statements of J. Alter Meyers, Jr., Forest
Farmers Ass'n of Atlanta; William Barnes [patents]; Rolla Campbell, National Council of
Coal Lessors, Inc.; J.S. Seidman, American Institute of Accountants [foreclosure]; John
Williamson, Nat'! Ass'n of Real Estate Boards [investment by dealers]; Robert Wadlington
[same]; Brach, Gosswein & Lane [short sales]; Henry Isham, Clearing Industrial District,
Inc. [investment by dealers]; respectively); !d., pt. 4, at passim (statements of Richard
Uhlmann, Chicago Board of Trade [holding period]; Francis Davis [patents]; John Giesse
[same]; Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. [capital losses and tacked holding period];
Ellsworth Alvord, Esq. [qualified stock options, capital gains rate, and like-kind exchange of
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format of high and sharply progressive ordinary income rates (up to 91
percent or so) at the upper individual brackets coupled with a substantial
preference for long-term (six months) individual capital gains in the form
of a 50 percent deduction for individuals with small incomes and a
maximum rate of 25 percent 109 for the big incomes. Also included were a
few more special interest provisions. 110
In the 1960's and 1970's the result in practice under the 1954 Code,
due to these structural provisions, was an effective rate of 35 percent. 111
This was primarily due to the concentration of capital gains income at the
highest level of income individuals: top 1 percent or less. 112 Every year on
average, the top 1 percent of individuals realized 50 percent or more of the
capital gains realized by individuals, 113 who own nearly half of the public
stock coupled with taxation of unrealized appreciation at death], respectively). See also S.
REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 110, 114 (1954) (mortgage foreclosures and investment
accounts of real estate dealers).
I 09. Internal Revenue Code of I 954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, §§ 120I(b), I 202, 68A Stat. 3,
320.
110. Given the number of appeals for extension of capital gains treatment by interest
groups, the actual extension of the preference was moderate. Proponents of extension met
with success as to patents and timber administrative costs, S. REP. No. 1622,at 8 I, I 14; but
arguably failed with other controversial House special interest capital transactions, id. at I I 0
(mortgage foreclosure), I 13 (investment account of real estate dealers), I 16 (private
annuities). The reason probably was that the Republican-controiied Senate Finance
Committee, fearing the controversial provisions could delay the biii to the next term of
Congress wherein the one-seat Republican control of the Senate might be lost (as it was).
Hence, the proponents generaiiy removed innovative and controversial House provisions.
See John W. Lee, The Art of Regulation Drafting: Structured Discretionary Justice Under
Section 355, 44 TAX NOTES I 029, I 033 n.44 (1989).
I I I. For example, in the I 960's high income individuals in general had an effective rate
of around 35%. 1 I 0 CONG. REC., pt. 2, at S 1438 (Feb. 1964) (statement of Floor Manager
Sen. Long, Senate Finance Comm. Member).
I 12. See, e.g., supra notes 43 (data as to 1925), 86 (1937, 1938) and infra note 136
(1960). The top 1% of families owned 31% ofhousehold net worth in 1983 (36% in 1989).
Ann Fisher, The New Debate over the Very Rich, FORTUNE 42, 43 (June 29, 1992). The top
I 0% of families owned 89.3% or so of ail publicly traded stock held by individuals.
DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 99TH CONG., TRENDS IN THE
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AMONG AMERICAN FAMILIES 24 (Comm. Print 1986). Currently
the top 2% of households with highest incomes own 70% of large firms and 45% of smaii
firms. John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe:
"Hey the Stars Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do," 78 TEX. L. REV. 885, 910 (2000).
I 13. CBO, How CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATES AFFECT REVENUES: THE HISTORICAL
EVIDENCE 30-3 I (1988) (around 50% of the realized capital gains in the I 950's and I 960's,
dropping to 30% to 40% in the 1970's, and climbing back to 55% in 1982 through I 985);
CBO, PERSPECTIVES ON THE OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL ASSETS AND THE REALIZATION OF
CAPITAL GAINS 2, 15, 20, 21 tb1.6, 22 fig.5 (1997) [hereinafter CBO, PERSPECTIVES ON
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stock held by individuals. II
At this time, one fourth of high income
individuals who did not enjoy significant amounts of capital gains had
effective rates much closer to the nominal top individual ordinary income
rate. I Is

3.

Mills Tax Policy Hearings: The Best Policy Discussion to that Date

Possibly in response to the Senate and Conference Committee's
thwarting of the most controversial provisions in the House version of the
1954 Code, soon to be Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, Representative Wilbur Mills, D-Ark., commenced innovative
tax policy hearings in 1955 with submitted papers from invited witnesses,
including academics rather than the special interest witnesses primarily
used in the past. This culminated in the well-known 1959 TAX REVISION
COMPENDIUM and its accompanying PANEL DISCUSSIONS. The consensus
conclusion of the Mills Hearings witnesses on capital gains was the notion
propounded by Harvard Law Professor Stanley SurreyiiG that the
excessively high nominal individual ordinary income rates coupled with the
excessively large individual capital gains preference created politically
irresistible pressure to expand the categories of capital gains.II? The

OWNERSHIP] (For 1979-85 the 3% of families with adjusted gross income of $100,000 or
more in 1993 dollars accounted for 70% of all realized gains; those families with $200,000
or more adjusted gross income accounted for over 50% in seven and nineteen year
averages.). See also supra notes 86 and infra note 136 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 142-46 and 163 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 139 and 204-06 and accompanying text.
116. Surrey's posture in the Mills Hearings was presaged by the ALI Study. The
fundamental goal of the ALI project was simplification without touching the core political
contracts or "policy." [ AM. LAW [NST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX STATUTE xvi (Feb. 1954
draft). Consequently the ALI capital transactions proposals (Harv. Prof. Stanley Surrey was
the Chief Reporter of this Project, id. at v.) left in place the 50% deduction feature and
sought simplification through (a) tightening the definition of a capital asset by deleting the
services- and inventory-favored and royalty additions of the '40's and early '50's, id. at 32942 and the tables at 339-41; and (b) eliminating the long- and short-term gain distinction and
the sale or exchange requirement, id. at 319-20. In many other income tax areas the ALI
proposals served as the model for at least the House bill and often the final 1954 Code
provisions, however in regards to capital transactions, this was not to be. The probable
reason for this was because the pertinent 1939 Code sections were permeated with special
interest provisions. Any proposed repeal would have raised considerable opposition anathema to the 1954 Code drafters particularly on the Senate side. See supra note II 0.
117. JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 84TH CONG., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY: PAPERS SUBMITTED BY PANELISTS APPEARING BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TAX POLICY 404 (Comm. Print 1955) [hereinafter 1955 TAX POLICY
PAPERS]. Professor Surrey's "paper" also appears in Surrey, Definitional Problems in
Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1956), and in revised form in 2 HOUSE
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consensus was to lower individual ordinary income rates, raise capital gains
rates, repeal the 1940's and 1950's accretions to capital gains treatment, 118
"recapture" depreciation deductions to correct the Crane character mischaracterization, and tax unrealized capital gains at death and upon gifts. 119
COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86TH CONG., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1203-32 (Comm.
Print 1959); see also Hearings on Federal Tax Policy for economic Growth and Stability
before the Subcomm. on Tax Policy of the Joint Comm. on the Economic Report, S. Rep.
No. 1310, 84th Cong. 322 (1955) [hereinafter 1955 Tax Policy Hearings] (Statement of
Prof. Carl Shoup [chief economist in '54 Code triumvirate]; 326 (Prof. Surrey); and 327
(Prof. Keith Butters). Treasury had earlier noted that the "discrepancy" in the upper
brackets between the alternative tax and the regular income tax had resulted in increased use
of conversion methods and "stimulated efforts to obtain legislation broadening the area of
capital gains." Revenue Act of 1951: Hearings on H.R. 4473 Before the Senate Committee
on Finance, pt. 1, 82nd Cong. 120 (1951) (Sec'y of the Treasury Snyder).
118. Paralleling "his" 1954 ALI Capital Gains Proposals, see supra note 116, Surrey
presented the basic definitional issues as (I) distinguishing investment from (a) business, (b)
speculation, and (c) personal efforts; (2) classifYing recurring receipts; and (3)
transformation of (a) tangible assets into intangible property, viz., equity interests in
collapsible corporations and partnerships, and (b) retained corporate ordinary income into
stock appreciation. 1955 TAX POLICY PAPERS, supra note 117, at 406-15. By the 1959
Panel Discussions Chairman Mills at least clearly had accepted the policy argument that the
capital gains preference should be limited to traditional investment assets and manifested a
thorough knowledge of the host of exceptions. Panel Discussions on Income Tax Revisions
before the House Committee on Ways & Means, 86th Cong. 693 (1960) [hereinafter I959
Panel Discussions]. Even as the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy under Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson, Professor Surrey was unable to significantly reform the definition of
capital gains. He was only able to change the definition of a depreciation recapture (which
was 80% ineffective as to real estate improvements due to the compromise limitation of
"recapture" to the excess of accelerated depreciation over straight-line depreciation) and
ultimately service-flavored compensation (lump-sum and employer stock distributions from
"qualified" profit sharing and stock bonus plans, and qualified stock option plans).
119. Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. I (1947) (stating that exclusion of allowable
deprecation deductions from consideration in computing gain would result, in effect, in a
double deduction on the same loss of assets). See 1955 TAX POLICY PAPERS, supra note 117
at 406-15; Message from the President of the United States relative to our Federal Tax
System, H.R. Doc. No. 140, at 13 (1961) ("Our capital gains concept should not encompass
this kind of income. This inequity should be eliminated, and especially so in view of the
proposed investment credit. We should not encourage through tax incentives the further
acquisition of such property as long as this loophole remains."). Crane required that nonrecourse liabilities be included in the amount realized under the predecessor to Section 1001
in part because such liabilities had been included in basis at acquisition and thus supported
depreciation deductions which reduced such basis. Mis-characterization arose because the
depreciation deductions were ordinary, whereas the gain resulting from such basis reduction
was capital under the predecessor to Section 1231, (enacted after the tax years in Crane but
long before the Court's decision). See John W. Lee & Mark S. Bader, Contingent Income
Items and Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions: Correlative Adjustments and Clearer
Reflection of Income, 12 J. CORP'N L. 137, 219-20 (1987).
The 1955 Tax Policy Hearing Pamphlet prepared by the Staff discussed a proposal
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Ill. UPS AND DOWNS OF CAPITAL GAINS
TAXREFORM: 1960's-1980'S
A. 1960'S: THE FAILURE OF THE BEST, AND COMMENCEMENT OF
SURROGATE CAPITAL GAINS REFORM
1.

President John F. Kennedy's Reform Proposals: Uniting the Special
Interest Opponents

In the early 1960's the Kennedy Administration formulated a tax plan
incorporating several features of the 1950's Mills Hearings radical
consensus on the best capital gains tax policy: equitable limitations and
120
taxation of unrealized capital appreciation at death.
The common
denominator to the Kennedy proposals and to the Mills capital gains
consensus was Harvard Professor Stanley Surrey who served as JFK' s
Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy.
A combination of the traditional Republican tax cuts to spur the
economy leg and a traditional Democrat equity leg ran through the 1963
121
Kennedy tax proposals, no doubt motivated at least in part by a desire to

derived from Surrey's paper to confine capital gains to "the sale or exchange of a much
narrower category of assets than at present, principally corporate securities." STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON ECONOMIC REPORT, 84TH CONG., THE FEDERAL REVENUE SYSTEM: FACTS
AND PROBLEMS 32 (Comm. Print 1956). "Other types of income currently receiving capital
gains treatment, such as those representing compensation for personal service (distributions
from retirement plans, stock options, patent royalties), gains from transactions involving
inventory-type assets (coal royalties, cutting of timber, livestock), and anticipation of future
income (in-oil payments, life interests in estates) would be subject to ordinary income
treatment or whatever preferential treatment specifically accorded with the special
circumstances." !d. The principal objection was the virtual impossibility of distinguishing
"true" capital gains from the wide range of other income receiving capital treatment, which
often turned on the circumstances under which the income was received. Even strict
adherence to the capital asset-sale or exchange rule would still leave open the question of
what assets were to be included as capital assets. !d. at 32-33.
When Section 1250 was enacted, real estate depreciation recapture was limited to
the excess of accelerated over straight-line depreciation, which Rep. AI Ullman, D-Wash.,
viewed as not costing the real estate industry greatly and not putting a damper on real estate
development. Hearings on President's 1963 Tax Message Before the House Committee on
Ways & Means, pt. I, 88th Cong. 895 (1963) [hereinafter 1963 House Hearings]. For the
Committee Report rationalization seeS. REP. No. 830, at 132 (1964).
120. PRESIDENT'S 1963 TAX MESSAGE 26, reprinted in 1963 House Hearings, pt. I,
supra note 119.
121. The JFK Administration believed that the reduction in the capital gains rate would
be "somewhat more than offset by the increased revenue from the change in holding period,
the taxation of capital gains at death and the changes in definitions .... " PRESIDENT'S 1963
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broaden the support base for tax reform. This was also described as a "quid
pro quo" concession by the Kennedy Administration. JFK' s proposed
capital gains rate cuts - a 70 percent capital gains deduction not seen since
FDR's Revenue Act of 1934's "sliding scale" deductions, coupled with a
reduction of the top individual ordinary income rate from 90 to 65 percent,
resulted in a maximum capital gains rate of 19.5 percent. 122 This ran
contrary, however, to the radical consensus of raising not cutting the
capital gains rate. On the other hand, President Kennedy's proposed cut in
the top ordinary rates 123 was thought to lessen the pressure for new capital
. add -ons. 124
gams
Nevertheless, the benefit of the Democratic "quid" (increased capital
gains preference) was outweighed in the eyes of the Republicans by the
burden of their "quo" 125 (taxation of unrealized capital appreciation at death
which would have more than paid for the capital gains cuts through
increased realizations 126) in the eyes of both wealthy individual taxpayers 127
TAX MESSAGE, supra note 120 at 26. The anticipated increase in revenue would have arisen
primarily from the elimination of the ability to avoid all capital gains by holding assets until
death. The increased volume of realizations was to yield approximately $700,000 per year
in additional revenues for a net increase of $100,000 per year. !d. Between 50% and 70%
of annually accrued capital gains are not realized prior to the owner's death, see note 126
infra at which point the estate or heirs take a date of death (or alternate valuation date) fair
market value as their basis in the capital asset, Section I 014, with no income tax being paid
on the appreciation in value.
122. Proposed top individual rate of65% x 30% = 19.5%.
123. PRESIDENT'S 1963 TAX MESSAGE, supra note 120, at 6 (proposed reduction of top
individual rate from 90% to 65%).
124. See 1955 Tax Policy Hearings, supra note 117.
125. Revenue Act of 1963: Hearings on H.R. 8363 Before the Senate Finance
Committee, pt. I, 88th Cong. 285 (1963) [hereinafter 1963 Senate Hearings] (statement of
Sec'y C. Douglas Dillon) ("We did not get a quo. So that is why we are asking that
provision be stricken.").
126. Between 50% and 70% of accrued capital gains are not realized prior to the owner's
death at which point the estate or heirs take a date of death (or alternate valuation date) fair
market value as their basis in the capital asset with no income tax being paid on the
appreciation in value. Jane Gravelle, Limits to Capital Gains Feedback Effects, 51 TAX
NOTES 363, 364-65 (Apr. 22, 1991) (Director of Congressional Research Service) (From
1949 to 1989 on the average about 30% of all capital gains accruals were recognized; with
adjustments for gains not recognized because of reasons other than stepped up basis at
death, e.g., owner-occupied housing sold after age fifty-five and corporate stock held by taxexempts, taxable realizations were about 46% of accruals).
127. 1963 House Hearings, supra note 199, at 1419 (statement of Keith Funston, New
York Stock Exchange) (capital gains cuts do reduce taxes, but taxation at death of
unrealized appreciation "takes away the benefit-- so that I don't believe, in general, the
present tax bill is any great advantage to the persons above the middle-income bracket in
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(long a Republican constituency) and special interests such as farmers,
ranchers, 128 and small businessmen, 129 which were more likely than not to
be Democrat constituencies in the South. Consequently, the House
retained the traditional 50 percent deduction and six month holding period
for both the special interest statutory add-ons and "classic" capital assets
(stock and real estate) while granting an additional capital gains cut (60
percent deduction after 1-year holding period) for classic capital gains
assets only. 130 However, it did not provide for taxation of unrealized
capital appreciation at death. Therefore the best capital gains reform
proposals to that date (definitional purification and taxation of unrealized
appreciation at death) united the interest groups in opposition, thereby
dooming the Kennedy capital gains reform proposals. 131

terms of the complete package."). See also 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 496
(Joel Barlow, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.) (would not support capital gains cut if
dependent on taxation of unrealized capital appreciation).
128. 1963 House Hearings, pt. 3, supra note 120, at 1538, 1540-42 (Albert Mitchell and
Stephen Hart, Esq., National Livestock Tax Comm.); id., pt. 5, at 2529-91 (Rep. Joseph M.
Montoya D-N.M.) (taxation of unrealized appreciation at death would create a severe
hardship on small businesses and especially ranches).
129. 1963 House Hearings, supra note 120, at 1327 (Henry Bison, National Association
of Retail Grocers); id. at 1344 (statement of Donald Alexander, Association of Institutional
Distributors) (heaviest burden would fall on small- and medium-sized businesses, citing
1959 Panel Discussions); id. at 1364 (Samuel Foosaner, New Jersey Manufacturer's
Association) (burden on small business particularly from "goodwill" based upon capitalized
earnings).
130. The 1940s' and 1950s' add-ons were limited to the old 50% deduction. The Mills
Hearings manifest that Chairman Mills had learned the difference between classic capital
assets and the 1940's and 1950's special interest "hardship" add-ons. But the 1963 House
Hearings equally manifest the attachment of Committee members to the special interest
provisions. Chairman Mills' compromise was not to cut back on the existing preference
(50% deduction) for such items (newly labeled as "Class B" or "statutory" capital assets),
but instead to limit the new additional preference (60% deduction) to "Class A" or classic
capital assets. Indeed, the House bill extended the Section 631 (c) capital gains treatment for
timber and coal royalties to iron ore royalties. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., I st Sess. 9394 (1963). The House bill used two holding periods (similar to the Revenue Act of 1938),
providing the additional preference only to Class A Assets held two or more years. !d. at
96-97. Secretary Dillon criticized the House two step arrangement and two maximum rates
as seriously complicating the capital gains portion of the tax return and the Code. 1963
Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 129.
131. It was the date of death taxation of unrealized appreciation issue which was critical,
not the too readily conceded definitional issues, as perhaps could have been predicted by the
response of the Congressmen at the Mills Hearings. For example, Senator Douglas stated,
"What has progressively happened has been that the reform elements which you [Sec'y
Dillon] propose, and I think they were rather timid, I may say, have been progressively
eliminated, and I think they have been eliminated in large part because the members of the
legislative bodies and the special interests who throng these hearing halls and who call upon
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Rhetoric in the 1963 House Hearings on JFK's capital gains proposals
constituted a transition from earlier decades. This rhetoric justified the
capital gains preference on the basis of its alleged salutary effects on the
stock market, the economy, or on increasing revenue, to an overt
Congressional policy of principally intending that the capital gains
preference benefit special interests as a subsidy, 132 to small businessmen,
farmers, ranchers, or timber owners with no attention explicitly given to the
actual distribution of net capital gains by classes of assets and levels of
income, although Treasury supplied the data for 1959.
For 1959, the largest percentage sources of individual net long-term
capital gain were 41.5 percent from corporate stocks, and 18 percent from
real estate. 133 For higher income taxpayers the percentage of net capital

Senators and Congressman, have the impression that you are so anxious for a tax cut that
you can throw all of these away and nothing will happen, so that by not presenting a virile
position, not having a virile stance in favor of tax reform, you have permitted the tax reform
measures to be progressively gutted." 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 286
(statement of Sen. Douglas).
132. See, e.g., 1963 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 125, at 483-84 (written statement
of Joel Barlow, Director U.S. Chamber of Commerce); id. at 542-43 (written submission by
Forest Industries); id. at 759-60 (statement of Harv. Prof. Dan Throop Smith); id. at 810
(written statement of Roswell Magill, Esq., Undersecretary of Treasury under FDR); id. at
916,923-28 (statement of G. Keith Funston, New York Stock Exchange); id., pt. 3, at 1187
(statement of J. Sinclair Armstrong, U.S. Trust Co.); supra notes 128-29 and accompanying
text.
By subsidy I mean a rate reduction or preference for an activity that the taxpayer
probably would have engaged in anyway. Soon to be Chair Mills, D-Ark., noted that the
statutory proliferation of categories of capital assets in effect lessened the channeling value
of the preference. 1955 Tax Policy Hearings, supra note 117, at 326. See also S. REP. No.
131 0, at 8-9.
133. Net long-term capital gains, 1959, by type of gain, amounts and percent, 1963
Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at 197:
[Dollar amounts in thousands]
[Percent]
100.0
Total net long term gain
$12,331 ,867
Corporate stocks

$5,116,261

41.5

Bonds and notes

$189,480

1.5

Distributions from mutual funds

$360,371

2.9

$1,010,202

8.2

Share from partnerships/trusts
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gains from sales of stock ranged from 53.5 percent for AGI's from $50,000
to $100,000 ($322,000 to $644,000 in 2004 dollars) to 70.5 percent for
$500,000 and above ($322 million in 2004 dollars). 134 Conversely, the

Livestock

$701,116

5.7

Natural resources

$262,593

2.1

Depreciable assets used in trade or business

$537,631

4.4

Real estate

$2,217,438

18.0

Other capital assets

$1,936,775

15.7

134. Net Long-term capital gains, 1959, percentage distribution by type, for AG income
classes, id. at 197, tb1.5, were as follows:
Income Classes rin thousands of$
$0 to
$10
$50
$100
All
$500
$10
to
to
to
+
$50
$100
$500
Security-type gain

30.4

55.9

67.2

70.6

78.4

54.1

A. Securities

19.4

43.1

55.2

61.6

72.4

43.0

19.1

41.7

53.5

59.8

70.5

41.4

2. Bonds

0.3

1.4

1.8

1.9

1.6

7.1

B. Mutual Fund Distributions

3.8

4.0

2.2

0.7

0.4

2.9

C. Gains from Partnerships/
Trusts

7.2

8.8

9.0

8.3

5.6

8.2

29.4

18.2

11.3

10.2

1.5

18.0

5.9

5.3

2.2

1.5

1.0

4.4

16.3

2.2

1.0

0.05

0.1

5.7

3.5

1.2

0.3

1.7

2.6

2.1

13.9

16.6

17.3

15.6

16.2

15.7

I. Corporate stock

Real Estate
Depreciable property
Livestock
Natural resources
Other
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percentage of net long-term capital gains consrstmg of real estate and
livestock, and to a lesser degree depreciable business property, decreased
the higher the income class. 135 Capital gains realizations were concentrated
in higher income taxpayers, 136 reflecting the concentration of ownership of
public stock, which was concurrently in the hands of the top 14 percent of
families, who owned 64 percent of all public stock, especially the top 4
percent, who owned 42 percent. 137

Total

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

135. !d.
136. Amounts and percentages of net long-term capital gain among individual income
classes in 1959 Jd at 197 tbl ..
5
AGI Classes

Amount of
gains
(thousands)

Percent of
total gains

Average gain
in income class
reporting gains

Percent of all
returns in
income class

Total

$12,331,867

100.0

$2,516

8.1

Under $10,000

$3,562,976

28.8

$1,100

5.8

$10,000, under
$50,000

$4,350,337

35.3

$3,428

29.0

$50,000, under
$100,000

$1,454,337

11.8

$15,712

82.4

$100,000, under
$500,000

$1,991,358

16.1

$87,346

85.7

$500,000 or
more

$983,030

8.0

$1,028,242

95.8

137. Concentration of publicly traded common stockholdings, by income classes, 1960.
Jd at 168

Income Class

Percentage of all
families

Percentage of total value
of stock

Under $5,000

47

10

$5,000 to $10,000

39

26
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For the first time the Senate Hearings and floor debate disclosed hard
evidence on the use by the vast majority of highest income individuals of
the capital gains preference (75 percent of their income then consisted of
capital gains) to obtain low effective rates of income taxation with the very
top high income taxpayers achieving even lower effective rates than those
just below them. 138 For example, most individuals with $1,000,000 or
more annual income in 1963 ($6, 100,000 in 2004 dollars) used the capital
gains preference to obtain a 22 percent effective rate when the top
individual ordinary rate was still 90 percent. 139 High income individuals
generally had an effective rate of approximately 35 percent. Such effective
rates were averages with one-quarter of the high income taxpayers paying
an effective rate much closer to the nominal rates, e.g., 50 to 60 percent in
the early 1960's, and 75 percent paying a much lower effective rate than
the average. 140 A structural feature of President Kennedy's 1963 tax

$10,000 to $15,000
$15,000 and over
Total

10

22

4

42

100

100

138. Senator Douglas, D-Ill., asked Secretary Dillon if certain tables (including those
contained in the footnotes above) prepared by the Treasury Department in 1962, but not
released, were accurate. Dillon dryly replied, "I recall those tables." Senator Douglas then
had them entered into the Record of the Hearing. 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 125, at
278-83 ([Sen. Douglas]: "Now, Mr. Secretary, I find these figures shocking. Here are 20
men with adjusted gross incomes of over $5 million who paid no taxes." !d. at 283); id. at
1253, 1291.
139. Seesupranote 114.
140. See supra note 131, and infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text. Effective tax
rates on adjusted gross income and amended adjusted gross income 1960 are as follows
(amended adjusted gross income includes full capital gains and losses realized in the tax
year and excludes capital loss carryovers):
dollars in millions]
AGI classes

AGI

Adjusted AGI

Tax as
percentage
ofAGI

Tax as
percentage of
Adjusted AGI

Up to $5,000

$69,141

$69,564

9.1

9.0

$5,000 to $10,000

$138,456

$139,244

11.1

11.0
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proposals was to weigh individual income tax reductions disproportionally
to the lower income groups to increase consumer spending. 141
In the Senate floor debate on the Revenue Act of 1964, Floor Manager
Long, while successfully arguing against a capital gains cut not coupled
with some treatment of unrealized capital appreciation at death, pointed out

$10,000 to $20,000

$56,128

$57,060

15.0

14.8

$20,000 to $50,000

$21,901

$22,902

22.8

21.3

$50,000 to
$100,000

$6,648

$7,300

34.3

31.1

$100,000 to
$150,000

$1,688

$1,971

40.3

34.6

$150,000 to
$200,000

$750

$920

42.6

34.7

$200,000 to
$500,000

$1,370

$1,821

44.3

33.3

$500,000 to
$1,000,000

$486

$726

46.4

31.1

$1,000,000 upward

$584

$869

47.8

32.3

Total

$297,151

$302,377

13.3

13.0

141. 1963 House Hearings, supra note 120, at 28 (distribution of proposed tax liability
changes by income classes). The Kennedy tax proposals thereby neglected, according to
conservatives, upper income groups who, under the trickle down theory, would invest the
tax reduction. Id. at 1069 (statement of Throop Smith); id. at 1370-74, 1385, 1387
(statement of Roswell Magill, Esq., who had represented Treasury in the 1934 and 1938 Act
Hearings, here a partner in Cravath, Swaine & Moore) (arguing that lower brackets should
not get as much of a tax cut because "investment money is largely produced by the middle
and upper brackets and not by the lower brackets. . . . In sum, these structural [capital
transaction] changes would steepen the progression of the individual income tax, add a new
layer of complex restrictions and requirements on top of existing complexities, free some
groups of taxpayers from any tax, and limit tax relief in the middle and higher income
brackets."). Another structural feature of Kennedy's 1963 tax proposals was financing the
tax cuts with deficits rather than cuts in expenditures. 1963 House Hearings, supra note
120, at 534, 626 (statements of Reps. Byrnes and Curtis) (critical of such deficit financing).
For subsequent compositions see infra note 339.
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that the vast majority of top bracket individuals used the capital gains
preference (75 percent of their income then consisted of capital gains) to
obtain "surprisingly" low effective rates of income taxation (22 percent). 142
Assistant Secretary Surrey testified at the end of lame duck President
Johnson's Administration, that in 1964 for approximately 75 percent of the
individual taxpayers with over $1,000,000 in actual annual income, the
effective income tax rate clustered in the area between 20 percent and 30
percent, which was comparable to the effective rates paid by approximately
60 percent of the individual taxpayers in the group, who earned between
$20,000 and $50,000 of actual income. 143 The effective rate increased with
actual income for taxpayers up to $50,000, flattened for those earning
$50,000 to $100,000, and decreased for those earning above $100,000. 144
Surrey further testified that these figures did not appear to be a one-shot
phenomenon as to high income individuals. 145 The capital gains preference
constituted the primary reason for these low effective rates. 146 The
purchasing power of a 1964 dollar was $6.04 in 2004. The super rich thus
enjoyed a lower effective rate than the merely wealthy. In Long's words,
the "tax on this capital gains income is low enough already. In a long run,
capital gains clearly represents an ability to pay taxes .... [b ]ecause this
income is bunched, we tax it at lower rates; but is not 25 percent low
enough?" 147
Without taxation of unrealized appreciation, the JFK capital gains cut
would have primarily benefitted upper income taxpayers, as the major
capital gains preference legislation of the past had. Kennedy believed the
reduction in capital gains rate would be "somewhat more than offset by the
increased revenue from the change in holding period, the taxation of capital
gains at death and the changes in definitions." 148 Consequently, the
142. 110 CONG. REC., pt. 2, S1438 (Jan. 30, 1964) (statement of Floor Manager Sen.
Long).
143. 1969 House Hearings, pt. 4, supra note 8, at 1598-99 (statement of Assistant Sec'y
Stanley Surrey)
144. !d.
145. !d.
146. !d.
14 7. II 0 CoNG. REc., pt. 2, at S 1438 (Jan. 30, 1964) (statement of Floor Manager Sen.
Long). For a debunking of the bunching myth, see supra note 50 (1920' and 1930's capital
gains realization concentrated at the top brackets) and Lee, supra note 13, at 40-50.
148. PRESIDENT's 1963 TAX MESSAGE, supra note 120, at 26. The anticipated increase in
revenue would have arisen primarily from the elimination of the ability to avoid ail capital
gains by holding assets until death. The increased volume of realizations would yield
approximately $700 miiiion per year in additional revenues for a net increase of $100
miiiion per year. !d. at 26.
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Kennedy Administration opposed the aforementioned notion of two classes
of stock compromise the House had passed, but without taxation at death of
unrealized appreciation. 149 The Senate (and the Conference Committee)
agreed, rejecting the flawed House capital gains provisions with its quid
without the quo. The end result was continuation of the 1954 Code's 25
percent flat rate for the upper income, 50 percent deduction for the
moderate income taxpayer, the special interest add-on of capital assets
(e.g., coal, timber, livestock and, iron ore), and a step-up in basis at death
of capital assets.
The Surrey/JFK capital gains reform attempt, and hence the Mills Tax
Policy Hearings in this context, thus came to naught because it had united
in opposition all of the interest groups underlying the Conservative
Coalition on capital gains. Aiding this process was the fact that Chair Mills
was so obsessed with obtaining consensus in his Ways and Means
Committee and victory on the floor, that its bills were more conservative
than Congress as a whole. 150 Additionally, Secretary Dillon, who was
demanded by Congress to present President Kennedy's tax proposals
instead of the theoretician Surrey, was overly willing to concede at least the
capital gains definitional reforms. 151 Even though Mills was personally
convinced of the merits of capital gains definitional simplification, 152 the
Committee in 1963 only restricted the proposed additional capital gains

149. See supra note 125. Secretary Dillon also criticized the House 2-step arrangement
and 2 maximum rates, see supra note 130, as seriously complicating the capital gains
portion ofthe tax return and the Code. !d. at 129.
150. BARBER. CONABLE, CONGRESS AND THE INCOME TAX 19-20 (1989) ("[S]ince Wilbur
was a legislative psychologist who waited for the committee to make up its mind and then
positioned himself at the head of the column, the result was that the Ways and Means
Committee came to have a consensus that was much more conservative than was the case
with the majority of the Democratic party in the House.").
151. Former Commissioner Morty Caplin recounted the story of this Congressional
demand at a social event at Ed Cohen's house following a Virginia Tax Conference. Rep.
John W. Byrnes, R-Wis., announced to Secretary Dillon at the beginning ofthe 1963 House
Hearings "that the greater part of the proposed structural reforms had better be put in deep
freeze if we are going to get a tax bill this year." 1963 House Hearings, supra note 120, at
534. Indeed, when Secretary Dillon conceded that the proposed elimination of coal
royalties from capital gains treatment was probably the smallest "suggestion in the whole
bill," Rep. Howard Baker, R-Tenn., quipped: "and could well be put in Mr. Byrnes' 'deepfreeze."' Secretary Dillon responded, "I don't think the bill would suffer if that happened."
/d. at 607.
152. See supra note 130.
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preference to classic capital assets. Further, Mills did not favor taxation of
153
unrealized appreciation at death.

2.

Surrey Papers and Tax Reform Act of 1969: Surrogate Limitations on
the Capital Gains Preference

In 1968, Surrey, continuing as Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax
Policy under President Johnson, designed a different approach to tax
reform of capital gains and other areas. Surrey's approach, which included
surrogate limitations aimed at the effect of tax "preferences" or
154
155
"expenditures"
rather than at the cause,
was backed up by a
complicated allocation of deduction provisions that Surrey wrote of in the
landmark TREASURY DEPARTMENT, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND
156
PROPOSALS, which came to be known as the "Surrey Papers."

153. 1959 Panel Discussions, supra note 118, at 55-59.
154. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, pts. 1-4 (Comm.
Print 1969) [herein~fter Surrey Papers] (prepared in 1968 and published in 1969); Joseph J.
Minarik, How Tax Reform Came About, 37 TAX NOTES 1359, 1362 (Dec. 27, 1987); Sylvia
Porter, Your Income Tax, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1969, at B-1 ("the most sweeping blueprint
for tax reform ever to come out of government"). Text accompanying infra notes 154-67
sketches the Strange Political Story of (a) President Lyndon Johnson refusing to publish the
Surrey Papers despite a Congressional directive to do, and (b) really short-term Secretary of
Treasury Joseph Barr's letting several cats out of the tax bag by (i) handing over the Surrey
tax studies to the incoming Secretary of Treasury in the first Nixon Administration, and (ii)
revealing to a Congressional Committee that 155 "millionaires" had paid no federal income
taxes in 1967 and explaining to it the role played by tax preferences (especially the capital
gains preference). Mostly likely this explains the publishing of Treasury Studies jointly by
the House Ways & Means Committee headed by powerful Chair Wilbur Mills in his finest
hour in 1969, having directed tax reform studies often with hearings with invited witnesses
only in the first four or five years following enactment of the 1954 Code, and the Senate
Finance Committee. The Committee Print stated that the document had not been considered
by either Committee and was "being printed for information purposes only so as to make it
available." !d. pt. I, supra at p. i. Professor Stanley Surrey had frequently appeared in
Mill's reform hearings. See, e.g., notes 116-19 supra.
155. "Stanley S. Surrey, a lawyer, contributed a new view of the selective tax
preferences in the law [i.e., departures from a uniform or ideal tax base]. He likened the tax
savings from a preference for a particular purpose, say encouraging business investment, to
a government outlay for the same purpose. Thus was coined the term, 'tax expenditures.'"
Minarik, supra note 154, at 1361; see generally Barry Forman, Origins of the Tax
Expenditure Budget, 30 TAX NOTES 537 (Feb. I 0, 1986). Senator Jacob Javits, R-NY,
argued that a list of tax expenditures should be part of Treasury data. 1969 House Hearings
pt. 4, supra note 8, at 2358 (statement of Sen. Javits). "This concept was institutionalized
on an illustrative basis in the federal budget in the mid-1960s [sic, mid-1970s ], and has had
a powerful influence on virtually all deliberations on the Federal income tax ever since."
Minarik, supra note 154, at 1361.
156. The Surrey Papers computed the minimum tax base by adding back to taxable
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Surely reflecting the 1963-64 experience, the Surrey Papers did not
tighten the capital gains definition, but did include "Supplementary
Material" as to the tax treatment of timber and real estate. 157 They
documented the concentration of preference in high income individuals and
corporate taxpayers along with other inequities, including the relative
inefficiency of "recapture" of depreciation under Section 1250. 158 Similar
to the 1963 JFK capital gains proposals, the Surrey Papers proposed taxing
unrealized capital gains at death. 159 The author suspects that Surrey knew
that this proposal would go nowhere in Congress at this time
notwithstanding the support of some liberals. 160 If so, he was right. 161
The Surrey Papers also addressed the other side of the capital gains
problem: artificially high nominal ordinary income rates that seldom
actually applied.
When they did apply, they presented substantial
horizontal inequity 162 as Senator Long had pointed out on the Senate Floor
in 1964. 163 The Surrey Papers would have applied an optional, alternative
maximum 50 percent tax to an expanded tax base substantially identical to

income (in the order of revenue importance) (1) one-half of net long-term capital gain, (2)
tax-exempt interest, (3) charitable contributions of appreciated property, and (4) percentage
depletion in excess of cost depletion. Surrey Papers, pt. I, supra note 154, at II 0 (ranking
of items reducing taxes for high income taxpayers); id., pt. 2, at 136-40 (minimum tax
base). Surrey proposed a graduated minimum tax rate of 7% to 35% (roughly parallel to
half of graduated rates under the regular rates), limited to a maximum rate of 25 percent in
the case of unrealized appreciation in capital assets taxed at death. !d., pt. 2, at 141-42.
!57. The Surrey Papers pointed out (as Sen. Long had noted in 1964) that the wealthy
with large amounts (and percentages) of capital gains income often achieved substantially
lower effective rates than the 25 percent alternate maximum capital gains rate by offsetting
or "sheltering" the taxable income remaining after the 50 percent capital gains deduction
with other deductions. Surrey Papers, pt. I, supra note 154, at 84-86; id., pt. 2, at 142-45.
Therefore, Surrey's Treasury proposed that non-business deductions be allocated between
taxable income and the more common sources of tax exempt income and only the former
portion be allowed as a deduction. !d., pt. 2, at 145-46.
158. !d., pt. 2, at 434-58.
159. !d., pt. I, at 118-19; id., pt. 2, at 334-51.
160. 115 CONG. REC., pt. 2, at 2121 (Jan. 9, 1968) (statement of Rep. Reuss); see also
id., pt. 8, at H9956 (Apr. 22, 1969) (statement of Rep. Hanley).
161. H.R. REP. No. 413, pt. I, at 2 (1969) ("[Y]our committee found that the time
available did not permit the inclusion of reform measures relating to the revision of the
estate and gift tax laws or the related problem of the tax treatment of property passing at
death.").
162. Surrey Papers, pt. I, supra note 154, at 172 (29 percent of individuals with adjusted
gross income of $500,000 or more would pay more than 50 percent of their true income in
taxes). See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 142-149 and accompanying text.
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the alternative mmrmum tax base (plus the value of any stock options
exercised during the tax year in excess of the option price). 164 The
articulated purpose was to reduce the incentive to use tax loopholes. 165
Thus, with the minimum tax raising the effective rate of high income
individuals for capital gains to a 35 percent range, and the maximum tax
lowering the maximum rate on ordinary income to 50 percent (if no
preferences were present), Surrey would have achieved his agenda of a
decade and a half earlier.
President Lyndon Johnson refused to release the Surrey Tax Reform
Studies and Proposals even though Congress had directed him to submit
specific tax reform proposals by the end of 1968. 166 On January 17, 1969
just three days prior to President Richard Nixon taking office, Treasury
Secretary Barr (who held office just eighteen days) warned of a "taxpayer's
revolt" pointing to the 155 individuals with adjusted gross incomes of
$200,000 or more-$1,522,000 in 2004 dollars (including 25 with incomes
topping $1,000,000)- who paid no federal income tax in 1967; and handed
the Surrey Papers over to Treasury Secretary-Designate Kennedy. 167

164. Surrey Papers, pt. 2, supra note 154, at 172.
165. Porter, supra note 154; cf H.R. REP. No. 413, at 208 ("The 50-percent limit on the
tax rate applicable to earned income was adopted not as a tax relief measure but to reduce
the pressure for the use of tax loopholes.").
166. On December 31, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson formally advised Congress of
the existence of the Treasury Tax Reform Studies and Proposals and of his decision to make
no recommendations to Congress in light of his leaving office in January 1969. Surrey
Papers, pt. I, supra note 154, at iii. See Congressionally Initiated Tax Reform Bill Enacted,
25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 596 (1969); 1969 House Hearings, pt. 7, supra note 8, at 2358
(statement of Sen. Javits ).
167. Porter, supra note 154. See 115 CONG. REC., pt. 7, H22562 (1969) (statement of
House Ways and Means Chair Wilbur Mills); accord, Tax Reform Act of 1969: Hearings on
HR. 13270 Before the Senate Finance Committee, pt. 26, 91 st Cong. 35484 (1969)
[hereinafter 1969 Senate Hearings] (statement of Senate Finance Comm. Chair, Russell
Long); Tax Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on HR. 10612 Before the Senate Finance
Committee, pt. 4, 94th Cong. 1004-05 (1976) [hereinafter 1975 Senate Hearings] (statement
of former Undersecretary Walker) (constituent ire ignited by Barr revelation in January
exploded with the addition of the Vietnam War gasoline surtax on April 1969 returns).
The real problem was not the zero tax millionaires, most of whom had non-abusive
causes for paying no taxes as Assistant Secretary Cohen pointed out. 1969 House Hearings,
pt. 14, supra note 8, at 5486-87 (statement of Assistant Sec'y Ed Cohen); see also 1969
Senate Hearings, supra at 639-40 (1969) (colloquy between Assistant Sec 'y of the Treasury
for Tax Policy Ed Cohen and Sen. Williams, R-Del.). The story improved with the telling.
122 CONG. REC. Sl8814, pt. 15 (June 17, 1976) (statement of Chair Long, D-La.). In my
opinion, the real problem was the lower effective rates on the upper income taxpayers as a
whole. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
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The 1969 House Hearings revealed a split on capital gains between two
sides. The first was comprised of academic and labor witnesses and
Members of Congress favoring some of the following capital gains
reforms: extending the holding period to one year; repealing the alternative
25 percent rate; taxing unrealized appreciation at death; allowing only
deduction of 50 percent of capital losses against ordinary income;
tightening up capital asset definitions; tightening up tax-free exchanges;
and even substituting income averaging for a percentage exclusion. 168
Their oppsition consisted of conservative economists, stock exchange
representatives and investor group witnesses who favored the status quo;
advocated an increased preference along the 1920's lines with shorter
holding periods and a special interest repeal of depreciation recapture; and
only rarely called for channeling the preference by tightening the definition
or adopting a 1930's sliding scale-like holding period. 169 Both sides byand-large rehashed arguments raised in the Mills tax policy Hearings over
the previous decade. Responding to the Surrey Papers' strong criticism of

168. See, e.g., 1969 House Hearings, pt. 12, supra note 8, at 4269 (statement of former
Rep. Schmidhauser); id. at 4318-19 (statement of Rep. Bingham); id. at 4189 (statement of
Rep. Addabbo); id. at 4471, 4474-75 (statement of Rep. Adams); id., pt. 12, at 4536
(statement of Stanford Research Inst. Prof. Throop Smith); id. at 4267 (statement of Colum.
Prof. Shoup); id., pt. 13, at 5001 (statement of Penn. Prof. Bernard Wolfman); id., pt. 12, at
4263 (H & R Block Pres. Block); id., pt. 13, at 4891-92 (statement of Stanford Ross, Esq.);
id., pt. 8, at 3087-90 (statement of Reuben Clark, Esq.); id., pt. 13, at 4602 (statement of
UA W President Reuther).
169. E.g., 1969 House Hearings, pt. 12, supra note 8, at 4253-54 (statement of Norman
Ture, economist).
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capital gains for timber royalties, 170 timber interests were especially wellrepresented in the capital gains discussion. 171
House Ways and Means Committee Chair Mills was unwilling to wait
for a comprehensive survey promised by the Nixon Administration by
November 30, 1969. 172 In marathon executive sessions, the Committee
reported out a bill, and won its passage in the House before the summer
recess to the amazement of friends and foes alike. 173 The House bill

170. The Surrey Papers critiqued capital gains for timber royalties, focusing on the
heavy concentration in a handful of corporations. Sixteen of the largest timber and plywood
corporations had more than 50 percent of their income from timber royalties, as compared to
the overall corporate pattern of only five percent of income from capital gains. The five
largest wood processing corporations had half of their corporate capital gains from timber,
with the largest corporation enjoying 25 percent of the total corporate timber royalties.
Surrey Papers, pt. I, supra note 154, at 140 and id., pt. 3, at 434-38, respectively. The
Surrey Papers also argued that the tax benefit of timber (and coal) royalties
disproportionately went to high income individuals. "Of the 43,977 taxable [1962] returns
with net gain or loss from timber and coal, 3,427 returns had adjusted gross income of
$25,000 or more [about $155,000 in 2004 dollars, and] ... reported 25.4 percent of the
gross gains." !d., pt. 3, at 435. In fact this was the mirror image of stock transactions where
75 percent of the gains were concentrated above that level. See table for net long-term
capital gains, supra note 133. In any event, undoubtedly reflecting the 1963-64 experience,
the Surrey Papers made no explicit recommendation as to timber royalties.
171. The members of the Ways and Means Committee appeared particularly wellcoached, and were sent to stage colloquies with public witnesses, to "establish" that (I)
timber needed the capital gains preference because of the long time it took for a stand of
forest to mature (twenty to fifty even seventy years) and the resulting low rate of return,
E.g., 1969 House Hearings, pt. 8, supra note 8, at 2859 (statement of Collett); (2) such
preference supported reforestation, which began to grow only after the introduction of
capital gains for timber royalties in 1943; e.g., id. at 2903 (statement of Rep. Dorn); id. at
2949 (statement of Dr. Zivnuska, Dean of School of Forestry and Conservation, University
of California); and (3) encouraged scientific management, development, and practices, e.g.,
id. at 2875-76 (colloquy between Rep. Landrum, D-Ga., and Collet and Langdale); id. at
2878 (colloquy between Rep. Ullman, D-Ore., and Collet). But timber's case was hurt a
little by the fact that a supply pinch had recently resulted in substantial price increases,
which particularly disturbed Congressmen with ties to developers, id. at 2878-79 (Rep. Joel
Broyhill, R-Va.). But see id. at 2822 (statement of Rep. Wyatt) (increase would have been
more without capital gains preference); id. at 2881 (colloquy between Rep. Watts, D-Ky.,
and Collet). More significantly, questioning drew out that the capital gains tax savings
ranged from I 0 percent to 20 percent of profits, id. at 2894-95 (colloquy between Rep.
Schneebeli and Stewart and Bendetsen); timber producers often bought mature stands, id. at
2899 (colloquy between Rep. Barber Conable, R-N.Y., and Bendetsen); and much of the
timber harvested came from stands owned by the Federal Government and managed by the
Forestry Service, id. at 2896 (statement of Bendetsen).
172. See 1969 House Hearings, pt. 14, supra note 8, at 5529 (colloquy between Rep.
John W. Byrnes, R-Ill., and Undersecretary Charles Walker and Assistant Sec'y Edwin
Cohen); Porter, supra note 154.
173. /d.
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generally erected two lines of defense against preferences: direct curbs and
surrogate limitations. 174 For capital gains, the House bill eliminated the 25
percent alternative maximum rate, imposed a 50 percent limit on the
amount of long-term capital losses deductible against ordinary income (to
parallel the then 50 percent deduction on long-term gains), lengthened the
holding period to one year, and pared the definition of capital gains slightly
(eliminating capital gains treatment of collections of letters and
memoranda, of lump sum distributions, and transfers of franchises in
certain circumstances). 175 It also imposed a minimum tax that would have
impacted more than 80 percent on the individual capital gains preference. 176
Witnesses testifying on the minimum tax (as contained in the Surrey
Papers) at the 1969 House Hearings either (a) favored it; 177 (b) would
strengthen it; 178 (c) were "sympathetic," but suggested alternatives; 179 or

174. 115 CONG. REC., pt. 17, at 22564 (1969) (statement of Chair Mills). A number of
Members of Congress called for such surrogate approaches. !d., pt. 10, at 12712 (statement
of Rep. Bertram Podell, 0-N.Y.); id., pt. 13, at 17855 (statement of Rep. Joshua Eilberg, 0Pa.). For an outstanding discussion of the policy of direct versus surrogate approaches to
tax shelters among the leading academicians, former Treasury officials and tax
administrators of the time, see Panel Discussions on Tax Reform (Invited Panelists) Before
the House Committee on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
175. H.R. 13270 91st Cong., §§ 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516(c), 1st Sess. (1969); see
H.R. REP. No. 413, pt. 1, supra note 161, at 144-64.
176. H.R. 13270, supra note 175, at§ 301; H.R. REP. No. 413, supra note 161, at 77-80.
The House bill included as tax preference items both the 50 percent individual long-term
capital gains deduction and tax-exempt interest. At the time, the Treasury knew that the
individual minimum tax would mostly tax capital gains. See 1969 House Hearings, pt. 14,
supra note 8, at 5524 (statement of Undersecretary of Treasury Walker). See infra note 221.
177. E.g., id., pt. 5, supra note 8, at 1793 (statement of Rep. McCarthey, 0-N.Y.); id. at
1802 (Statement of Rep. Ed Koch, 0-N.Y.).
178. !d., pt. 5, at 1776-77 (statement of former Comm'r Mortimer Caplin) (sound
beginning, strongly supported by late Senator Robert Kennedy, 0-N.Y., and owing much to
Senator Long's work, but should include accelerated depreciation and intangible drilling
costs); id., pt. 7, at 2356 (statement of Sen. Javits, R-N.Y.); id., pt. 12, at 4204-06
(statement of former Comm'r Sheldon Cohen) (it is unrealistic to assume that all
preferences giving rise to inequities can be corrected over the short run. The minimum tax,
however, prevents preferences from becoming tax escape routes, and should be strengthened
as Caplin and Javits recommend); id. at 4333 (Written statement of George Meany, AFLI
CIO) (if one can not immediately tax exempt and partially exempt income, e.g., impose a 25
percent rate on preferences, including capital gains, tax-exempt interest, appreciation in
charitable contributions, and accelerated depreciation except as to low-income housing); and
id., pt. 13, at 4590 (Statement of Walter Reuther, UA W) (the most serious defect is too
generous: a 50 percent ceiling on income can be sheltered; a rate should be 75 percent of the
existing graduated rate).
179. !d., pt. 12, supra note 8, at 4319 (statement of Rep. Bingham, 0- N.Y.) (it should be
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opposed it. A consensus of academics who favored directly attacking the
underlying abusesi 80 and special interest representatives, claimed that the
underlying abuses should be examined.I 8 I A lobbyist for the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce presciently argued that the new tax intended to obtain
revenue from relatively small numbers of persons would expand in burden
and scope until virtually all taxpayers come under a gross receipts tax.I 82
Its current incarnation (the individual Alternative Minimum Tax) covers 3
percent of taxpayers today but is projected to cover 30 percent by 2010.I 83
Representative George H.W. Bush complained that the individual side
cuts were to be paid for under the House bill in large part by tax increases
on the corporate side. I84 He also argued that the total individual side

the final safeguard if all else fails, and should supplement efforts to directly close tax
loopholes); id., pt. 14, at 5484-85 (Statement of Assistant Sec'y for Tax Policy Cohen) (tax
preference income should not include tax exempt income or capital gains preference; the
former because of Justice Department questions as to constitutionality, and the latter
because it could raise the capital gains effective rate to 35 percent).
180. !d., pt. 9, supra note 8, at 3409 (statement of Yale Prof. Wright) (imperfect
substitute for a direct attack on special tax privileges enjoyed by extractive industries); id.,
pt. 12, at 4255 (statement of Norman Ture) (reflects conviction that a frontal attack on
preferences is doomed to fail, and attempts a backdoor approach. This approach leaves out
as many troublesome items as are included, and would complicate the system. It sweeps
under the carpet some of the most serious issues of Federal tax policy); id. at 4269
(statement ofColum. Prof. Shoup) (prefers continuous rigorous examination one-by-one of
each preference; a minimum tax would slow if not stop efforts at specific reforms); id. at
4290 (statement of Wis. Profs. David and Miller) (misdirected and obscured real tax issues
while making only token changes in current inequities).
181. !d., pt. 8, supra note 8, at 3028 (statement of John Davidson, The Tax Council)
(solve abuses at the source, but advocated for lower capital gains rate-the chief preference
lowering effective rate of high income individuals; id., pt. 12, at 4516-17 (statement of
George Koch, Council of State Chambers of Commerce) (reexamine the validity of
preferences rather than the backdoor approach); id., pt. 12, at 4388 (statement of William
Barnes, Am. Inst. of Certified Public Accountants) (same; and would further complicate the
presently over-complicated system); see also id., pt. 14, at 5530 (statement of Rep. John W.
Byrnes, R-Wis.) ("!have always been somewhat concerned that, if we put our emphasis on
those proposals in the first instance, we may not focus the necessary attention on the
individual preferences.").
182. !d., pt. 12, at 4388 (statement of Walker Winter, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
183. IRS, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE'S 2003 ANNUAL
REPORT
5-6
(Dec.
31,
2003),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/nta_2003_annual_update_mcw_1-15-042.pdf (last accessed Apr. 2, 2005); see also
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX, AN OVERVIEW OF ITS
RATIONALE AND IMPACT ON [ND!VlDUAL TAXPAYERS (Aug., 2000), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg00180.pdf (last accessed Apr. 2, 2005).
184. 115 CONG. REC., pt. 17, at 22584 (Aug. 6, 1969) (statement of Rep. George H.W.
Bush, R-Tex.) ("Furthermore, I would ask, have we, in this legislation, affected the proper
balance between investment and consumption? Much of the revenue gain distributed to the
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package, as in the Revenue Act of 1964, was skewed to low and moderate
income taxpayers. 185 House Conservatives supported the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 because of tax relief, not because of tax reform. 186 House Liberals
supported it because of limitations on preferences. 187 With one exception,
this bi-partisan coalition was able to prevent the Conservative Coalition in
the House from emerging on the Tax Reform Act of 1969. 188
Representative George H.W. Bush, R-Tex., had the gall to cloak his
opposition to the minimum tax in the mantle of the small, black business
person 189 when actually 80 percent of its impact would fall on capital gains
sales of public stock held by the rich. 190 In contrast, Senator Jacob Javits,
R-N.Y., laid out a rationale (besides symbolic reform) to not directly attack
taxpayer by the tax cut is coming from corporations.").
185. !d., pt. 17, at 22567 (Aug. 6, 1969) (statement of House Ways and Means Comm.
Chair Mills).
186. !d. at 22582, 22768-69 (Aug. 6 and 7, 1969, respectively) (statement of Rep.
George H.W. Bush, R-Tex.) (also decried "trend towards centralization"). Bush ultimately
voted against the House bill on August 7, 1969. 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 611. Bush had
earlier criticized the 1969 Ways and Means Committee Report as eroding the difference
between capital and income, and opposed lengthening of the holding period, repeal of
individual maximum 25 percent capital gains rate and inclusion of the capital gains
deduction in the limitation on tax preferences, and the allocation of deduction provisions.
H.R. Rep. No. 413, supra note 161, at 225.
187. 115 CONG. REC., pt. 17, at 22572-73 (Aug. 6, 1969) (statement of Rep. James C.
Corman, D-Cal.); id. at 22796 (Aug. 7, 1969) (statement of Rep. John S. Monagan, DConn.).
188. 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at I 054 ("In the House, the coalition appeared only once in
connection with the tax reform bill.").
189. 1969 House Hearings, pt. 5, supra note 8, at 1805 (Rep. George Bush, R-Tex.)
("[U]nless we can find some way around that the small businessman gets clobbered, he gets
$10,000 gross income and he suffers a $15,000 loss of some sort, business doesn't go well,
he is just struggling along in the ghetto getting started, say under one of those small business
programs, that he should be taxed with a minimum tax on him regardless of the fact that he
is struggling to get a business started under say a black capitalism approach."). As
President, George H.W. Bush became known for his "choppy" sentences and "fractured
syntax." A.L. May, Jobs to Get Top Priority, Clinton Says; He Names Advisory Team for
"High Gear" Transition, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 13, 1992, at A-1; Charles-Gene
McDaniel, The Truth About Arkansas, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, at 42; Paul Richter,
The President-elect: Just the Average Joe (Or Bill); Personality: A Golf Duffer Who's Often
Tardy and Battles His Weight, Clinton Has Share of Human Foibles, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23,
1992, at A-1; Michael Kranish, Day of Decision; Emotions run high in Bush finale;
Campaign '92, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 1992, at I.
190. See infra note 221. George Bush represented a district in Houston, Texas, later
represented by Bill Archer, R-Tex., at which time it would be the 6th most wealthy
congressional districts in the nation. See David E. Rosenbaum, With a Passion for Tax Cuts,
and in Power, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1995, at A-I.
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preferences popularly called loopholes, and reduce them in the light of the
new standards of fairness and equity:
[S]ome of these preferences may be found desirable for retention for
social or economic reasons. When a taxpayer is in a position to take
advantage of a great number of these preferences at one time . . . the
resulting cumulative effect is the real inequity in our tax system.
Therefore, I urge ... as an interim step ... [that] we establish a minimum
tax below which tax liabilities would not be permitted by reason of the
preferences or loopholes to which I have referred. 191

The witnesses at the Senate Finance Hearings on the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 addressing capital gains reform overwhelmingly opposed the
House-passed reforms, particularly the repeal of the alternative 25 percent
capital gains rate, the lengthening of the holding period, and the elimination
of capital gains for lump-sum distributions from qualified retirement
plans. 192 Those witnesses not opposing the House capital gains proposals
generally thought that they did not go far enough, and should reach
unrealized capital appreciation at death, relying on the distributive effects
of a capital gains preference. 193 Moreover, the vocal Committee members,
191. 1969 House Hearings, pt. 7, supra note 8, at 2356 (Sen. Jacob Javits, R-N.Y.). See
also Hearings on High-Income Taxpayers and Related Partnership Tax Issues before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Ways & Means Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 68
(1985) (Assistant Sec 'y for Tax Policy Ronald Pearlman); cf Hearings on Tax Shelters,
Accounting Abuses, and Corporate and Securities Reforms before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1984) (Chapoton, Assistant Sec'y for Tax
Policy). Another liberal rationale offered later was that reliance on the minimum tax rather
than increased capital gains rates (in response to the charge that the 50 percent capital gains
deduction constituted at least 80 percent of the individual tax preference items) added
progressivity by increasing the effective rate on capital gains income only for higher income
individuals. 122 CONG. REC., pt. 16, 20239 (June 24, 1976) (statement of Sen. Walter
Mondale, D-Minn.). A conservative Senator scathingly replied that the minimum tax was
imposed, because Congress could not "find any other way to get to capital gains." /d. at
20244 (statement of Sen. William Brock, R-Tenn.).
192. E.g., 1969 Senate Hearings,pt. 3, supra note 167, at 955 (statements of Philip H.
Wielke, Rural-Small Town, Small City Coalition, Inc.); id. at 979-80 (Charles Stewart,
Pres. Mach. & Allied Prod's Inst.); id. at 1011-12 (Colum. Prof. of Econ. Saulnier); id. at
1018 ; (John Higgins, Chair Tax Comm. of Amer. Textile Mfrs. Inst.); id. at 1882-84
(statements of NYSE Pres. Haack); id. at 1904 (Merrill Lynch Pres. Donald Regan); id. at
1910 (Roland Bixler, Chair, the Tax Counsel); id. at 1923 (Gibraltar Growth Fund Pres.
Ehlers); id. at 1975 (Sears, Roebuck and Co. Pres. Wood); id. at 1986 (Council of ProfitSharing Indus. Chair Geisecke); id. at 2001 (William Drake and Henry Rothschild, Am.
Pension Conference).
193. !d., pt. 2, at 918 (Phillip Stem, Nat'! Comm. on Tax Justice); id., pt. 3, at 1928-31,
1941-43 (Statements ofNaval Acad. and U. Md. Econ. Prof. Hinrichs and Minn. Law Prof.
Waterbury) (showed capital gains preference biggest source of inequity causing effective
rate above $1 ,000,000 annual income to drop and advocated eliminating preference and
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particularly Chair Long, 194 were predisposed to view the House provisions
as disincentives to investment. Not surprisingly, the Senate Finance
Committee retreated on both direct and indirect capital gains tax reform by
limiting the 25 percent alternative capital gains rate to $140,000 of net
long-term capital gains provided that other preference income did not
exceed $10,000; restoring the six month holding period; and imposing only
a 5 percent minimum tax on tax preference items, 195 which included the
capital gains preference.
On the Floor, the Senate gutted the minimum tax on tax preferences by
providing an offset for ordinary income taxes paid, 196 which reduced the
potential revenue by more than 60 percent. 197 This offset required the

imposing taxation at death, substituting averaging and using revenues to reduce rate on
ordinary income to maximum rate of 40 percent to 50 percent, since no progressivity in
practice anyway) and (Minn. Law Prof. Waterbury), respectively.
194. E.g., id., pt. 3, at 1957 (statement of Sen. Robert Bennett, R-Utah, Senate Finance
Comm. Member); id., pt. 3, at 1905-06 (statement of Sen. Long, D-La.) (House changes
would cause capital to move to Canada where no capital gains tax), 1913 (lower capital
gains rates would induce greater investments).
195. S. REP. No. 552, supra note 103, at 113, 192-93, 200.
196. The Senators raised the alternative minimum tax rate to 10 percent, but the rate
increase was more than offset by the Miller amendment adding to the $30,000 trigger an
alternative floor of the regular income taxes paid for the year. 115 CONG. REC., pt. 28, at
38297 (Dec. 10, 1969) (statement of Sen. Jack Miller, R-Iowa). The Senate Finance
Committee provision would have raised $700 million; the Miller amendment was estimated
to pick up $740 million; id. at 38298 (Statement of Sen. Miller). Subsequent events,
however, showed that the Miller amendment in fact gutted at least the individual minimum
tax. The Conservative Coalition defeated an amendment by Senator Vance Hartke, D-Ind.,
which would have reduced the taxes offset by 50 percent. !d. at 38315 (Rollcall vote 52 nays
to 31 yeas). See 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 38-S (Republicans 35-1, Northern Democrats 238, and Southern Democrats 14-2). Technically the Conservative Coalition did not arise as to
the Miller amendment itself, because the Congressional Quarterly definition requires that a
majority of Republicans and Southern Democrats vote one way while a majority of
Northern Democrats vote the other. See text accompanying supra note 65. On the Miller
amendment a majority of all three groups voted yea. See 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 38-S
(Republicans 35-1, Northern Democrats 23-8 and Southern Democrats 14-2).
The Conservative Coalition also defeated amendments by Senator Edward
Kennedy, D-Mass., which would have added unrealized appreciation in charitable
contributions to the tax preference items, and would have substituted a four-bracket
graduated minimum tax schedule (as proposed in the Surrey Papers) in lieu of the five
percent rate reported out by the Senate Finance Committee. 25 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 34-S.
197. This offset came to be known as the "Executive Suite" loophole to tax reformers.
See 122 CONG. REC., pt. 16, 20206 (June 24, 1976) (statement of Sen. Walter Mondale, DMinn.); id. at 20209, 20225 (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.). The Miller
amendment, by providing an offset to the minimum tax base for regular income taxes paid,
"substantially cut the effectiveness of the minimum tax." 121 CONG. REC., pt. 29, 38291
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Senate to raise the minimum tax rate to 10 percent and include corporations
in order to approach the projected revenues from the House version. 198 The
Senate minimum tax provision prevailed in Conference. In the end
Congress enacted an extremely watered down version of Surrey's
minimum tax on tax preferences 199 (which principally applied to the capital
gains preference (80 percent or so of the individual tax preference items)200
and limited the alternative 25 percent maximum capital gains ceiling to
$50,000 of annual capital gain. 201
The justification for the individual mmrmum tax was "fairness" or
horizontal equity (i.e., all similarly situated taxpayers bear equal tax
burdens). 202 Existing tax law with high rates on ordinary income and a
deep capital gains preference of a maximum rate of 25 percent resulted in
large variations in the tax burdens placed on taxpayers who received
different kinds of income. 203 In general, high-income individuals earning

(Dec. 3, 1975) (statement of Rep. James C. Connan, D-Cal.) ("'n 1969, it was predicted that
the minimum tax for individuals would yield about $300 million annually, but in 1973 it
yielded only a disappointing $180 million."). The regular income tax offset accounted "for
about half of the gap between the minimum tax's nominal rate of I 0 percent and the
effective rate of 4.4 percent. ... It shelters tax loopwhole [sic] income of more than $2.5
billion that would otherwise be taxable at a minimum rate." 1d., pt. 30, at 38678 (Dec. 4,
1975) (statement of Rep. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa). It enabled 55 percent of the taxpayers
otherwise subject to the minimum tax to escape it. 122 CONG. REC., pt. 16, 20206 (June 24,
1976) (Statement of Sen. Mondale). Under the above figures, had the $2.5 billion of
preference income been subject to the I 0% minimum tax, the total revenue from the
individual sector from the preference tax would have been $250 million greater, or $530
million. Thus, the effectiveness was reduced by about 60%.
198. The House Bill would have increased tax liabilities by $40 million in 1970 and $85
million a year when fully effective, half from taxpayers with incomes of $50,000 and over.
H.R. REP. No. 413, supra note 161, at 80. The Cohen Treasury Proposal would have raised
$80 million a year when effective, but the big revenue raiser, as in the House bill, would
have been the allocation of deductions provision - $500 million a year. 1969 House
Hearings, pt. 14, supra note 8, at 5527-28 (statement of Assistant Sec'y for Tax Policy
Edwin Cohen). The Senate 5% minimum tax as reported out by the Finance Committee
would have raised $380 miiiion a year from corporations and $320 million from individuals
when fully effective (the allocation of deductions provisions was dropped). S. REP. 552,
supra note I 03, at 118.
199. 115 CONG. REC., pt. 17, at 22564 (Aug. 6, 1969) (statement of Chair Mills). A
number of Members of Congress caiied for such surrogate approaches. 1d., pt. I 0, at 12712
(May 15, 1969) (statement of Rep. Bertram Podell, D-N.Y.); id., pt. 13, at 17855 (June 30,
1969) (statement of Rep. Joshua Eilberg, D-Pa.).
200. See infra note 221.
201. Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 301, 511, 83 .Stat. at 580-85, 636-37.
202. See 1969 House Hearings, pt. 4, supra note 8 and S. REP. No. 552, supra note I 03,
at 112.
203. Surrey Papers, pt. I, supra note 154, at 81-82, 88, 95-98.
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the bulk of their income from personal services were taxed at high effective
rates (60 to 65 percent) near the nominal top rates; meanwhile, those who
reported the bulk of their income from capital gains or who could benefit
from accelerated depreciation on real estate paid relatively low rates of tax
(20 to 25 percent) primarily due to capital gains income. 204 In fact,
individuals with high incomes who could benefit from these provisions
might pay lower average rates of tax than many individuals with modest
.
205
mcomes.
For example, most taxpayers with incomes in the $20,000 to $50,000
income class pay rates between 20 percent and 30 percent. Most taxpayers
with incomes between $500,000 and $1 million also pay rates of 20
percent; however, the latter group has, on the average, about twenty times
the income of the former group.
Another way of examining the favorable treatment of certain higher
income tax returns is to observe that almost five of every ten returns with
income ranging from $50,000 to $500,000 pays an effect rate of tax of less
than 30 percent, while almost seven out of every ten returns with income
from $500,000 to $1 million and about eight out of ten returns with income
in excess of $1 million pay an average tax rate lower that than 30 percent.
This runs contrary to the expected results of a nominally progressive tax
rate schedule. 206
The splitting of the Conservative Coalition on capital gains in the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 by the bi-partisan Liberal-Conservative Coalition was
facilitated, if not driven, by (a) the popular outrage at zero tax millionaires
arising from Treasury's disclosure very late in the lame duck Johnson
Administration, 207 and (b) the Vietnam War surtax, 208 enabling Chair Mills
to direct the tax reform that he had been preparing for the previous fifteen
years. 209 Popular enthusiasm for change opened the way for the tax

204. !d. at 82, 84, II 0.
205. S. REP. No. 552, supra note I 033, at 122; Surrey Papers, pt. I, supra note 154, at
96.
206. !d. at 96-97.
207. See 1969 Senate Hearings, pt. 26, supra note 167. In total, the disclosure indicated
155 high-income zero-tax individual taxpayers including 22 millionaires.
208. See id. I still remember filling out my first income tax return after law school.
Calculating the tax, and adding I 0 percent for the "the Vietnam War surtax" provoked even
more antipathy to that war (in which my brother Bob was then serving).
209. On the House floor, Mills opened the debate on the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
proclaiming that "this is the day that I have looked forward to for a long, long time." 115
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reformers to side step reluctance to reform capital gains taxation by the
210
Nixon Administration and the Senate Finance Chair.
The individual minimum tax initially served as a mere "excise or
211
privilege tax" on the use of tax preferences.
The low minimum tax rate,
particularly the offset for regular income taxes paid, rendered the individual
212
minimum tax on preferences only "symbolic reform."
By publicizing the
problem, but merely enacting a weakened surrogate technique, the
reformers set the stage for endless further incremental revisions until true
reform was reached, the problem went away, or tax transaction costs
213
outweighed the tax benefits.
Meanwhile, the populace became cynical
214
about Federal taxes and changed perceptions about its faimess.

B. 1970'S: SPECIAL INTERESTS FULLY UNCLOAKED AND FIRST
APPEARANCE OF THE 28 PERCENT RATE

1.

Prelude to the Tax Reform Act of 1976

In March 1973, the House Ways and Means Committee held extensive
panel discussions and public hearings on tax reform, but did not report out
215
a bill.
In 1974, with the Nixon Administration severely weakened by the
Watergate scandal, the impetus for tax reform shifted to Congress. From

CONG. REC., pt. 17, at H22562 (statement of Chair Mills).
210. Tax reform had not been among Nixon's top priorities, but initiative shifted to
Congress where concerned legislators were inundated by irate mail from constituents
protesting tax breaks for the rich. Porter, supra note 154. See also 115 CONG. REC., pt. I 7,
at 22562. For Long's attitude, see 1969 Senate Hearings, pt. 3, supra note 167.
211. See Daniel Shaviro, Perception, Reality and Strategy: The New Alternative
Minimum Tax, 66 TAXES 91,92 n.9 (1988).
212. See LEFF, supra note 61.
213. See Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and
Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 946, 960--61 (1987).
214. Thomas F. Field, The Emperor Has No Clothes, 101 TAX NOTES 1125 (2003) (the
"public has lost faith in the claim that our tax system treats both rich and poor fairly. For a
generation, tax reformers have highlighted the ability of wealthy taxpayers to successfully
avoid their tax burdens. Simultaneously, tax planners have trumpeted their ability to reduce
taxes through clever stratagem. Together they have convinced the public that 'only little
people pay taxes."'). Reformers' exposes via the media may have opened the eyes of many
to opportunities of such tax reductions. But cf Daniel Shaviro, Perception, Reality &
Strategy: The New Alternative Minimum Tax, 66 TAXES 91, 98 (1988) ("the significance of
the connection between [publicized] tax avoidance and reduced compliance ... is far from
clear").
215. Stanley Surrey, Reflections on the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 25 CLEVELAND ST. L.
REV. 303, 304 (1976).
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late August 1974 to mid-September 1974 (bracketing President Nixon's
August 9 resignation) the House Ways & Means Committee, as a follow-up
to the 1973 Hearings, reached a number of tentative decisions in executive
mark-up sessions. These included the alternative minimum tax and an
additional sliding scale capital gains deduction, reminiscent of 1934 and
1963, but only for securities, businesses and non-residential real estate of 1
percent per year holding period up to 25 percent of the gain realized upon
disposition. 216 Chair Mills, reflecting political weakness resulting from
scandals of his own, was unable to secure passage in the House of this
double-dipping, sliding scale capital deduction regime. 217
In 1974, Representative AI Ullman, D-Ore., replaced Mills as Chair,
and was also unable to achieve any capital gains legislation for a variety of
reasons. 218 Yet proposals for (1) additional sliding scale capital gains
deductions (or indexing of basis for inflation) and (2) differentiation
between categories of capital gains assets were to resurface repeatedly over

216. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93D CONG., BRIEF DESCRIPTION
OF TENTATIVE DECISIONS FOR DRAFTING PURPOSES ON TAX REFORM PROPOSALS (Comm.
Print Aug. 22, 1974) (ultimate annual revenue loss of $850 million, but in the next few
years, revenue gains from an increase in realizations of locked-in capital gains). In the 1969
House Hearings, Chair Mills had indicated a preference for a sliding scale, either applying
to the entire gain, or working in conjunction with a 50 percent exclusion. This would
account for inflation over a long period of time, 25 years for example. 1969 House
Hearing, pt. 14, supra note 8, at 5524.
217. See 39 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 4, I 0, 182 (1974).
218. Surrey notes that the Committee had increased by 50 percent, with over half of all
new members favoring tax reform, even thought they were unversed in tax matters. Surrey,
supra note 215, at 303-04. Moreover, AI Ullman was a "decent man," but a weak Chair.
See Peter Milius, Ullman shakes "Loser" Tag in Give-and-Take with Long, WASH. PosT,
Sept. 13, 1976, at C7. Part of the problem was the shift from the Mills school of consensus
building to a committee accountable to the majority party in the House. CONABLE, supra
note 150, at 23. Conventional wisdom holds that AI Ullman, D-Ore., lost his re-election,
notwithstanding his Chairmanship, due to his sponsoring the Tax Restructuring Act of 1979,
H.R. 5665, 96th Cong. (1979), which would have integrated individual and corporate
income taxes and imposed a I 0 percent value added tax on sales of property and services at
each stage of the production and distribution process). Jane Seaberry, Treasury Dept.
Releases VAT Study; Tax Called Close Contender to Plan Submitted by Regan, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 22, 1984 at B I; Michael White, "Spreading the pain" tax reform will mean
juggling "fairness," THE GUARDIAN (London), July 15, 1985. ("Everyone remembers the
horrible fate of Rosty's predecessor, AI Ullman, voted out of office for backing VAT.");
Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Will U.S. Ever Adopt a Consumption Tax?, 93 TAX NOTES
TODAY 238-S (1993). In any event, it soon died because the Secretary of Treasury opposed
it and no other Committee members supported it. John Copelan, Burying the Income Tax?,
95 TAX NOTES TODAY 171-52 (Aug. 31, 1995)
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the ensuing decades. 219 The other recurring capital gains taxation issues
before Congress throughout the tumultuous 1970's were mostly carry-overs
from the unfulfilled capital gains reform of the 1960's including: (3) the
length of long-term capital gains holding period, (4) the treatment of capital
losses, (5) the taxation of unrealized capital appreciation at death (or the
second best alternative of a carryover basis), and (6) the capital gains tax
rate (including the minimum tax on tax preferences).
2. Tax Reform Act of 1976: High Water Mark of first Wave ofTax
Reform
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 enacted by the "Watergate Baby"
. 11y strengthened the mmrmum
. .
tax. 221 E.rg hty percent
Congress220 sub stantla
of the covered preferences for individuals consisted of the 50 percent longterm capital gains deduction. 222 Chair Russell Long, D-La., objected,

219. After the window covered by this article, 1989, 1992
220. Public Hearings and Panel Discussions on Federal Estate and Gift Taxes before
the House Ways and Means Committee, pt. I, 94th Cong. (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Panel
Discussions] (statement of Rep. Barber Conable) ("this is a very liberal Congress"); 1975
Senate Hearings, supra note 167, at 1684, 1703 (statement of Sen. Carl Curtis and Sen.
Long). See also Surrey, supra note 215, at 305 (Sen. Long in defending the Committee bill
on the Senate floor "was pressed by a tax reform group better informed and more ably led
than the Senate had seen before. The center of this activity was Senator Edward Kennedy,
who ... coordinated a steady drumfire against the bill."). However, by-and-large the
Liberal Coalition's amendments failed on the Senate floor, often to the Conservative
Coalition, including an attempt to eliminate the minimum tax regular income tax offset. See
32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 50-51 (1976). In a "rare victory for the liberals" they did defeat the
Conservative Coalition, id. at 61, attempting to amend the Senate bill to provide an
additional sliding scale deduction of I% a year up to twenty-five years with a maximum
deduction of 75%. The coalition relied mostly on need for additional capital and mobility
and to a lesser degree on inflation. 122 CONG. REC, pt. 21, at S26096-98, S26099-1 02
(Aug. 6, 1976) (statement of Sen. Curtis, Sen. Charles Percy and Sen. Cliff Hansen). A
Liberal Coalition, defeating the amendment 39 to 44 (Republicans and Southern Democrats
supported it 23 to 7 and I 0 to 8, respectively, roll call vote 493, id. at S261 02, relied upon
arguments that (I) inflation gains were unrelated to time held; (2) a sliding scale would
result in more lock-in, and (3) 66 percent of the benefits would go to taxpayers earning
$50,000 and above ($164,590 in 2004 dollars). !d. at S26092 and S26095 (Statement of
Sen. Ed Muskie and Sen. Ted Kennedy).
221. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 301, 90 Stat. 1520, 1549-50.
222. In the debate leading up to the Tax Reform Act of 1976 most spoke of 80 percent of
the individual tax preference items consisting of the 50 percent capital gains preference.
E.g., 1976 Panel Discussions, supra note 220, at 80 (statement of Rep. Duncan); 1975
Senate Hearings, pt. I, supra 167, at 42 (statement of Sec'y of the Treasury Bill Simon);
122 CONG. REC., pt. 16, at S20232 (June 24, 1976) (statement of Chair Long) (80 to 90
percent of the minimum tax revenues come out of capital gains); id. at S20240 (statement of
Sen. Bennett Johnson)(" ... I am wondering of that 75 or 80 percent what percentage is paid
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however, to a floor amendment by Senator Edward Kennedy, D-Mass.,
reducing the minimum offset for regular taxes to 50 percent of the taxes
paid, because if the Senate Conferees go to conference with a 50 percent
offset as opposed to the House's total elimination, the compromise would
be an offset of 25 percent of regular taxes paid. 223 That amendment was
defeated 44 to 35 by the Conservative Coalition. 224 Additionally, the tax
reformers, spearheaded by Senator Kennedy, enacted "carryover basis" at
death, a watered down substitute for taxation at death of unrealized
appreciation in capital assets. 225
Significantly, the Hearings and floor debate on capital gains and related
items such as minimum tax, taxation of unrealized appreciation, and tax
shelters over the decade of the 1970's revealed more clearly than ever (a)
the relative weight of the special interests for which the majority in
Congress now ostensibly maintained the capital gains preference
(consisting of small business, farming, ranching and timber interests,
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs); 226 (b) the processes of masking the
by high rollers and what percentage would be paid by ordinary people selling homes, and
that sort of thing."); S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong. (1976) (existing minimum tax is largely a
tax on long-term capital gains "which constitutes about seven-eighths of the income in the
minimum base"). In short, the realized capital gains of wealthy taxpayers would have been
taxed in the 30 percent range rather than in the low 20 percent range.
223. 122 CONG. REC., pt. 21, at S26164 (Aug. 6, 1976)
224. Rollcall vote No. 503. !d. at S26164; 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 69-S (Republicans
and Southern Democrats opposed it 25 to 4 and 10 to 5, respectively; while Northern
Democrats supported it 26 to 9).
225. Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 2005, 90 Stat. 1872-76. The House Ways and Means
initially reported the ambitious, long-postponed restructuring of the estate and gift tax (H.R.
14844), which by a 24 to 10 vote included carryover basis at death of capital assets. 32
CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 65. Professor Surrey appears the conceptual father of this
compromise to taxation of capital appreciation at death. 1959 Panel Discussions, supra
note 118, at 710-11 (statement of Prof. Surrey). Heated opposition on the Floor by the
Conservative Coalition led to withdrawal of the bill by Chair Ullman on August 30, 1976.
32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 66-67. The Senate Tax Reform Bill of 1976 contained, however,
estate and gift tax reform and the Conference bill adopted carryover basis as well. !d. at 64.
On the House side, the Conference estate and gift tax provisions were separately voted on
and an attempt by the Conservative Coalition to delete carryover basis was defeated 229 to
181. Rollcall vote No. 740. 122 CONG. REC., pt. 24, at H30858-59 (Sept. 16, 1976).
Republicans supported the attempt 129 to 9, and Southern Democrats tied 42 to 42, while
Northern Democrats opposed it 178 to 10. 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 158-H and 65-S
(1976). Interestingly by this point Professor Surrey had changed his tune, severely
criticizing carryover basis. Surrey, supra note 215 at 326-27.
226. Revenue Act of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 13511 Before the Senate Finance
Committee, pt. 4, 95th Cong. (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Senate Hearings] (statement of
Robert Brandon, Director of Public Citizen's Tax Reform Research Group) (75 percent of
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real special interests in capital gains tax legislation; 227 and (c) the
distributive effects of the capital gains preference. 228
Senator Lloyd Bentsen, D-Tex. (subsequently Chair of the Senate
Finance Committee and President Clinton's first Secretary of the Treasury),
confirmed in a 197 6 colloquy with Treasury Secretary Bill Simon that a
major Congressional target of an additional sliding capital gains deduction
proposed by the Ford Administration was retirement bailouts by small
businessman. 229 After being chastised by Senator Abraham Ribicoff, DConn.,230 for arguing that an increased capital gains preference was the
most effective way to encourage more investment by small income
taxpayers, 231 when the brokerage firm's true interest was the large investor,
"capital gains reduction would go to non-stock-market-related investment, primarily in real
estate speculation, farmland speculation and the like--not very productive investment.");
accord, id. at 759 (statement of Sen. Bentsen, D-Tex.); 124 CONG. REC., pt. 124, at S35824,
S35249-50 (Oct. I 0, 1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). In fact the decreased percentage of
capital gains attributable to stock was in large part caused by the recognition of recent stock
market losses. See supra note I 0 I and infra note 261.
227. See infra text accompanying notes 231-33.
228. 1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 4, supra note 226, at 755 (Under Hansen-Steiger bill
3000 people earning over $1 ,000,000 [$2,870,000 in 2004 dollars] a year would get tax
reductions averaging over $200,000 each [$574,500 in 2004 dollars] - 40 percent of the
revenue reduction under the bill - and average reductions of $60,000 each [$172,400 in
2004 dollars] would result for the 20,000 individuals earning over $200,000 a year
[$574,500 in 2004 dollars] with no benefits to 99.4 percent of individuals or to 93 percent of
the individuals reporting capital gains; similar statistics for the House bill except 94 percent
of individuals reporting capital gains would receive no benefit from proposed cuts). See also
124 CONG. REC., pt. 26, at S35261 (Oct. I 0, 1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (distributive
effects of70 percent capital gains deduction).
229. Hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1976 Before the Senate Finance Committee,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, 43 (1976).
230. Senator Ribicoff preferring an argument for the true interest of the firm, asked what
percentage was new customers, the witness stated that a quarter of Merrill Lynch's new
individual accounts were opened by customers with incomes under $15,000 ($43,090 in
2004 dollars) and the median income was about $22,000 ($63,200 in 2004 dollars). !d. at
1845-46.
231. Senator Ribicoff stated that:
And while I'm certainly aware of the need for large-scale investments by wealthy
individuals and major institutions, we also need the cumulative contributions of
the smaller investor. The small investors are especially conscious of the fact that
the Government is their partner in gains, but not in losses; that many of their longterm gains result from inflation; and above all, that making any change in their
investments requires the surrender of part of the total capital built up over the
years. This hits hardest those in or near retirement who, as a matter of prudence,
should now seek out more conservative, income-type securities but who, to do so,
must surrender part of their income-producing assets.
!d.
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a spokesman for Merrill Lynch & Co explained that his real point was that
an investor retiring from a small business was subject to high capital gains
taxes in one year. 232 Thus, the witness just dug his cloaking hole deeper,
since stock of a small business entrepreneur isn't even listed on the stock
exchanges. Capital gains cuts proponents often cloaked their interests in
the mantle of the small businessmen and residences, 233 which even then
were largely taken out of capital gain realizations with tax-free roll-overs
into another home until age fifty- five, when a $100,000 gain exclusion
became available. 234
3.

Revenue Act of 1978: Pendulum of Tax Reform Swings Back Towards
the Rich- Indexing Proposals and 60 Percent Capital Gains Deduction

In the Revenue Act of 1978, the pendulum of tax reform swung back as
the Conservative Coalition reversed the tax legislation pattern that began
with the Revenue Act of 1964's skewing of tax benefits to the lower and
middle income groups. The 1978 Act provided proportionally greater
benefits to higher income groups, epitomized in the direct and indirect
capital gains cuts. 235 The Conservative Coalition was bolstered by the
raging inflation increasing the phantom element in capital gains and the
"tax revolt"236 engendered in part by popular outrage at "bracket creep"237

232. "I think the point I was trying to make is that the capital gains tax has fully as great
if not greater impact of the investor who has one or two investments in the market [sic] and
might for instance have invested in his own company, a growth investment for years, and
when he gets-- when he retires he has a transaction which may result in a 42-percent tax on
that transaction in 1 year." !d. at 1850 (statement of Chrystie ).
233. E.g., 124CONG.REC.,pt.l9,atH25474(Aug.l0, 1978)(statementofRep. Bill
Frenzel) (inflation gain in home). See also H.R. REP. No. 1445, 95th Con g., 2d Sess. 119
(1978) ("In addition, the committee believes that the present level of capital gains taxes has
contributed to the shortage of investment funds needed for small businesses and for capital
formation generally. Moreover, the committee believes that it is inappropriate to subject
many once-in-a-lifetime gains on the sale ofproperty, such as small businesses or personal
residences, to the minimum tax.") (emphasis added).
234. Internal Revenue Code of 1954 §§ 121, 1034.
235. 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 219 (1978); see generally Art Pine, $18.7 Billion Tax Cut
Sent to the White House, WASH. PosT, Oct. 16, 1978, A-1, A-9.
236. 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 219 ("[L]awmakers, riding the crest of a middle class
'taxpayer's revolt,' reversed some of the prized liberal 'reforms' of the past- cutting back
the minimum tax on preferences, and approving a potentially fatal delay of ... [carryover
basis]."); 1978 Senate Hearings pt. 4, supra note 226, at 834 (statement of Sen. William V.
Roth, Jr.) (tax revolt has trumped in Congress income redistribution and higher capital gains
rates); see generally Robert G. Kaiser & Mary Russel, A Middle-Class Congress- Haves
Over Have-Nots, WASH. PosT, Oct. 15, 1978, A-1 ("Majorities in both House and Senate
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ansmg from increases in nominal compensation due to such inflation,
which elevated taxpayers into higher brackets without any increase in real
compensation.
The story of the increase in the capital gains preference enacted in 1978
on the ruins of President Jimmy Carter's capital gains tax proposals238
reveals the Conservative Coalition's strength at this time. President Carter
had campaigned in 1976 on repeal of the capital gains preference among
other tax reforms, repeatedly declaiming that the Federal tax system is "a
disgrace to the human race." 239 This united in opposition the capital gains
special interests that forced President Carter to back down on repeal. He

were searching feverishly for legislative Acts that could cater to a 'tax revolt' that many
members believed was sweeping the country."). See generally E.J. DIONNE, WHY
AMERICANS HATE POLITICS 246 (1991) ("[I]nflation raised tax rates on the middle class so
high and so suddenly that its members could not believe that what they were getting out of
government had any connection with what they were paying. The New Deal had taught that
government was the middle class's friend. The inflation-tax surge of the 1970s taught that
government was the enemy."). Others explained the Republican successes in the 1970's and
1980's Presidential Campaigns (Nixon, Reagan and Bush) in capturing the votes ofworking
class white males, who formerly voted the Democratic ticket (often, incorrectly called
"Reagan Democrats") first in the South and then in the Northern, often ethnic, white
working class neighborhoods as resting on a linked-chain of (a) reaction to the civil rights
movement (school desegregation in the South followed by cross neighborhood bussing in
the North as well affirmative action in the workplace), and (b) the above "tax revolt"
coupled with the perception that the Federal taxes were largely being redistributed to
minorities, reinforced by (c) culturally potent "rights" and "value" issues. T.B. EDSALL &
M.D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION passim (1991) ("Under the banner of a conservative
'egalitarianism,' the political right can maintain the loyalty of its low-income supporters by
calling for an end to 'reverse discrimination,' while simultaneously maintaining the loyalty
of the richest citizens by shaping to their advantage government policies that provide them
with the greatest economic benefits.").
237. "Bracket creep" is taxation of the same real income at higher marginal and effective
rates due to inflation. What happened during the 1970's and 1980's was that wages at the
bottom did not keep up with inflation. See infra note 375.
238. 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 219 ("The bill bore little resemblance to the tax program
the president had proposed in January. Almost all of his proposed 'reforms,' except for a
few tokens, had been scrapped, and the cuts were much more skewed towards the upper end
of the income scale than he had recommended.").
239. Carter repeatedly used this phrase on the stump and in his acceptance speech at the
Democratic National Convention.
It is time for a complete overhaul of our tax system. I still tell you: It is a disgrace
to the human race. All my life I have heard promises of tax reform, but it never
quite happens. With your help, we are finally going to make it happen! And you
can depend on it!
Text of Carter's Speech Accepting the Nomination, 510 FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS
DIGEST, at AI (July 17, 1976).
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still proposed tightening up on capital gains on high income individuals. 240
Once the capital gains lobby was geared up with no major defensive battle
to fight, it shifted to the offense of routing the capital gains reformers. 241
Consequentially, the House Conservative Coalition242 passed, over the
objections of then Chair AI Ullman, D-Ore., 243 and future Chair Rep. Dan
Rostenkowski, D-111.,244 an additional sliding scale deduction of 1 percent
per year up to twenty-five years for a maximum deduction of75 percent for
stock and depreciable capital assets. The primary rationale for the "double

240. President Carter proposed eliminating the residual individual alternative capital
gains rate and eliminating the minimum tax offset of Yz of the regular taxes. Message from
the President of the United States Transmitting Proposals for Tax Reductions and Reform,
95th Cong. (House Doc. No. 95-283 1978) (estimated annual increases in revenue of $284
million and $100 million, respectively); see generally 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 226.
241. Tax Cut for Capital Gains Stalled, 7 TAX NOTES 702 (June 19, 1978) (Because a
majority [the Conservative Coalition] on the Ways and Means favored the Steiger proposal
of indexing capital gains for inflation, Chair Ullman refused to call the Committee together
for three months lest it approve the Steiger amendment.). In the floor debate Rep. Charles
Yanik, D-Oh., recounted that President Carter and his advisors were "totally naive about the
fundamental legislative process and gave Chairman Ullman no help." 124 CONG. REC., pt.
19, at H25425 (Aug. I 0, 1978).
242. When Chair Ullman reconvened the Ways & Means Committee to consider the
Revenue Bill of 1978 after a three month delay (to allow the Carter Administration to lobby
for a lesser capital gains cut, unsuccessfully), the Committee in an unexpected move voted
21 to 16 to adopt the proposal of Rep. Bill Archer, R-Tex., indexing certain capital gains for
inflation. Art Pine, House Unit Votes Inflation Factor for Capital Gains, WASH. PosT, July
26, 1978, at A-I. "The measure was approved by an unlikely coalition of conservative
Republicans and Democrats, who are intent upon providing over a billion dollars in tax
relief for investors, and Democratic liberals, who aim to stop the momentum for the gains
cut by loading the Jones bill with enough tax breaks to insure its defeat on the House floor."
124 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 228 (1974); see generally Pine, supra. This Liberal strategy
backfired as a classic Conservative Coalition on capital gains passed a capital gains
indexing provision on the House floor. 124 CONG. REC., pt. 19, at H25474-75 (August I 0,
1978) (Rollcall vote No. 680, 249 yeas to 167 nays). The Conservative Coalition prevailed:
the Republicans supported the indexing amendment 142 to I; the Southern Democrats, 59 to
26; while the Northern Democrats opposed it 140 to 48. 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 170-H.
243. 124 CONG. REC., pt. 19, at H25472 (Aug. I 0, 1978) (statement of Chair Ullman)
("this is not the time or place to provide indexing on capital gains .... the committee is
going to look at capital formation. It may be that we will provide indexing in some form,
but we ought to do it in relation to some other moves that ought to be made at the same
time; so I strongly urge a no vote on this committee amendment.").
244. !d. at H25471 (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski) ("It is inconceivable that we can
choose to totally insulate from inflation the one type of income in this country already
cushioned from inflation-- capital gains [by the then 50 percent of gain exclusion]- while at
the same time ignore the eroding effect of inflation on savings, wages, and salaries.").
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dipping" additional deduction up to 25 percent was to offset the then
raging inflation. 245
The Finance Committee proposed a repeal of the residual 25 percent
maximum individual capital gains rate (on the first $50,000 of capital gain
in a tax year), long a goal of tax reformers, rationalizing that it was
unnecessary with a 70 percent deduction and, hence, maximum 21 percent
rate. 246 Given the tendency of Conferees to split the difference between
conflicting House and Senate versions of a tax bill, the author surmises that
Chairman Long and others expected a 60 percent deduction (with a
resultant 28 percent maximum individual capital gains rate) would prevail
in Conference. 247
And so it was that the Conference Committee
compromised on a 60 percent deduction, 248 which in conjunction with the
then maximum ordinary rate of 70 percent on investment income, resulted
in a maximum capital gains rate of 28 percent. At the same time, the

245. William H. Jones, Consumer Prices in Area Rise 112% in Two Months, WASH.
PosT, Dec. 23, 1978, at A-6; William H. Jones, AT& T Decision: Cut Rates Or Raise
Earnings Level, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1978, at E-3 (continuing inflation and interest rates at
near record levels); Art Pine, Boost in Prime Rate to 11% Triggers Big Market Drop; Prime
Rate Increase Triggers Market Drop; New Fears Of Recession, WASH. PosT, Nov. 14, 1978,
at D-7 (inflation rate 7 to 8 percent). While the effect of inflation on nominal gains and the
shortage of venture capital due to high capital gains rates frequently were heard in the
Hearings and on the Floor, see infra note 252, the crescendo was reached in the repeated
plaint that the maximum tax on capital gains was almost 50 percent counting the AMT and
maximum tax preference offset or poison. See e.g., 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 226,
at 672 (statements of Deans Stewart, Nat'! Oil Jobbers Council). The conservative coalition
in the House Ways and Means Committee and its Report by-and-large ignored the facts.
Farmers, and small businessmen in fact did better than inflation, 1976 Panel Discussions, pt.
2, supra note 220, at 1233-34; 1237, 1239 (statements of Prof. Michael J. Graetz as to farm
real estate). Moreover, many capital assets are financed with debt; new equity issues
followed the market rather than rates, and market followed interest rates; and the actual
average effective rate on capital gains was 18 percent. 1978 Senate Hearings, supra at 500,
755, 799, 801.
246. SeeS. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
247. President Carter was now receptive to a 28 percent rate. See 124 CONG. REC., pt.
26, at S35262 (Oct. I 0, 1978) (statement of Sen. Nelson, Senate Finance Committee
Member); 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 235. Also the House in 1963 had passed a 60 percent
rather than President Kennedy's proposed 70 percent deduction. In light of this, motivation
for requesting a ruling that Senator Nelson's amendment to limit the capital gains cut to 60
percent deduction out of order (due to a drafting defect) so that it never came to a vote, 34
CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 243, may have been to preserve bargaining power in the Conference.
Senator Ted Kennedy's amendment to delete the increase in the capital gains deduction to
70 percent was defeated 82 to I 0 by a majority of not only the Republicans (34 to 0) and
Southern Democrats (17 to I), but also a majority of Northern Democrats (31 to 9), 34
CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 68-S, so that technically, the Conservative Coalition did not emerge.
248. Revenue Act of 1978 § 401, 92 Stat. at 2866-67.
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Revenue Act of 1978 finally repealed the alternative 25 percent rate. 249
The Conservative Coalition also retroactively postponed the effective date
of"carryover basis"250 enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 in lieu of the
more meaningful taxation of unrealized capital appreciation at death, which
ultimately was repealed in 1980. 251 The Act fashioned a separate minimum
tax for capital gains and excess itemized deductions with a 10 - 25 percent
graduated rate, but with an offset for 100 percent of regular income taxes
paid, and repealed the preference poison. 252 This substantially weakened
the individual minimum tax as to the capital gains preference. 253
With a 50 percent capital gains deduction against a top rate of 70
percent (if the maximum capital gains rate of 25 percent were eliminated),
and the alternative minimum tax imposing a 15 percent tax on that
deduction or 8V4 percent, the top nominal capital gains rate would be 43V4
percent and higher if the earned income subject to a 50 percent maximum
were reduced by the capital gains deduction as well. 254 The 1978 Senate
Committee Report justified the increased capital gains deduction, rather
than just modifications to the Alternative Minimum Tax effecting a rate
reduction just at the top, as benefiting "all taxpayers with capital gains,
regardless of their respective income levels. " 255 Similarly it rationalized an
increased deduction as tending "to offset the effect of inflation," and
"unlike the automatic adjustments generally provided for in various
indexation proposals, it should not tend to exacerbate inflationary
increases. " 256
The testimony by private and public interest groups, economists and
their interchanges with the Senate Finance Committee members in the 1978

249. !d.
250. !d. § 515, 92 Stat. at 2884. See 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 234.
251. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-223, § 40l(a), 94 Stat. 229,
299.
252. Revenue Act of 1978 §§ 421, 441, 92 Stat 2872, 2878; see supra note 250.
253. Lawrence B. Lindsey, Giving and Tax Cuts: Recent Experience, 28 TAX NOTES
1399 (Sept. 16, 1985) (In 1978 tax treatment of capital gains under both the maximum tax
and the additional minimum tax was made far more generous.); John Zimmerman, Should
the Income Tax System Be Overhauled?, 25 TAX NOTES 1143, 1145 (Dec. 17, 1984)
("minimum and alternative minimum tax only applied to 262,000 of the more than 95
million filers in 1981. (Statistics of Income for Individual Returns for 1981, 3 S.O.I. Bull.
No. I, p. 9 (1983)). Less than I 0 percent involved capital gains and losses.").
254. See infra note 260.
255. S. REP. No. 1263, at 192.
256. !d.
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Senate Hearings reveal a somewhat higher level of capital gains debate
than in earlier years. More attention was being paid to econometric
studies, 257 which also surfaced in the floor debate, 258 and to consideration
of different solutions. 259 The Hearings and floor debate made extensive use
of symbols, particularly the alleged 50 percent maximum capital gains
effective rate, 260 the drying up of venture capital issues, 261 and the impact of

257. 1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 226, at 207 (statement of Ronald Bixler,
Nat'! Ass'n Mfrs.) (strong support of econometric analysis); id. at 693 (statement of
Feldstein) (perpetual revenue unlock theory, akin to an argument that capital gains cut
would unlock a flood of technological improvements); but see id. at 707 (statement of Nw.
Econ. Prof. Eisner) (response); id., pt. I, at 148 (statement of Sec'y Blumenthal critiquing
Feldstein's study); id., pt. I, at 698 (solloquy Sen. Hansen, R-Wyo., and Feldstein)
(Treasury had engaged Feldstein for study in question). Senator Bob Dole, R-Kan., sagely
concluded that different models yield different answers. !d., pt. I, at 832. See generally
DIONNE, supra note 236, at 250-51 ("Following a brilliant lobbying and public relations
campaign, complete with careful academic studies that were to become so central to
conservative political breakthroughs, Congress voted in 1978 to cut the capital gains tax.
The theory was not that the rich 'deserved' a break. It was that government would promote
more investment by taxing it less, and that everyone would benefit from a surge in
productivity and employment. Advocates of Calvin-Coolidge-style economics thus stole
away New Dealism's most potent word,jobs.").
Stagflation, the combination of inflation and a recession or stagnant economy, John
Jacobs, Carter Lacks Plan to Attack Inflation, U.S. Ex-Aide Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1978,
at A-3, had an adverse effect on the stock market in the 1970's, Sylvia Nasar, Private
Sector: An Economic Reality Check From Someone Who's Seen It All, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
29, 2002, at B-1; Tom Saler, Ready or Not, Old Man Inflation Is Knocking at the Door
Again, MIL WAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 9, 200 I, at D-1 ("inverse relationship between
inflation and valuations is one of the stock market's most enduring principles").
258. 124 CONG. REC., pt. 19, at H25427 (Aug. I 0, 1978) (statement of Rep. William
Steiger); accord id. at 25428 (statement of Rep. Frenzel); id. at H25431 (statement of Rep.
Archer).
259. 1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 226, at 651-52, 657 (statement of Arthur
Levit, Am. Stock Exchange) (credit for investment in small and medium sized firms;
analysis of which income classes benefit overlooks impact on investment psychology); id.,
pt. 2, at 835-44 (statement of Sec. Indus. Ass 'n) (discussion of capital gains alternatives).
260. See id., pt. 2, at 672 (written statement of Deans Stewart, Nat'! Oil Jobbers
Council); id., pt. 2, at 685 (written statement of William McCamant, Nat'! Ass'n of
Wholesaler-Distributors); id., pt. 2 at 886 (written statement of Dr. Ture in Econometric
Study); id., pt. 5, at I 088 (written statement of Mark Tanenbaum for the Int'l Council of
Shopping Ctrs). For the computations behind the "rare" 49.1 percent effective rate, see
Calvin Johnson, The Economic Waste in Cutting Capital Gains Taxes, 7 TAX NOTES 203 n.l
(Aug. 21, 1978) ("35% of this maximum arises because half of capital gains can be taxed
like other income ... [subject to 70 percent rate]. The other 14.1% ... arises because
capital gains is a tax preference, which is subject to the minimum tax ... and disqualifies a
taxpayer in part from the benefits of the 50% ceiling on the rate for his salary and other
service income."). For more extreme calculations, see 1978 CAPITAL GAINS REPORT, supra
note 45, at 37.
261. 1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 226, at 460 (colloquy between Sen. Charles
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Moreover, one of the co-sponsors of the Steiger amendment claimed broad

Hanson, R-Wyo., and former Sec'y of the Treasury Fowler) (stating that Tax Reform Acts
of 1969 and 1976 treatment of capital gains have had a very real impact in drying up sources
of equity capital); accord, 124 CONG. REC., pt. 19, at H25439 ( Aug. 10, 1978) (statement of
Rep. Stockman) (noting that supply of risk capital has almost entirely dried up so capital is
flowing to the low-growth industries rather than the high-productivity, high growth new
industries; entrepreneurship is waning because of the very high tax rates on high incomes.
"Today, if you put all those things together you can see why the economy has been growing
at such an anemic rate and why our rate of growth has been reduced."). But see 1978 Senate
Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 226, at 800 (written statement of Robert Brandon, Public
Citizen's Tax Reform Research Group) (debunking myth that Tax Reform Act of 1969
caused decline in capital gains realizations by showing lack of correlation with effective
dates of reforms and other causes such as bursting of the stock speculation bubble of the
1960s, guns and butter inflationary policy of the Johnson Administration, energy crisis and
Watergate scandal of the early 1970's, and inflation, devaluation of dollar and dislike of
President Carter of late 1970's); accord 124 CONG. REC., pt. 24, at S34825, S35250
(statement of Sen. Kennedy). Cf 1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 226, at 707
(statement ofNw. Econ. Prof. Eisner) (small investor left stock market, because of better tax
treatment of retirement plan investments and poor performance of market).
262. Indexing proponents frequently raised the symbol of the entrepreneur precluded
from raising capital by the minimum tax, id., pt. 2, at 216-1 7 (statement of Sen. Charles
Hansen, R-Wyo., S. Fin. Comm. Member); id., pt. 2, at 437 (statement of John Davidson,
Nat' I Taxpayers Union); id., pt. 2, at 476 (statement of Thomas Corcoran, Esq. [key FOR
Braintruster]); id., pt. 2, at 503 (statement of Chair Long). For the "homeowner" myth and
its debunking, see supra note 224. See also 124 CONG. REC., pt. 19, at H25428 (statement
of Rep. Frenzel); id. at H25437 (statement of Rep. Clausen); accord id. at H25474
(statement of Rep. Frenzel) (inflation gain in home). Rep. Dan Rostenkowski correctly
pointed out that inflation gain in homes was largely a red herring due to then Section 121 's
once-in-a-lifetime post-age fifty-five exclusion of up to $100,000 gain. 1d. at H25471.
Typically up to that age the tax-free rollover provisions of Section 1034 were used. See
1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 1, supra note 226, at 176 (statement of Sec'y Blumenthal); 1978
CAPITAL GAINS REPORT, supra note 45, at 20. For these reasons in 1985 gains from the sale
of principal residences accounted for only 2 percent of gains subject to tax. Gerald Auten &
Janette Wilson, Sales of Capital Assets Reported on Individual Income Tax Returns, 1985,
18 S.O.I. BULL. No.4, at 113, 115 (Spring 1998).
263. The actual average marginal rate on capital gains had been 18.5 percent and the
average capital gains tax rate for 1976 had been 15.9 percent, up from 14.5 percent in 1970
(beginning of minimum tax and of limitation on alternative 25 percent rate under the Tax
Reform Act of 1969) and 11.5 percent in 1954. New Work by Treasury on Capital Gains, 6
TAX NOTES 728 (June 26, 1978). The 18.5 percent figure was widely cited by tax reformers
in the Hearings. See 1978 Senate Hearings pt. 2, supra note 226, at 500 (statement of Leon
Shull, Am. for Democratic Action); id., pt. 4, at 755-56 (statement of Robert Brandon,
Public Citizen's Tax Reform Research Group) (capital gains still primary cause in high
income taxpayers paying little or no tax; further pointing out that carryover basis or even
taxation of capital appreciation at death would be better unlock capital transactions than a
rate reduction); id., pt. 4, at 799,801 (written statement of Brandon) (citing above Treasury
study).
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economic benefits from indexing: "[i]f enacted, our proposal will get this
country moving again. These are the very words used by President
Kennedy in the early 1960's when he proposed a bold tax reduction plan
slashing individual and corporate tax rates. " 264 The Representative
supported, of course, repeal of carryover basis, 265 while President Kennedy
had conditioned his capital gains rate cut on enactment of analogous
taxation of unrealized capital appreciation at death. 266
When opponents of a capital gains cut criticized its distribution in favor
of high income taxpayers, 267 some supporters ofthe cut brought up the once
in a lifetime sale of the family farm or small business,268 while others
characterized such opponents as repeating "anti-rich statements but they are

264. 124 CONG. REC., pt. 19, at H25438 (statement of Rep. Clausen).
265. 35 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 194-H (1979) (vote 657: Rep. Clausen along all other
House Republicans but one voted to direct the House Conferees to accept the Senate Bill's
repeal of carryover basis).
266. See supra note 121.
267. 1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 4, supra note 226, at 755 (statement of Robert Brandon,
Director of Public Citizen's Tax Reform Research Group) (75 percent of "capital gains
reduction would go to non-stock-market-related investment, primarily in real estate
speculation, farmland speculation and the like - not very productive investment."); accord
id., pt. 4, at 759 (Statement of Sen. Bentsen); 124 CoNG. REc., pt. 24, at S35249-50,
S35251-52, S35824 (Oct. I 0, 1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("! am amazed we have
not heard about the mom and pop farm yet. But I am sure we will hear about it. Or mom
and pop's little store.") Of course, they did. ld., pt. 24, at S35355 (statement of Sen.
Curtis). See also 1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 4, supra note 226, at 755 (Under HansenSteiger bill, 3000 people earning over $1,000,000 a year would get tax reductions averaging
over $200,000 each - 40 percent of the revenue reduction under the bill - and average
reductions of $60,000 each would result of the 20,000 individuals earning over $200,000 a
year with no benefits to 99.4 percent of individuals or to 93 percent of the individuals
reporting capital gains; similar statistics for the House bill except 94 percent of individuals
reporting capital gains would receive no benefit from proposed cuts.).
268. 124 CONG. REC. S35252 (Oct. I 0, 1978) (statement of S. Fin. Comm. Chair Long)
("It was my good fortune to buy a piece of land from a dear old couple who had lived on it
[for 50 years] since they were young. The sale price was $200,000. Those people never
made more than $25,000 in their lives .... She was a retired schoolteacher and her husband
a retired plant worker."); accord id. at S35253 (statement of Sen. Hansen) ("[B]ecause a
family that may have practically every dime of its savings invested in a small business, or a
farm, or whatever kind of operation, will make a once-in-a-lifetime sale and, as a
consequence, they can appear in the expanded income columns of the IRS as being in the
group of taxpayers with incomes of $50,000, $100,000, or $200,000."). Chair Long was
given to "rhetorical 'histrionics' at the expense of strict objectivity." Daniel Shaviro,
Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated
by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 138 U. PENN. L. REV. I, 13 n.41 (1990).
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made just on the bald basis, if the rich get a break, it is bad. There is no
tradeoff. " 269
Small business was a preeminent special interest in the 1978 capital
gains debate, 270 as Representative Ed Jenkins, a Georgia hill country
Democrat with textile mills in his district, and the Ways & Means
Committee Report attested:
[MR. JENKINS:] I was somewhat surprised to see that the one area for
which your members [National Federation of Independent Business] in
my district showed great interest in the field of taxation was the issue of
capital gains.

I think that is primarily attributable to one of two things. Perhaps they
believe that if the value of their business builds, they will be able to retain
some reasonable portion of the value when they sell it. Really, this is the
main reason that most business people are working. They wish to retain
something when they finally dispose of the business. Perhaps many of
them are also investors in land or other capital assets unrelated to their
business. This is an extremely important issue to them in my district. ...
All my small businessman simply tell me don't do anything to hurt capital
gains treatment. Basically this is the message I get from small business. 271

Indeed, Senator Jacob Javits, R-N.Y., an opponent of the 1978 House
bill capital gains cut, stated that small, not big, business owners now were
the biggest overt backers of the capital gains preference, rather than the
reverse as in the 1930's. 272 A capital gains cut would not help big industry,
but only small businesses, which tended to raise capital by retention of
earnings and borrowed funds not through new equity issues, and therefore,

269. 1978 Senate Hearings, pt. 4, supra note 226, at 791 (statement of Sen. Packwood).
Senator Packwood went on to ask whether Brandon would oppose (capital gains) tax cuts
which took the rich off the tax roll even if they increased revenue. !d., pt. 4, at 791-92.
Brandon would. "Again, I would rather have whatever level of revenue there is to be borne
fairly by all taxpayers. I think that is the basic notion of our tax system." !d., pt. 4, at 792.
270. See H.R. Rep. No. 1445, at 119 ("'n addition, the committee believes that the
present level of capital gains taxes has contributed to the shortage of investment funds
needed for small businesses and for capital formation . . . generally. Moreover, the
committee believes that it is inappropriate to subject many once-in-a-lifetime gains on the
sale of property, such as small businesses or personal residences, to the minimum tax.")
(emphasis added).
271. Hearings on the President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals Before the
House Comm. on Ways & Means, pt. 5, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2803 (1978); see also id., pt. 2,
at 1253; H.R. REP. No. 1445, at 119.
272. 124 CONG. REC. S35254 (Oct. 10, 1978) (statement of Sen. Javits). Senator Hansen
agreed. !d. at S35254-55.
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was taken care of by more rapid depreciation rules and a corporate tax cut.
It would, however, benefit the rich with their large portfolios of public

stock.
Senator John C. Danforth, R-Mo., a capital gams cut proponent
characterized these remarks as class warfare.
[Mr. Danforth]: [T]he course of the debate often takes the form of what is
in it for me, what is in it for this group or that group, as though we are
involved in some sort of warfare between the rich and the poor, as though
we always have to choose up sides between those who are relatively well
to do and those who are not, as though we always have ... cast our vote
on whether we are for the side of big business or for the side of small
business." 273

The 1978 Committee Reports incorporated most of the themes
presented by the proponents of an increased preference in the Hearings.
The Finance Committee Report, explaining its reduction in the maximum
capital gains rate (by increasing the capital gains deduction to 70 percent
from 50 percent), repeated the notion from the 1978 House Ways and
Means Committee Report that the combined level of direct and indirect
capital gains taxes contributed to a slower rate of economic growth with
fewer realizations and a shortage of investment funds. 274 The Senate
Report omitted the 1978 House Ways and Means Committee Report
explanation that it was "inappropriate to subject many once-in-a-lifetime
gains on the sale of property, such as small business or personal residences,
to the minimum tax.',n 5 The Finance Committee added its beliefthat:
[L]ower capital gains taxes will markedly increase sales of appreciated
assets, which will offset much of the revenue loss from the tax cut, and
potentially lead to an actual increase in revenues. In addition, the
improved mobility of capital will stimulate investment, thereby generating
more economic activity and more tax revenue. Six former Secretaries of
the Treasury have informed the committee that they believe lower capital
gains taxes will raise, not lower, revenues. 276

273. !d. at S35255.
274. S. REP. No. 1263, at 192; H.R. REP. No. 1445, at 119. This was an oblique
reference to the intense debate on use of "feedback effects" in revenue estimates. See 1978
Senate Hearings, pt. I, supra note 226, at 179, 197 (statement of Sec'y Blumenthal); id., pt.
2, at 211 (statement of Chair Long); id., pt. 2, at 452 (statement of former Treasury Sec 'y
Fowler); id., pt. 2, at 495 (statement of Samuel Cohn, Comm. for Capital Formation through
Dividend Reinvestment); id., pt. 3, at 688, 697 (statement of Martin Feldstein, Nat'! Bureau
of Research and Econ., Harv. Univ.).
275. H.R. REP. No. 1445, at 119.
276. S. REP. No. 1263, at 192. While the 1985 Treasury Report on the 1978 Capital
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The data for 1979 shows that the effective rate for the top 1 percent of
taxpayers for all federal taxes remained in the mid 30's (37 percent). 277 It

Gains Cuts showed revenue gains from the 1978 capital gains cut under the "cross-section"
analysis now used by Treasury, Chief of Staff Pearlman pointed out that the "time series"
data, then used by Treasury and still used by the Joint Committee Staff, showed revenue
losses after the first year or two. Hearings on Tax Incentives for Increasing Savings and
Investments Before the Senate Finance Committee, 10 I st Cong. (1990) [hereinafter 1990
Senate Tax Incentives Hearings]; see 1978 CAPITAL GAINS REPORT, supra note 45, at ix.
The former looks at a large group of taxpayers horizontally across a single year, whereas the
latter looks vertically through a period of time at aggregate taxpayer data. Revenue and
Spending Proposals for Fiscal Year 1990: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
pt. 2, 101 st Cong. (1989) (statement of Thomas Barthold, Joint Comm. Staff Economist).
Since a capital gains tax cut generally spurs a one-time realization of capital gains that
otherwise would be realized in future years, a "time series" approach appears preferable.
Additionally there is the old difficulty of separating market effects from the effects of the
capital gains rate cut. See id. at 156 (written statement of Robert Mcintyre, Citizens for Tax
Justice) (growth in venture capital already underway before 1978 capital gains cut).
277. Effective Federal Tax Rates for All Households by Household Income Category,
1979
Income Category

Total

Individual
Income
Tax

Social
Insurance
Tax

Corporate
Income
Tax

Excise
Tax

Lowest Quintile

8.0

0

5.3

1.1

1.6

Second Quintile

14.3

4.1

7.7

1.2

1.3

Middle Quintile

18.6

7.5

8.6

1.4

1.1

Fourth Quintile

21.2

10.1

8.5

1.6

0.9

Highest Quintile

27.5

15.7

5.4

5.7

0.7

All Quintiles

22.2

11.0

6.9

3.4

1.0

Top I 0 percent

29.6

17.4

4.2

7.4

0.7

Top 5 percent

31.8

19.0

2.8

9.5

0.6

Top I percent
37.0
21.8
0.9
13.8
0.5
CBO, EFFECTIVE TAX RATES 1997 TO 2000, app. B, at 22-24 (2003) [hereinafter CBO, 19972000 TAX RATES].
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is noteworthy that the effective income tax rate of the top 1 percent was
21.8 percent, and all but 1.4 percent of the remaining effective federal tax
rate was attributable to imputation of the corporate income tax rate
according to ownership of capital (13.8 percent). 278
C.

1980's: RISE (20 PERCENT RATE) AND FALL (BACK TO
RATE) OF THE CAPITAL GAINS PREFERENCE

28 PERCENT

1.

1981: ERTA- First Riverboat Gamble, 20 Percent Capital Gains
Preference

In 1980, Republican California Governor Ronald Reagan campaigned
for President vowing to cut taxes and government while increasing defense
spending without increasing the deficit. 279 Administration witnesses in the
1981 Hearings on the President's tax proposals asserted that resulting
increased incentives would lead to higher output in the economy,
generating increased tax revenues under "supply side economics,"280 while

In the analysis, households were assumed to bear the burden of the taxes that they
pay directly (for example, individual income and payroll taxes). Excise taxes were assumed
to be borne by households according to their consumption of taxed goods (tobacco and
alcohol) or - in the case of excise taxes that affect intermediate goods - in proportion to
overall consumption. Taxes on businesses were attributed to households. CBO assumed, as
do most economists, that employers' shares of payroll taxes fall on employees and therefore
that the amount of those taxes should be included in employees' income and the taxes
counted as part of employees' tax burden. Corporate income taxes were assumed to be
borne by owners of capital. CBO allocated corporate tax liabilities to households in
proportion to their income from interest, dividends, rents, and capital gains.
This analysis is based on adjusted pretax comprehensive household income. That
measure includes all cash income (both taxable and tax-exempt), taxes paid by businesses
(which are imputed to individuals on the basis of assumptions about incidence), employee
contributions to 401 (k) retirement plans, and the value of income received in kind from
various sources (including employer-paid health insurance premiums, Medicare and
Medicaid benefits, and food stamps, among others). The tables use the Census Bureau's
fungible value measure to determine the cash equivalent of in-kind government transfers.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTIVE TAX RATES 1979 TO 2001, at I (2004).
278. CBO, 1997-2000 TAX RATES, supra note 277, app. B, at 22-24.
279. Lou Cannon and David S. Broder, GOP Debaters Restate Basic Positions; Seven
Republicans Restate Their Basic Positions in N.H. Debate, WASH. PosT, Feb. 21, 1980, at
A-1; Lou Cannon, Reagan Campaign Takes Turn Toward November, WASH. POST, Mar. 20,
1980, at A-1; E.J. Dionne, The Nation; Candidates talk to the Issues, but Address their
Supporters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1980, § 4, at 4.
280. Hearings on Tax Aspects of the President's Economic Program Before the House
Committee on Ways & Means, pt. I, 97th Cong. (1981) [hereinafter 1981 House Hearings]
(statement of Arthur Laffler). The extreme supply side claims were more audacious than
supported by evidence and disfavored among mainstream economists. THOMAS J CONLAND
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making tax shelters relatively less attractive. 28 I Such revenue increases
coupled with spending cuts, higher real economic growth and lower
inflation would supposedly permit balancing of the budget at a lower level
of taxation. 282 Such results were based on an "economic scenario"283 rather
than traditional econometric models. OMB Director David Stockman later
admitted that supply-side economics was merely a cover for the trickledown theory, bragging that the across-the-board rate cuts (Kemp-Roth)
were always a Trojan Horse to bring down the top investment income and
. 1gams
. rate. 284
capita
Many Democrats on the Ways & Means Committee were quite
skeptical of these assumptions, particularly the effects of the across-theboard cuts on savings rates. 285 They were right to be skeptical. 286 "Despite
AL., TAXING CHOICES 33 (1990).
281. 1981 House Hearings, supra note 280, at 14 (statement of Sec'y Regan); see
Reagan Tax Cuts Face Hungry Congress, 12 TAX NOTES 422 (Feb. 23, 1981); 127 CONG.
REC. S15768 (July 15, 1981) (statement of Chair Dole).
282. 1981 House Hearings, supra note 280, at 17 (statement of Sec'y Regan); id. at 57,
61, 70 (OMB Director David Stockman) (Spending control plan is the essential and
indispensable anchor; "combination of incentive-minded tax rate reductions and firm budget
control is expected to lead to a balanced budget by 1984."); id. at 115, 118 (Chairman of
President's Council of Economic Advisors Weidenbaum).
283. !d. at 17, 42, 54 (Treasury Sec'ty Donald T. Regan); id. at 56 (Dir. of Office of
Mgmt. and Budget David Stockman); id. at 42 (statement ofSec'y Regan) ("What we did in
fact was to create our own scenario.").
284. William Greider, The Education of David Stockman, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 27, 47
(Dec. 1981 ). See also 139 CONG. REC. H2795 (May 25, 1993) (statement of Rep. Sabo ); id.
(statement of Rep. Obey) ("You remember David Stockman, in his famous book in 1981,
explained the truth when he said - his words were - 'Supply-side was always a trickle
down.' It was a Trojan horse. The magic supply-side formula was a Trojan horse through
which they drove trickle-down economics to the wall, and trickle-down economics produced
a bonanza for these people at the top of the income scale, a few drops for everyone else.");
cf 136 CONG. REC. H8057 (Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Boxer) (Republican rhetoric
about growth and investment is only a smokescreen for real agenda of taking care of the
rich). History was to repeat itself, the second time both as tragedy and farce. In 2003
Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, when he opposed a second round of tax cuts (taxing
dividends as capital gains) because they would exacerbate a looming fiscal crisis as
economy was beginning to recover, was cut off by Vice-President Richard Cheney with: the
tax cut was not only affordable, "Reagan proved deficits don't matter. We won the midterms [congressional elections]. This is our due." RONALD SUSKIND, THE PRICE OF
LOYALTY 199 (2004).
285. 1981 House Hearings, supra note 280, at 44 (statement of Rep. Sam Gibbons); id.
at 44-45 (statement of Rep. J.J. Pickle); id. at 54-55 (statement of Rep. Downey); id. at 73,
131 (statement of Rep. Pease); id. at 74 (statement of Rep. Matsui).
286. STAFF OF HOUSE WAYS & MEANS COMM., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
BUDGET AND TAX POLICY FOR FISCAL YEAR 1991 AND BEYOND, 10lst Cong. 101-21 (Comm.
ET
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these generous economic stimuli, the hoped-for supply-side 'miracle' did
not come to pass. Unemployment soared to postwar highs in 1981 and
1982, while the stock market plummeted and real interest rates escalated in
spite of a reduction in inflation. More troubling still, the federal deficit
exploded to levels unimaginable under any of the previous supposedly freespending administrations."287 Senator Bob Packwood, R-Ore., later pointed
out that at the time of the 1981 cuts, the Congressional Budget Office was
. . a surp 1us. 288
proJectmg
The reduction by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ("ERTA")
of the maximum regular tax rate on investment income from 70 percent to
50 percent, 289 with no adjustment to the three year old 60 percent capital
gains deduction applicable to all capital assets reduced the maximum
capital gains rate from 28 percent to 20 percent. 290 By 1985, the top 5
percent of individuals had an effective Federal income tax rate of 17.2
percent (down from 20.7 percent in 1980) when the maximum ordinary rate
was 50 percent and maximum capital gains rate was 20 percent. 291
Congress also enacted a three year across the board 25 percent reduction in
individual rates and an indexing of tax brackets, exemptions and the
standard deduction. 292
At the same time, the 1981 Act put capital recovery methods (ACRS),
now encompassing real estate depreciation, on steroids through accelerated
rates and much shorter than true economic useful lives for depreciation

Print 1990). Cutting the top rates did not increase private savings as proponents had
claimed. 132 CONG. REC. Sl3926 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Mathias) ("When the
1981 tax bill was passed the proponents argued that lowering marginal tax rates for the
wealthiest individuals from 70 percent to 50 percent would encourage savings and these
savings would stimulate economic growth that would finance the rate reductions. Between
1981 and today the savings rate of individuals as a percentage of national income has
declined from 5 percent to the current 3.2 percent."); see also Hearing on Taxes: SupplySide Theory Revisited before the Joint Economic Committee, 99th Cong. (1985) (statement
of Henry Bosworth, Sr. Fellow, the Brookings lnst.) (to finance the Deficit takes two-thirds
of all private savings which had stayed in the range of 8 to 9 percent).
287. CONLAND,supra note 280, at 33.
288. 139 CONG. REC. S7696 (1993).
289. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-34, § I 01, 95 Stat. 172, 176-82.
290. S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong. (1981).
291. Congressional Reports, Documents at a Glance: JCT Tables of Distributional Data
by Income Class in Tax Reform Bill, 33 TAX NOTES 73, 74 (Oct. 6. 1986); see generally
John W. Lee, Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded Partnerships, Personal
Service Corporations and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 VA. TAX REV. 57, 70-71 n.43
(1988).
292. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 § I 04, 95 Stat. at 188-90.
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purposes293 that resulted in the sheltering of (a) investment and business
income by many more high- and even middle-income individuals, 294 and
(b) of business income by big corporations. 295 Of 260,000 individual
returns in 1983 with "positive income" in excess of $250,000 [$4 70,130 in
2004 dollars], 11 percent paid less than 5 percent in Federal income taxes
and 76.4 percent paid less than 30 percent. 296 Sixty-four percent of these
260,000 returns showed partnership losses, a major cause of the low
effective rates. While Treasury could not break out tax-motivated losses
from economic losses, the largest source of deductions in these loss
partnerships was interest, depreciation, and depletion.
By the early 1980's, high income individuals as a whole ($200,000 in
annual income) had an effective rate of around 22 percent when the
maximum rate was 50 percent. 297 In contrast, during the 1960's and 1970's
the average effective rate of high income individuals as a whole was 35
percent, and only the richest enjoyed a 22 percent effective rate. 298 After
the 1981 Act cuts were effective in 1982, the effective federal tax rates fell,
especially at the top, with the greatest decrease there in imputed corporate
income rates. 299

293. !d., § 20 I, 95 stat. 203-19; 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 91 (1981 ); 127 CONG. REC. at
S 15768 (July 15, 1981) (statement of Senate Finance Chair Dole).
294. Hearings on High-Income Taxpayers and Related Partnership Tax Issues before the
Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Ways and Means Committee, 99th Cong., I st Sess.
6-7, 12-13 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 House Hearings] (statement of Assistant Sec'y for Tax
Policy Pearlman).
295. "[I]n 1955, corporate income taxes represented 27.3 percent of total tax receipts. In
1989, it was down to 10.5 percent." Hearing on Decline of Corporate Tax Revenues before
the Senate Finance Committee, 101 st Con g., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Senate
Hearings] (statement of Chair Bentsen); id. at 4 (statement of Deputy Assistant Sec'y for
Tax Analysis Rosen) (By 1986 percentage of corporate taxes as a percentage of Federal total
revenue receipts had dropped to 5.1 percent, thereafter declining trend reversed.). See Lee,
supra note 291, at 129 n.324 (corporate taxes had declined from 27 percent of total budget
receipts in 1950 to 8 percent in 1985). For a discussion of the causes, see 1990 Senate
Hearings, supra at 5-6 (primarily corporate pre-tax profits were lower than estimated, due to
higher wages and salaries and interest payments than expected) (statement of Harvey
Rosen); id. at II (statement of Director of Congressional Budget Office Reischauer) (58
percent of shortfall due to CBO overestimation of corporate profits- due to error in model,
increased debt financing, and underestimation of depreciation deductions; and 42 percent
attributable to other factors such as ESOPs and increased use of S Corporations).
296. 1985 House Hearings, supra note 294.
297. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DATA ON DISTRIBUTION BY INCOME CLASS OF
EFFECTS OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 (Comm. Print Oct. I, 1986).
298. See supra notes 122, 165.
299. Effective Federal Tax Rates for All Households by Household Income Category,
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One of the structural signatures of President Reagan's 1981 tax cut,
deficit financing (found also in JFK's 1963 tax proposals300) came to give
the term a new meaning. 301 In 1963, Republicans had opposed deficit
financing. 302 In 1981, Chair Rostenkowski attempted (unsuccessfully) to
out-bid Republicans for the swing votes of Southern Democrats by granting
tax preferences including the Reagan-sponsored rate cuts and investment

1982
Income Category

Total

Individual
Income Tax

Social
Insurance
Tax

Corporate
Income
Tax

Excise Tax

Lowest Quintile

8.2

0.4

5.9

0.5

1.4

Second Quintile

13.8

4.2

8.0

0.5

1.1

Middle Quintile

17.9

7.4

8.9

0.7

0.9

Fourth Quintile

20.6

10.0

9.1

0.7

0.8

Highest Quintile

24.4

15.3

6.3

2.1

0.6

All Quintiles

20.4

11.0

7.5

1.4

0.8

Top I 0 percent

25.3

16.9

5.1

2.8

0.5

Top 5 percent

25.6

18.3

3.7

3.5

0.5

5.4

0.4

20.0
Top I percent
27.7
1.6
CBO, 1997-2000 TAX RATES, supra note 277, app. B, at 22-24.

300. See supra note 141.
301. In fairness to President Reagan, the looming deficit was the product of years of
fiscal mismanagement, as well as changing macroeconomic forces (including reduced
inflation that resulted in lower federal revenues), not merely the direct consequence of
Reaganomics. Indeed, as Gene Steuerle has shown, the "era of easy financing" that
characterized postwar fiscal policy ended before Reagan took office (Steuerle, 1992, 1996).
Nevertheless, ERTA 1981 and Reagan's increased defense spending accelerated the day of
reckoning. Dennis J Ventry Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political
History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969-99, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 983, 1064 n.76 (Dec. I,
2000).
302. See supra note 14; DIONNE, supra note 236, at 251.
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incentives. 303 Congress took the "Riverboat Gamble"304 that supply-side
economics would work.
The other major signature of the Kennedy tax proposals, enactment by
projecting benefits to income groups skewed to lower income groups to
increase consumer spending305 was written in reverse by the 1981 Reagan
tax cuts.
Like the Revenue Act of 1978, the 1981 cuts benefitted
disproportionally higher income individuals and large corporations to

303. Chair Rostenkowski's open competition for the votes of conservative Southern
Democrats ("boll weevils") and oil Democrats initially resulted in a Ways and Means
Committee bill they would support. In the end the Reagan Administration outbid
Rostenkowski, e.g., with support for Georgia's peanut crop. Melissa Brown, Democratic
Strategy Backfires - GOP Wins in the House, I 3 TAX NOTES 3 I 5 (Aug. 3, I 98 I); Congress
Enacts President Reagan's Tax Policy, 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 91, 100. Forty-eight
Democrats defected to Reagan in adopting the Republican Substitute for the House Ways
and Means bill. !d. See Rollcall vote No. I 77, I 26 CONG. REC. HI 826 I -62 (198 I).
Technically, the Conservative Coalition did not arise in that a slim majority of Southern
Democrats remained in the Democratic fold. (Republicans supported the alternative I 90 to
I, while Southern Democrats opposed it 43 to 36 and Northern Democrats I 5 I to I 2. 37
CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 58-H. The Conservative Coalition did emerge and prevail in the
final vote on the entire tax bill which lowered the maximum individual capital gains rate to
its lowest level (20 percent) since I 942. Republicans and Southern Democrats supported the
bill I 90 to I and 69 to 9, respectively, while Northern Democrats opposed it 97 to 64.
Rollcall vote No. 178. 127 CONG. REC. at Hl8262-63; 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 58-H.
304. In the Republican controlled Senate, the Finance Committee bill, which was much
closer to Reagan's proposals, overwhelmingly passed 89 to I I with majorities of
Republicans and Northern and Southern Democrats. Rollcall Vote No. 239. I 27 CONG.
REC. at S I 7983; 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 4 I-S. Indexing of rates and brackets (to begin in
I 985 after the third year of the rate cuts) was separately voted on, passing 57 to 40 along
partisan lines. /d. at 35-S, 100-01. Such indexing prevailed in Conference. Economic
Recovery Tax Act of I 98 I § I 04, 95 Stat. at I 88-90. On the House side in the Conference
Chairman Rostenkowski leveled the charge that the legislation was not written in
Committee but "in some downtown hideaway," and carefuiiy laid the Act, "a bold-and
risky-economic strategy" at President Reagan's door. 127 CONG. REC. at H19521. Others
called it "a riverboat gamble that is going to make every Member of this body and every
citizen in the United States pay a big price in the next few years if it does not work out."
I 27 CONG. REC. at HI 9525 (Aug. 4, I 98 I) (statement of Shannon). And so it did. Senate
Majority Leader Howard Baker, R-Tenn., originated the phrase. See 147 CONG. REC. S4778
(2001) (statement of Sen. Byrd); 139 CONG. REC. S3601 (I 993) (statement of Sen. Hollings)
("Twelve years ago, the new President stepped forth with an audacious plan to slash taxes
by one-third, drastically increase the defense budget, and trimming domestic spending.
President Reagan promised that his plan would balance the budget in a year's time. Thenmajority leader Howard Baker called Reaganomics a riverboat gamble, but he urged us to
vote for it as a solid bet, and a majority of Senators went along with that gamble. I, for one
dissented. I voted against the Reagan tax cuts. Any simpleton should have foreseen that
Mr. Reagan's riverboat gamble would leave us up the creek, drowning in deficits.").
305. See supra text accompanying note I 04.
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encourage productive investments. 306 The 25 percent across the board rate
cuts, created by raising the bracket breakpoints, were proportional but
phased in over three years. Other elements, including accelerated real
estate depreciation that enabled the use of tax shelters to explode, the 28.6
percent cut in year one in the maximum investment income tax rate from
70 percent to 50 percent, and the maximum capital gains rate change from
28 percent to 20 percent, all disproportionately favored the top income
individuals. Their effective income tax rate fell from the mid-30s to about
22 percent. 307
2.

1982 TEFRA: Reappearance of Indexing Proposals

The Supply Side miracle did not come to pass. 308 The economy went
into a recession in 1981 that continued into 1982, which coupled with the
1981 tax cuts and increases in defense spending, caused the Federal deficits
to increase significantly above prior levels. 309 The Administration then
pushed for loophole closing and improved collections while maintaining
the three year phased-in across the board individual tax cut and indexing. 310
The Senate Finance Committee was inspired by the Budget Reconciliation
directives to raise revenues and cut spending. 311 By adding the Tax Equity

306. 1981 House Hearings, supra note 280, at 13 (statement of Sec'y Regan); id. at 115
(statement ofWeidenbaum).
307. See supra note 297.
308. CONLAND, supra note 280, at 34.
309. The 1981 deficit ($57.9 billion) was about the same as 1980 ($59.6 billion) but
almost twice that of 1979 ($27.7 billion), while 1982 was almost double 1981's ($11 0.6
billion) and the worst was yet to come (1983, $195.4 billion and 1984 $175.36 billion). 40
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 142 (1984). The 1982-83 recession was the worst recession as far as
unemployment went (just under II percent) since the Great Depression. 1992 Senate
Hearing, supra note 63, at 23 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes, Chair of the Joint Economic
Comm.). Chair of the Senate Finance Committee Dole, now had no patience with "supplysiders," quipping in early 1982 that the good news was that a bus full of supply-siders went
off a cliff; the bad news, two empty seats. JEFFREY BIRNBAUM & ALAN MURRAY,
SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH 31 (1987).
310. Tax Increases Meet Deficit Reduction Target, 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 29 (1982).
Notwithstanding floor fights the Senate maintained the three year individual tax cut intact.
Rollcall vote No. 234. 128 CONG. REC. Sl7195 (July 21, 1982); 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at
36 (amendment to delay scheduled rate cuts for high income individual taxpayers only was
defeated along largely partisan lines).
311. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in
the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 514 (1998) ("Section 311(a) [of the
Budget Act, 2 USC § 642(a)(l) (1994)] effectively requires that any amendment to a
reconciliation bill be revenue neutral, thereby limiting the ability of members to amend
reconciliation legislation on the floor. Unlike PA YGO, the offset cannot come from
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and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA") as a rider to an unrelated
House revenue bill, the Committee, followed the Administration's
The individual minimum tax was
approach of loophole closing.
strengthened: it covered the capital gains preference again, and safe harbor
leasing was restricted. 312 They strengthened compliance while adding
increases in excise taxes and eliminating additional depreciation and other
corporate changes scheduled in ERTA to be phased in, 313 which actually
constituted the bulk of the revenue "increases." The Finance Committee
bill also shortened the capital gains holding period back to six months. 314
On the Senate floor, the Conservative Coalition added indexing for
stocks and real estate to start prospectively in out years. 315 The amendment
was strongly opposed by Senator Dale Bumpers, D-Ark., because he was a
long-time supporter of a capital gains preference limited to venture capital
investments, and double indexing (with ordinary rate being indexed as

reducing entitlement spending. As with reserve fund limitations, the Senate can waive this
requirement only by a three-fifths vote; Section 3 I I (a) also applies to amendments in the
House, which can waive it in a special rule or by majority vote."). P A YGO expired in 2002
and the Senate attempted in 2004 to reinstitute it as to taxes as weii as discretionary
spending while the House and the Administration were opposed as to taxes because they
wanted to make the 2001 and 2003 cuts permanent. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Panel Vote
Draws Battle Lines for Pay-as-You-Go Tax Cuts, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2004, at A-30
("Acknowledging that applying so-caiied pay-as-you-go rules to taxes would complicate
efforts to make the tax cuts permanent, White House officials have been lobbying hard
against the legislation. The House speaker, J. Dennis Hastert of Illinois, has signaled that
House leaders intend to kiii the provision when House and Senate budget writers meet to
reconcile differences in their proposals. Republicans say it would be foolish to erect barriers
to extending tax cuts that have spurred economic growth; Democrats say the cuts are the
main reason the nation faces its largest-ever deficit in doiiar terms.").
312. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of I 982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, §
201, 96 Stat. 324, 4 I I- I 8 (I 982). Also "safe harbor" leasing or inter-corporate sale of tax
losses was restricted. !d.,§ 209, 96 Stat. 442-47. See 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 32-3.
3 I 3. TEFRA, § 206, 97 Stat. at 43 I -32.
3 I 4. S. REP. No. 494, at I I 7 (1982).
3 I 5. Rolle ail vote no. 243 (64 yeas to 32 nays, 4 not voting). 128 CONG. REC. at S I 7537.
The Conservative Coalition prevailed: Republicans (45 to 8) and Southern Democrats (11 to
4) supported the amendment while Northern Democrats opposed it 20 to 8. 38 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC at 43-S. Southern Democrat Senators voting for the amendment consisted of
Senators Bentsen (Tex.), Boren (Okla.), Bumpers (Ark.)(voted yes in order to be able to
move for reconsideration), Byrd (Va., independent caucusing with Democrats), Ford (Ky.),
Heflin (Ala.), Johnston (La.), Long (La.), Nunn (Ga.), and Pryor (Ark.). On the motion to
reconsider, Senators Bumpers, Nunn and Pryor in effect changed their vote. !d. at 17541
(Roiicaii vote 244, 61 nays to 35 yeas). For a general discussion of the conservative
coalition in the Senate in 1982, see 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 40-C.
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well) on distributive grounds would encourage speculation rather than true
investment. 316
Senator Bill Armstrong (R-Col.), sponsor of the capital gains indexing
amendment, pointed to recent data showing that all of the reported gain on
average was inflation gain, and mostly relied upon examples of
residences. 317 He also employed familiar rhetoric from the late 1970s that
"in many instances people do own houses, farms, small businesses which
have been in the families for long periods of time." 318 Subsequent studies
would show that the inflation argument was only half true, and that the
other grounds accounted for small portions of total capital gains
realizations. 319 For instance, for 1985 all capital assets, except bonds, for
taxpayers with $200,000 and over ($348,000 in 2004 dollars) real gains
constituted 81.5 percent of their nominal gains. 320 Similarly, the
Congressional Budget Office's 1990 study of inflation and capital gains
using Treasury data concluded that real gains on corporate stock sales on
the average were positive only as to taxpayers with AGI above $100,000 in
1981 dollars [$206,000 in 2004 dollars] and negative for taxpayers with
AGI below $100,000. 321 "[T]he average real gain [in 1981] for taxpayers
with AGI over $100,000 was positive and accounted for 53 percent of their
total nominal gains. For the tiny fraction of taxpayers with AGI over
$1,000,000, who accounted for 18 percent of realized nominal gains on
stock in 1981, real gains amounted to 82 percent of their total gains. 322
Several Treasury or Joint Committee studies of capital gains
realizations in the early 1960s, the 1970s, and the early 1980s also
concluded that the top half by income of these individuals realizing capital
gains in most years have a real or economic gain of roughly 50 percent of
the nominal gains reported. 323 In all of these studies, the higher the income
bracket, the better the individuals' rate of return as to realized capital gains
was in comparison to the rate of inflation. The lower half in annual income

316. 128 CONG. REC. at Sl7537-38.
317. 128CONG.REC.atSI7534-35.
318. !d.
319. See notes 320-25 infra and accompanying text.
320. CBO, PERSPECTIVES ON OWNERSHIP, supra note 113, at 59 tbl.A-18 (May 1997).
321. CBO, INDEXING CAPITAL GAINS 23-25 (Aug. 1990) [hereinafter CBO, INDEXING
CAPITAL GAINS].
322. !d. at 24
323. E.g., 1978 CAPITAL GAINS REPORT, supra note 45, at I 0-11 (In 1977, only taxpayers
with over $100,000 adjusted gross income realized any real gains as to stock sales; for those
with over $200,000, real gains were of nominal gains).
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of the individual taxpayers annually reporting capital gains actually
incurred economic losses on average. 324 For example, a 1990 Joint
Committee study demonstrates that this class of taxpayers enjoyed a
reported capital gain no more than once in a five year period for an average
gain of $2,000 in 1980 dollars ($4,600 in 2004 dollars) that amounted to
less than 10 percent of the capital gains realized. 325
The House unexpectedly went straight to Conference. 326
The
Conference naturally followed the Senate bill, but dropped both the
provisions that would have shortened the capital gains holding period and
indexed selected capital assets. 327 The Conference Report barely passed the
House (226 to 207), 328 but nearly half of the Republicans who had
previously supported President Reagan voted against it, arguing that a
recession was not a time to increase taxes. 329
3. DEFRA of 1984: Holding Period Tinkering
In 1984, even though the recession had ended, the deficit continued to
grow. Again Budget Reconciliation directed tax increases, domestic
spending cuts and slowed down defense buildup. 330 A consensus emerged
among the House, the Senate and the administration on how much, and
how to, raise taxes consisting of: (a) closing loopholes, 331 (b) delaying or
eliminating a number of still to be phased in 1981 cuts besides the three
year, 25 percent individual rate cut and indexing, and (c) levying minor
324. CBO, INDEXING CAPITAL GAINS, supra note 320; accord, JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION STAFF, TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES 26 (Comm. Print 1989).
325. 1990 Senate Tax Incentives Hearings, supra note 276, at 70 (colloquy between Sen.
Bradley, D-NJ, and Joint Comm. on Taxation Chief of Staff Pearlman).
326. The House barely agreed (208 to 197) with Chair Rostenkowski's decision, which
rested on the technicality that the Senate bill had been a "rider" on an unrelated House
"revenue bill." Rollcall vote No. 225. 128 CONG. REC. at Hl8385-86. This action meant
that the House would have little hand in shaping the legislation for which House Democrats
were grateful. 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 37.
327. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, 477-78 (1982).
328. Rollcall vote No. 303. 128 CONG. REC. at 22239-40.
329. 38 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 38.
330. 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 143 (1984).
331. S. REP. No. 97-144, at 8-14 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105. This
encompassed a host of partnership and tax accounting changes aimed at tax shelters which
had exploded, notwithstanding the lowering of the top rate on investment income from 70
percent to 50 percent, justified in part as reducing tax sheltering due to the 1981 increased
richness of real estate depreciation In reality tax shelters exploded after 1981 Act due to the
rich capital recovery provisions.
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excise taxes. 332 Additionally, in the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
("DEFRA") Congress changed the 1978 Act's 1-year capital gains holding
period back to six months 333 as a trade-off for increasing the tax credit for
working poor from $500 to $550 per year. 334
4.

1984 Treasury Report: The Best Capital Gains Proposals-Universal
Indexing and No Preferential Rates-Maximum Individual Rate of 35
Percent

Near the end of his first term President Reagan announced the
appointment of a Treasury Group to study tax reform, and report back to
the President in December 1984 (just after the November Presidential
elections) provoking laughter among the White House joumalists. 335 To
the surprise of many, the timely 1984 Treasury Report to the President, Tax
Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth ("Treasury I"),
espoused many positions producing more equitable results than then
current law. 336 It would have lowered the top ordinary rate to 35 percent,
eliminated the Alternative Minimum Tax regimes, resolved major capital
gains and capital recovery problems by indexing the basis of debt and
depreciable and other capital assets (while using economic lives rather than
the much shorter tax recovery periods). 337

332.
333.
(1984).
334.
335.

40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 149-50.
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § I 001, 98 Stat. 494, I 011

40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC at 154.
BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 309, at 40-41. Although viewed at the time as a
political ploy, Treasury took the task seriously. CONLAND, supra note 280, at 45.
336. 2 TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS,
SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TREASURY
DEPARTMENT PROPOSALS I, 131 (1984) [hereinafter TREASURY I]. Its overriding objective
was to subject real economic income from all sources to the same tax treatment. I
TREASURY I, at xii, 13. One of the chief architects of Treasury I was then Assistant
Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy Ronald Pearlman. See BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra
note 309, at 46 (along with economist Charles McClure had Treasury Secretary Regan's ear;
Pearlman had "a thorough knowledge of the tax code and a theoretical bent"). Pearlman and
McClure were "allowed to design what they thought was a perfect tax system." !d. at 47.
"They called for a 'neutral' tax system, a system that does not influence private decisions."
!d. This was a recurring theme in the floor debate on the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
337. TREASURY I, supra note 336, at 65, 181, 177-200; BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra
note 309, at 53-54. Secretary Regan who previously was proponent of a capital gains
preference was persuaded to support indexing instead of a preference when shown that most
realizations would result in no taxable gain under indexing.
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Commentators criticized it as too elegant. 338 However, its fatal
weaknesses were more likely political.
The most powerful pressure
groups thought that they could do better than indexing. The favored
individual special interests either had scant basis in capital or sold too soon
for inflation to have much effect. 339 Meanwhile, large corporate America
apparently concluded (correctly it turned out) that it could retain the
existing accelerated capital recovery for personal property such as
equipment. 340 Much like Surrey's proposals, Treasury I united all interest
groups against it. "The Best is the enemy of the good."341 The 1985
Administration tax reform proposals and the 1985 House Tax Reform Bill,
therefore, retained the capital gains provisions and accelerated cost
recovery. 342

338. Minarik, supra note !54, at 1367. Also indexing capital assets would have required
a much higher individual maximum rate (perhaps 40 percent) to achieve distributive equity
among individual income groups. Hearings on Revenue and Spending Proposals for Fiscal
Year 1990 Before the House Ways and Means Committee, pt. 2, JOist Cong., at 50 (1989)
(statement of Robert Mcintyre, Citizens for Tax Justice).
339. Thirty eight percent of annual realizations in 1985 consisted of stock (both public
and closely held and mutual fund distributions). Auten & Wilson, supra note 262, at 116.
Gain from nonresidential real estate amounts to around 24 percent. !d. Installment sales
gain, largely from closely held stock and real estate, amounts to I 0 percent to 15 percent.
Timber and livestock, although politically important, amounted to 1.0 and 0.9 percent of
total 1985 realizations. CBO, PERSPECTIVES ON OWNERSHIP, supra note 320, at 49 tbl.A-7.
Due to the exclusion under section 121 (b) and roll-over provisions, only about 4 percent of
1985 realizations of capital gains from the sale of principal residences was subject to tax.
Auten & Wilson, supra note 262, at 113. Small business owners typically capitalized their
ventures with minimum equity. High-tech venture capitalists similarly invest more sweat
than cash equity, and historically have done better than inflation; timber lot owners and
farmers usually deducted most of their growing costs up front. Hearings on Impact,
Effectiveness, and Fairness of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 before the House Ways & Means
Comm., JOist Cong. 163 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 House Hearings on Fairness] (Statement
of Robert Mcintyre, Citizens for Tax Justice); accord id. at 299 (attachment by Rep.
Wyden). Improved real estate, rarely mentioned in the debate, annually loses basis with
depreciation. In contrast, high income chumers on the public market have basis, but do not
hold investments long enough to experience much inflation. Thus, most, if not ail, of the
traditional interest groups prefer a generic percentage exclusion to indexing of basis for
inflation. John W. Lee, Critique of Current Congressional Capital Gains Contentions, 15
VA. TAX REV. I, 25-33 (1995).
340. Minarik, supra note 154.
341. FRANCOIS VOLTAIRE, DICTIONAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE, DRAMATIC ART (1764),
reprinted in FRANCOIS VOLTAIRE AND THEODORE BESTERMAN (TRANSLATOR),
PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY (Penguin Classics 1984).
342. THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND
SIMPLICITY 166-169 (1985) [hereinafter TREASURY II] (50 percent capital gains deduction
(50% x proposed maximum rate of 35% =17.5% effective rate), and elective indexing in out
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5. Tax Reform Act of 1986 Compact of Lower Rates and Broader Base:
Unexpected Second Best End ofthe Capital Gains Preference Due to
Distributional Equity
In the case of personal property, the total package of post-ERTA
preferences was the equivalent of currently deducting the cost of such
property on a present value basis - a backdoor consumption tax. 343 The
recovery period for real estate improvements also was much shorter than
economic life. Capital intensive public corporations reported little or no
taxable income in comparison to their financial income. 344 Adverse
publicity of the zero tax multi-million dollar income corporations drove the
Tax Reform Act of 1986,345 much as the zero tax high income individual
story had driven the Tax Reform Act of 1969. 346 Secretary Regan
convinced President Reagan of the inequities of the 1954 Code by showing
"him that General Electric (Reagan's old employer) paid less in taxes than
the chief executive's personal secretary. " 347
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, which was largely fashioned
conceptually on the Senate side, followed both the Treasury I, and Senator
Bill Bradley's notion of lowering the top rates (to 28 percent on the
individual side and 34 percent on the corporate side) by limiting
preferences. 348 Like the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the Tax Reform Act of

years beginning in 1991, i.e., preferential deduction for high income and indexing for
moderate income); H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 196-7 (1985) (50 percent deduction for
individual long-term capital gains in 1986, and 42 percent thereafter, resulting in maximum
rate of 22 percent in 1986 and 22.04 percent thereafter).
343. John Lee, President Clinton "s Capital Gains Proposals, 59 TAX NOTES 1399, at
1410 (1993); Lee, supra note 112, at 968 n.441.
344. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 309, at 11-13 (Mcintyre disclosures naming
names and media interest).
345. 132 CONG. REC S 13867 (1986) (statement of Sen. Bentsen) ("Consider an employee
of a company working out his tax return on April 15 who reads about his own company
making hundreds of millions of dollars year after year and paying no taxes. He says
something is wrong with the system. You know, he is right. That is what we have to
change. There is a perception of unfairness in the tax system. It is more than a perception.
It is a reality."); BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 309, at 11-12; Minarik, supra note 154,
at 1365-66; CONLAND, supra note 280, at 36-37.
346. See supra note 16 7.
347. CONLAND, supra note 280, at 36.
348. 132 CONG. REC. at S 13782 (statement of Sen. Packwood) (many of suggestions of
Sen. Bradley, who has been advocating tax reform for at least 4 to 5 years, are incorporated
in bill); id. (statement of Sen. Eiden) (Sen. Bradley played key role in bringing tax reform to
the American people). Birnbaum and Murray recount that Chair Packwood in presenting his
initial individual top rate of 25 percent to his Finance Committee, first showed them the
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1986 limited preferences mostly by surrogate approaches. The main
exception was the unexpected elimination of the individual capital gains
preference, thus ending the vertical and horizontal inequities among
individual taxpayers from a capital gains preference for the first time since
1921 349 by a "Second Best" 28 percent compromise. If the top rate was low
enough, special interests were willing to give up their preferences. 350
Consistent with the 1986 Code's theme of lower rates paid for by a
broader base, 351 the top individual "permanent" ordinary income rate was
lowered from 50 percent to 28 percent while the top individual capital
gains rate was increased from 20 percent to 28 percent. 352 Such increase
was necessitated by the notion of distributional equity, i.e., high income
taxpayers could not receive as an income class a greater tax cut than the
middle and lower income taxpayers. 353 Distributional equity, however,

Bradley-Kemp plan which had started the low-rate/cut preferences movement by lowering
the top rate to 30 percent, explaining "This is the way Bill [Bradley] did it." BIRNBAUM &
MURRAY, supra note 309, at 209; Minarik, supra note 154, at 1365-66, 1370; CONLAND,
supra note 280, at 37-38, 143-46, 164. Actually the Finance Committee's maximum rate
was 33 percent for the well-to-do due to the phase outs of the 15 percent bracket dropping
back to 28 percent for the rich, which triggered some Liberal opposition and an unsuccessful
call for a 33 percent rate on the wealthy as well.
349. Many conservatives criticized elimination of the individual capital gains preference.
E.g., 132 CONG. REC. at S 13868 (statement of Sen. Gorton) (capital gains preference since
1921; bothered by repeal without replacing with indexing basis for inflation); id. at S8164
(statement of Sen. Heflin) (since 1921 capital gains preference has a proven track record in
stimulating new enterprises and risk taking); id. at Sl3929 (1986) (statement of Sen.
Wicker) (since 1921 capital gains have always been taxed at lower rates to encourage
investments in capital assets recognizing the greater risks undertaken by one who invests in
the future and to avoid the unfairness of bunching. "Our system thrives on such risk-taking
and now we will upset all tradition in this country by telling investors they are no better off
investing in a risky start-up than simply putting their money in blue chips.").
350. 132 CONG. REC. at S 13784 (statement of Chair Packwood) (many witnesses willing
to give up their preferences if the maximum individual rates were in the range of 20 to 30
percent.).
351. 132 CONG. REC. at S 13917 (statement of Sen. Dominici) ("The overall structure of
the bill is to reduce the rates and broaden the tax base. Adding back deductions, rules or
credits would mean a rate increase-- this should be avoided.")
352. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, §§ 1, 301-02,100 Stat. 2085,2096,221718. A 5% rate applied above $71 ,900 to phase out the 15 percent bracket (thus the
maximum tax under this provision was 13% of the amount of income to which the 15
percent rate had applied. !d. § 1(g). See note 358 infra.
353. Kenneth Kies, The Current Political, Budgetary, and Tax Policy Environment
Suggests the Possibility of Major Federal Tax Legislation in the I OOth Congress, 35 TAX
NOTES 179, 183 (Apr. 13, 1987); see Lee, supra note 291, at 133 & n.352; see generally
CONLAND, supra note 280, at 3, 58, 78-9, 114.
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froze in place the recent erosion of effective rates at the top, 354 because
ordinary income and capital gains rates were lowered in 1981. The capital
gains income at the top increased during the leveraged buyout run on the
market, and was offset to some degree by the increase in the effective rate
of corporate income tax. Effective tax rates for the bottom 80 percent
concurrently increased, because the effective Social Insurance Tax Rate
and the Excise Tax Rate went up. 355 As in earlier years, the largest

354. 132 CONG. REC. at S 13899 (statement of Sen. Rockefeller) (great weakness is that it
provides yet another tax cut to the wealthiest Americans who have had their tax burden cut
by enormous amounts during the Reagan years.; accord Floyd Haskell, Tax Reform, 35 TAX
NOTES 301, 305 (1987); see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the AntiProgressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987)
(Tax Reform Act of 1986 took a large structural step away from progressivity towards a flat
tax.); 132 CONG. REC. at S13893 (statement of Sen. Kerry)("' am troubled by the fact that
the bill abandons our traditional commitment to a progressive rate structure in the Tax Code.
When added to the burden of payroll taxes, the two rates in this bill create what comes close
to a flat tax for all Americans, with effective rates that actually decline as income rises into
the range of the wealthy."); id. at S13939 (statement of Sen. Chiles) ("How fair is tax
reform when the average taxpayer earning between $30,000 and $40,000 receives a tax cut
of a couple hundred dollars when the most wealthy individual receives a tax cut of almost 3
grand? How fair is a tax system that taxes middle- and high-income households at the same
rate and, in fact, includes a higher marginal tax rate of 33 percent for upper-middle-income
individuals, while offering a lower 28-percent rate for the very wealthy?"); accord id. at
S13919 (statement of Sen. Sasser) (serious mistake and unfair to treat a person with
$30,000 taxable income the same a person with a taxable income of $200,000). By 1990,
the effective rate at the top had been raised back to 27 percent, CBO, 1997-2000 TAX RATES,
supra note 277, primarily due to repeal of the capital gains preference and the passive
activity loss limitations of Section 469.
355. 136 CONG. REC. at H8321 (statement of Rep. Downey) (171% increase in capital
gains income from 1978 to 1990). Compare with the table for 1982, supra note 273, with
the following Effective Federal Tax Rates for All Households by Household Income
Category 1985
Income Category

Total

Individual
Income
Tax

Social
Insurance
Tax

Corporate
Income
Tax

Excise
Tax

Lowest Quintile

9.8

0.5

6.6

0.6

2.2

Second Quintile

14.8

4.0

8.8

0.7

1.4

Middle Quintile

18.1

6.6

9.5

0.9

1.1

Fourth Quintile

20.4

8.8

9.6

1.0

0.9

Highest Quintile

24.0

14.0

6.5

2.8

0.7

May 2005]

THE CAPITAL GAINS "SEIVE"

79

category of net capital gains by dollar value was corporate stock (37.8
percent); followed by net capital gains from partnerships, S Corporations,
and trusts (23.2 percent); residential rental property (1 0.8 percent); and
depreciable property (9.2 percent). Meanwhile the percentage dollar value
of capital gains from livestock, timber and farmland was 1 percent or
less. 356 In 1985, joint returns reporting $200,000 or more reported 69
percent of the capital gains, and those reporting $100,000 to $200,000
reported 17 percent. 357
Distributional equity required curbing preferences concentrated in high
income taxpayers, especially capital gains and tax shelters, 358 to offset

All Quintiles

20.9

10.2

7.9

1.8

0.9

Top I 0 percent

24.7

15.4

5.1

3.6

0.6

Top 5 percent

25.4

16.7

3.7

4.5

0.5

Top I percent
27.0
18.9
CBO, I 997-2000 TAX RATES, supra note 277.

1.3

6.4

0.4

356. CBO, PERSPECTIVES ON OWNERSHIP, supra note I I 3, at 48 tbi.A-7; accord Auten &
Wilson, supra note 262, at I I 5. Slightly different percentages (stock, 42 percent); real
estate (26 percent); and passed through (I 9 percent) are contained in CBO, CAPITAL GAINS
TAXES, supra note 39, at 2 fig. I, but the overall pattern is the same.
357. !d. at 69 tbi.A-28.
358. Additionally, distributional equity required the "bubble" 33 percent rate on the near
rich and limitation on deduction of consumer interest, as well as eliminating the
deductibility of consumer interest and barring IRA's to upper middle and high income
taxpayers. Kies, supra note 353, at I 83. IRA's were used most exclusively by those with
incomes over $50,000, 131 CONG. REC. HI2816 (1985) (statement of Rep. Guarini).
Because individual capital gains realizations after I 987 were less than estimated in the Tax
Reform Act of I 986, some of the projected increase in individual progressivity did not come
about. Andrew Hoerner, Economists Examine Whether Progressivity Has Regressed, 56
TAX NOTES I 520 (Sept. 2 I, I 992).
On the corporate side the principal surrogate approach was a strengthened minimum
tax, but repeal of the Investment Tax Credit was the big revenue raiser. Lee, supra note
291, at 72 & n.52. Little if any of the corporate sector increases appeared either, with
annual corporate income tax revenues falling short by $20 to 30 billion. 1990 Senate
Hearings, supra note 295, at I (statement of Chair Bentsen). About 60 percent of the
shortfaii arose from since-changed errors in the Congressional Budget Office "model" and
lower than predicted corporate before tax profits due to higher than predicted wage and
salary and interest payments. !d. at 6 (statement of Harvey Rosen, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant
Sec'y for Tax Analysis, Treasury) and id. at I I -12 (statement of Robert Reischauer, Ph.D.,
CBO Director). The increase in interest payments possibly was less due to leveraged
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cutting the top nominal rate from 50 percent to 28 percent for the minority
of high income taxpayers without capital gains or tax shelters, thereby
dividing the rich. President Reagan's pre-condition of revenue neutralitl 59
meant that the 5 percent cut for each individual income class required an
equal revenue increase - $120 billion over the five year revenue
window360-and a much higher percentage increase on the capital intensive
(but not services) corporate side. This provoked strong criticism from
Senators of industrial, or wannabe industrial states, such as New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. 361
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the repeal of the capital gains
preference rested on a new "bi-partisan"362 coalition of Liberals363 favoring

buyout actiVIty and more due to high interest rates of the 1980s, but data was still
insufficient. !d. Forty percent of the short-fall was due to unexpectedly higher use of
Employee Stock Ownership Plans in the late 1980's and more use of partnerships and S
corporations as the form of business organization than projected. !d. at 11-12 (statement of
Reischauer). See 132 CONG. REC. at S 13926 (statement of Sen. Mathias) ("The proponents
claim that the bill is revenue neutral, that it will not increase or decrease revenues over the
next five years. I hope they are correct. Too many of the provisions designed to raise the
revenue being lost through rate reduction may not provide the revenue that has been
estimated through the static analysis used by the tax committees.")
359. CONLAND, supra note 280, at 51; BlRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 309.
360. John Waggoner, Sizing up Tax Reform; Tax Debate Centers on Fairness, USA
TODAY, Apr. 17, 1990, at B-1 ("Are businesses paying a bigger share? No. Congress meant
to make corporations pay a bigger share of the tax bill so individuals could pay less. It
hasn't worked out that way, though. One explanation: 'Although Congress tried to close
corporate tax loopholes, they left some,' says William Melton, senior financial economist
for IDS Financial Services in Minneapolis. 'And corporations have faster and better tax
lawyers than individuals do."').
361. E.g., 132 CONG. REC. at S 13926 (statement of Sen. Mathias) (Act requires the
manufacturing sector to finance tax reductions for the rest of the economy, i.e., individuals
and non-capital intensive corporations.); id. at S 13927 (statement of Sen. Hollings) (noting
that saddling corporate America with $120 billion in additional taxes over 6 years, while
also ending investment credits and preferential treatment of capital gains, is simply robbing
Peter to pay Paul; "[a]nd, more serious, it could impair the ability of our industry to achieve
price competitiveness in international markets."); id. at 13929 (statement of Sen. Weicker);
id. at S 13942-43 (statement of Sen. Heinz) (shift in part of tax burden from individuals to
corporations including elimination of capital gains will harm fragile economy).
362. E.g., id. at S13962 (1986) (Statement of Sen. Dole) ("[B]ipartisan from the startnonpartisan may be even a better word. We have had 2 or 3 years of discussion, and it has
been on the merits."); 131 CONG. REC. H12233 (1985) (statement of Rep. Bonior)) (bipartisan coalition underlay 1985 House bill); 132 CONG. REC. at S 13881 (statement of Sen.
Kasten).
363. 132 CONG. REC. at S13899 (statement of Sen. Jay Rockefeller, D-W.Va.) (stating
that the principal purpose is to improve equity by removing numerous special breaks and
privileges, most importantly restrictions on tax shelters and repeal of capital gains
preference, that cause the tax burdens of people with similar incomes and family
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the limitation of preferences, and Conservatives364 favoring the lowered
rates and equalized taxation of all income and among different kinds of
businesses. 365 Some Liberals also agreed with such equalized taxation. 366
However, as evidenced by the Senate debate on the Conference Bill on the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, some Members of Congress railed against
elimination of the individual capital gains preference, often identifying a
special interest of their particular state, such as farmers or ranchers as to
livestock, farm or ranch land, 367 timber, 368 real estate, small business or

circumstances to differ so greatly; also noting the perceptions that tax laws aren't fair have
done much to destroy public confidence in the system); accord id. at S 13867 (statement of
Sen. Gary Hart, 0-Col.).
364. !d. at S8132 (June 23, 1986) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa) (major
benefit is lower rates which will make the Tax Code less important in making economic
decisions); id. at S13918 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Steven Symms, R-Idaho)
("They move the Tax Code generally in a positive direction with respect to rates and the
policy of allowing the free market to control the flow of capital. I intend to oppose any
attempt in the future to raise the rates."); id. at S 13948 (statement of Sen. Alan Cranston, DCal.) ("The 1986 Tax Reform Act is progressive because it broadens the tax base by closing
loopholes and limiting deductions which advantage high income taxpayers. This increases
the tax burden on these taxpayers and makes it possible to reduce the tax burden on lower
income taxpayers. And it makes it possible to lower the rates for all individuals and
corporations."); id. at S13785 (Sept. 26, 1986) (statement of Sen. Fin. Comm. Chair
Packwood, R-Ore.) ("We tried to equalize the taxation among different kinds of income,
whether that income is capital gains or income from dividends or interest, or income earned
from the sweat of your brow as a wage earner working in the factory. We, by and large,
achieved that.").
365. See Boris Bittker, Tax Reform - Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 44 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 11, 14 (1987); EUGENE STEUERLE, THE TAX DECADE 90-92 (1992); Lee, supra note
291, at 137. The shape of this coalition was discernable as early as the mid-1950s. See
1955 Tax Policy Hearings, supra note 117, at 327 (statement of Dr. Butters). House Ways
and Means Chair Rostenkowski articulated the tax policies [undergirding this political
realignment] as "fairness and economic efficiency." 1990 House Hearings on Fairness,
supra note 339, at 5-6. For early 1990 analysis of economic efficiency from 1986 Act, see
id. at 247,254 (statements of Sen. Bill Bradley, 0-N.J., and Rep. Dick Gephardt, 0-Mo.).
366. 132 CONG. REC. at S13949 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Joseph Eiden, DOe!.) ("[T]his bill will also create a more efficient economy by greatly reducing tax
advantage as a consideration in economic decision-making. Investors will give more
thought to the economic value of their decisions, and less to achieving tax advantage. The
Federal Government will have a reduced role in 'managing' the economy.")
367. E.g., id. at S8132 (1986) (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley, R-Iowa) (supports
but has reservations as to elimination of preference as to farmland); id. at S 13934 (Sept. 27,
1986) (statement of Sen. Jeremiah Denton, R-AJa.) ("I am in favor of special tax treatment
for capital assets held for long periods of time such as the old family farm, small businesses
which have passed from generation to generation and timber which takes several decades to
mature. In times like these, some are having to sell the fruits of a lifetime to pay off debts.
To tax them at ordinary income rates is simply unfair. I am particularly concerned about
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start ups, 369 and rarely mentioned public stock (in the guise of concern for
capital formation, jobs, and international competitiveness). 370 Alternatively,
they criticized it for failing to account for inflation. 371
Senator Bob Dole noted that Congress now "knew a lot more about
how corporations and individuals avoid paying taxes on all of their
economic income," namely using preferences such as the special rate on
capital gains income. "We have had an opportunity to review and
reevaluate our priorities, and we have made the decisions we think are
appropriate. " 372 Surrey's goals of identifying tax preferences to lower rates
how the loss of this deduction will effect the timber industry and other capital intensive
industries."); id. at Sl3888 (statement of Sen. Howell Heflin, D-Ala.) (undecided but
opposed repeal of capital gains preference for livestock and timber).
368. !d. at Sl3927 (Sept 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Ernest Hollings, D-S.C.)
(discourage investment in timber and real estate.); id. at S13939 (statement of Sen. Mark. 0.
Hatfield, R-Ore.) (in favor of bill but, "elimination of capital gains for individuals and
corporations likely will have a serious impact on Oregon's Christmas tree farmers and small
woodlot owners"); id. at S 13875-76 (statement of Sen. Alan Dixon, D-Ill.) (family business,
small farm and timber); id. at S 13918 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Steven Symms, RIdaho) (elimination of capital gains preference together with repeal of rule that corporations
are not taxed on appreciation in assets distributed in liquidation or sold pursuant to timely
liquidation would have "devastating to a retiring small farmer").
369. !d. at S 13793 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Russell Long, D-La.) ("What are
we doing to the future of America? Venture capital where somebody is willing to take a
risk, somebody is willing to take a risk and put off instant payoff for the possibility of longterm reward-- so we repeal the capital gains differention [sic]. We tax everything the same.
We say, in effect, to our business people. 'Get something safe, get something that returns
money now. There is no special reason for you to make a long-term investment or take a
long-term" ... The effect of the repeal of the capital gains differential on stock options will
mean that it is much more difficult for a new company, a company that is starting up, to go
out and hire first-rate, experienced people. What do they have to offer the people? A risk
for nothing? Stock options that do not take advantage of the capital gains differential?"); id.
at Sl3929 (statement of Sen Lowell Weicker, R-Conn.) ("Lowering the top individual rate
from 50 percent to 28 percent and the top corporate rate from 46 percent to 34 percent
sounds good. But in the process of slashing the top rates, we're bulldozing over a
generation of deductions and credits many of which achieved important social and economic
goals .... [I]t will have devastating, perhaps even crippling effects on capital formation
especially for small business [start-ups]."); id. at 13919 (statement of Sen. Sasser, D-Tenn.)
(elimination threatens business start ups).
370. !d. at Sl3926 (Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Charles Mathias, D-Md.)
(elimination along with curtailment of capital recovery provisions "will result in less
investment, less productivity growth, and a further erosion of the American balance of
trade."); id. at Sl3927 (statement of Sen. Ernest Hollings, D-S.C.) (Elimination "will
discourage investment in vital industries such as timber and real estate .... But the good
outweighs the bad.").
371. !d. at S 13886 (statement of Sen. Tribble).
372. E.g., id. at S13962 (statement of Sen. Dole) ("[W]e retained some tax incentives in
the tax law that will reduce taxable income in some cases below real economic income.
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by base broadening had finally bore fruit. 373 Since the high ordinary rates
only existed "on paper" with progressivity "more apparent than real," 374 a
farce due to the capital gains sieve, the lowered top rates merely brought
the nominal top rates closer to the actual effective rates. Those rates had
however, recently fallen substantially at the top due to the 1981 ordinary
and capital gains income cuts, and substantial increase in capital gains
income at the top. 375 In short, the disparity between capital gains and
ordinary income rates was finally eliminated, but at a much lower meeting
point than the 50 percent envisioned by Surrey in the 1950's and 1960's.
Time would tell that lowering the ordinary rate, even halving it, did not
lessen the desire of special interests, or at least of some politicians, for a
That caused some concern about whether some corporations could escape tax, even under
the new rules. As a result, the Senate adopted a very stringent minimum tax .... We should
feel confident that we now have an 'escape-proof minimum tax."); id. at SI 393 I (statement
of Sen. Andrews) ("Our present Tax Code has evolved into a maze of tax deductions,
credits, and loopholes which have only helped the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.").
373. I 39 CONG. REC. S5985 (1993) (statement of Sen. Moynihan) ("It was Stanley
Surrey's particular fate that few of his ideas for tax reform ever were reaiiy adopted by the
Kennedy or the Johnson administrations in which he served. But two decades later, in I 984,
in the celebrated Treasury I proposal, it was pure, if I may coin the term, 'Surreyan.' Ail his
large ideas about cleaning the Tax Code, cleaning out the loopholes and the avoidances and
the ambiguities and circularities and getting rates down by broadening the base, there it
was."); CONLAND, supra note 280, at 22.
374. See 132 CONG. REC. at SI3889 (statement of Sen. Hart) ("current law's
progressivity is more apparent than real. We have high rates on paper, but the rich can
shelter, exclude, or exempt far more of their income than lower or middle income people.
Some estimates indicate that those who make more than $200,000 can now exempt as much
as half of it."); id. at SI391 !(statement of Sen. Boschwitz) ("[D]ual rates of 15 and 28
percent are just terrific. [A higher rate] would be fine if people in the higher rate and higher
incomes were paying them. But I think history shows if you are making over $200,000 that
indeed you know how to protect your tax situation, and people were not paying those
rates.").
375. The resultant true limitation of (individual) preferences described below finaiiy
reversed the pattern of tax reform from I 969-8 I. Each tax reform during this period had
taken the budget "surpluses" from bracket creep (inflation moving individuals into higher
brackets) (a) to give a baiiyhooed tax cut through rate reductions or more frequently raising
the rate breakpoint coupled with partiaiiy curbing some abuses, while (b) actuaiiy using the
greater portion of the bracket creep revenues to increase tax preferences primarily used by
high income individuals and corporations, whose effective rates feii while an ever
increasing portion of the revenue burden was borne by the middle class. William Greider,
The Tax Machine, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1978, at AI (describing process every two years in
1960s and 1970s of a bracket creep tax cut); Lee, supra note 291, at 128-33. Because only
the high income taxpayers had a substantial increase in real income from I 979 through
I 985, see supra note 355 and accompanying text, their share of the Federal income tax
burden during this period actuaiiy grew. See CBO, 1997-2000 TAX RATES, supra note 277,
app. B, at 22-24 tbl.2B.
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capital gains preference. A study of the capital gains preference in the
1920's and early 1930's would have predicted that. 376
The Conference and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 followed the Senate
repeal of the capital gain preference for individuals and corporations. 377
However, the 1986 Act left the capital gains and losses definitions in place
explicitly so that the preference could be simply restored if Congress
subsequently increased the ordinary rates. 378
IV. CONCLUSION

From enactment in 1921 until repeal in 1986, the individual capital
gains tax preference undercut the progressivity of the Federal income
system, thus violating vertical equity. With the advent of high income
taxpayers with large service income but small capital income, the
preference violated horizontal equity as well by favoring capital income
over services income. 379 All of the classic arguments in favor of the
individual capital gains preference are ill-founded with one possible
exception: offsetting for inflation? 80 Even there, the higher the taxpayer's
income the more on average that recognized capital gain was real or
. 381
economrc.
Why then has reform of the individual capital gains preference proven
so exceedingly difficult? Part of this difficulty is due to the influence of
high income taxpayers owning the majority of public stock in individual
hands on the political system to obtain special legislative privileges as
Populism would predict. 382 Another factor is the power of local special

376. 1932 House Hearings, supra note 52, at 41 (colloquy House Ways and Means Chair
J.W. Collier, 0-Miss., and Undersecretary of Treasury Mills) (repeal of 12Yz percent flat
capital gains rate when top surtax rate was 20 percent would still block transactions).
377. Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 301, I 00 Stat. at 2216.
378. I.R.C. § I (h) (2005). S. REP. No. 99-313, at 169 (1986). Some feared that this was
"Freudian slip because this fits hand in glove with what the chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee has been saying for some time, and that is we are going to have to have a
tax increase." 132 CONG. REC. at H9408 (statement of Rep. Swindall); id. at H9416
(statement of Rep. Gingrich).
379. E.g., text accompanying supra note 204.
380. See Lee, supra note 13, at 8-10.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 320-25.
382. Populism may be defined as distrust of aggregations of economic power because of
resulting ability to obtain special privileges. Lee, supra note 112, at 947; compare William
Julius Wilson, Rising Inequality and the Case for Coalition Politics, 568 ANNALS OF AM.
ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCIENCE 78 (Mar. 2000) ("Political power is disproportionately
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interests, other than large owners of public stock (who garner the bulk of
the benefits of the preference), such as timber, livestock, start ups and small
business in general. An underlying factor during the first period of the
capital gains preference is that the creation, and further substantial
increases in the capital gains preference in 1921,383 1938,384 1942,385
1978/ 86 and 1981,387 all coincided with a downturn in the economy and/or
in the stock market. Finally, proponents of a capital gains preference have
often cloaked their interest in public stock in more appealing garb, such as
the family farm or family residence.
The same political pressures that promoted an individual capital gains
preference also led within a dozen years after Tax Reform Act of 1969 to
the Conservative Coalition greatly weakening the individual capital gains
preference in the Revenue Act of 1978. Initially, 80 percent of the
individual minimum tax base consisted of the 50 percent capital gains
deduction. 388 After the Revenue Act of 1978 made the minimum tax
treatment of capital gains more generous, less than 10 percent of the
individual minimum tax reported involved capital gains. 389
Clearly most of the political pressure arises from any large gap
between the income tax rates applicable to ordinary income and to capital
gains. Only by eliminating this gap was the Tax Reform Act of 1986 able
to repeal the capital gains preference. Other potential approaches to
splitting the special interest groups from the wealthy holders of public
stock were not attempted during this era of the first capital gains

concentrated among the elite, most advantaged segments of society. The monetary, trade,
and tax policies of recent years have arisen from and, in tum, deepened this power
imbalance. And, although elite members of society have benefited, ordinary families have
fallen further behind."). A more nuanced political science analysis is that "[r]ather than
using coercive power, economic elites exercise power by controlling values and limiting the
scope of alternatives considered in public decisions (i.e., by limiting the definition of what is
politically possible). This control of the 'agenda,' which serves to limit the bounds of
government action, is not seriously opposed because of mass inculcation of capitalist
values." Geier, supra note 6, at 122. For an excellent illustration of such mass inculcation,
see William Blatt, The American Dream in Legislation: The Role of Popular Symbols in
Wealth Tax Policy, 51 TAX L. REV. 287 (1996).
383. See supra note 49.
384. See supra notes 62-39.
385. See supra note 101.
386. See supra notes 257, 261.
387. See supra note 301.
388. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 253.
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preference, such as providing more favorable capital gains rates for the
special interest groups 390 or modest income sellers of public stock, whose
gains are devalued by inflation, than for wealthy sellers, whose gains are
mostly real.

390. A stock exchange representative in the 1955 Mills Tax Policy Hearings facetiously
suggested:
I might suggest instead of having just one basket labeled "capital gains" and the
other with everybody subject to ordinary income rates, you might consider having
5 or I 0 baskets, each of them labeled different things, each of them carrying a
different rate, or as an alternative, may I suggest facetiously you might subject
everybody's income, by definition, to a capital-gains rate, then we can start all
over again. [Laughter.]
1955 Tax Policy Hearings, supra note 117, at 345-46 (statement of Jonathan Brown, New
York Stock Exchange).

